Technical corrections only. The diff reflects a procedural update as the bill moved from the House of Representatives to the Senate, with no changes to the legislative text. No substantive policy changes were made between v3 and v4.
Main Street Capital Access Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2]
- Committees
- Financial Services Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 22, 2026
Bottom line
The bill seeks to modernize and streamline banking regulation, particularly for smaller institutions, while enhancing oversight accountability and promoting competition and innovation in the financial sector.
What it actually does
This bill, the 'Main Street Capital Access Act,' proposes extensive reforms to federal banking laws across eight titles. It aims to promote new bank formation, tailor regulations for smaller institutions, enhance transparency and fairness in bank supervision, strengthen local bank funding, foster competition in mergers, improve bank resolution processes, and facilitate innovation and partnerships with fintech companies. Key provisions include streamlining application processes, adjusting regulatory thresholds, reforming the CAMELS rating system, establishing an independent examination review office, and modifying rules for reciprocal deposits and failing bank acquisitions.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the bill will reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens on community banks and credit unions, enabling them to better serve local communities and foster economic growth. They contend that streamlining new bank formation and merger processes will increase competition, while reforms to supervision will ensure fairness and transparency, preventing past abuses like 'Operation Choke Point.' Furthermore, proponents believe the bill will enhance financial stability by improving the discount window and bank resolution mechanisms, and promote innovation through support for fintech partnerships.
Opponents contend
Critics may contend that the bill's regulatory tailoring and reduced scrutiny for smaller institutions could weaken safety and soundness standards, potentially increasing systemic risk. Concerns might also be raised that changes to merger review processes could lead to increased market concentration, despite the bill's stated intent to promote competition. Opponents might also argue that limiting regulators' discretion, such as by restricting the use of 'reputational risk' or allowing federal court election for enforcement actions, could hinder effective oversight and consumer protection.
The bill is moderately long and highly technical, requiring significant time for a thorough understanding, especially given the extensive amendments to existing statutes and the numerous policy areas covered.
Title I, Sec. 101
Promoting New Bank Formation
This provision amends the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act to reduce the review period for new bank applications from 180 days to 90 days. Crucially, it makes the authorities for promoting new bank formation permanent unless federal banking agencies jointly determine, between January 1 and June 30, 2031, that these provisions have had a significant adverse effect on the safety and soundness of qualifying community banks. If such a determination is made, the authorities would only apply to banks established before that date.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that shortening the application timeline and making the program permanent will significantly encourage new bank formation, fostering competition and ensuring access to financial services in underserved areas. They believe the current process is too slow and creates unnecessary barriers to entry.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that reducing review periods could compromise the thoroughness of safety and soundness assessments, potentially allowing less stable institutions to enter the market. The permanence clause could also be seen as limiting future regulatory flexibility.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the desire to stimulate new bank formation and competition with the need to maintain robust safety and soundness standards for the financial system.
Title I, Sec. 104
CDFI Bond Guarantee Improvement
This section expresses a Sense of Congress regarding the importance of the CDFI Bond Guarantee Program. It then amends the Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1994 to increase the total amount of guarantees the Secretary of the Treasury may issue in any fiscal year from an unspecified amount (previously tied to outstanding principal balance) to $1,000,000,000. It also adjusts the guarantee fee to be between 10 and 15 basis points and extends the program's authority until December 31, 2028. A report on the program's effectiveness is mandated within 3 years.
Title II, Sec. 201
Tailoring Regulation to Business Model and Risk
This section mandates that all Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies (OCC, Fed, FDIC, NCUA, CFPB) must consider the risk profile and business models of different institutions when issuing new regulations. They are required to tailor regulatory actions to limit the impact (cost, human resources, other burdens) on institutions, proportionate to their risk. Agencies must also consider the aggregate effect of all regulations and the potential for third-party service providers to undermine tailoring efforts. Annual reports to Congress and a GAO report are required to evaluate compliance and effects.
Title II, Sec. 203 & 204
Tailoring and Indexing Enhanced Regulations & Community Bank Regulatory Tailoring
These sections require the Board of Governors, OCC, and FDIC to periodically adjust various statutory and regulatory asset and dollar thresholds in banking laws every 5 years (starting 2031 for Sec. 204, and 2026 for Sec. 203). These adjustments will be based on economic indicators like nominal U.S. GDP or the Consumer Price Index, selected by the agencies after a study. The goal is to ensure that regulatory thresholds remain relevant over time and account for inflation and economic growth, preventing smaller institutions from being inadvertently subjected to regulations intended for larger entities due to nominal asset growth.
Title III, Sec. 301
Amendments to the CAMELS Rating System and 'Well Managed' Definition
This section mandates the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to recommend amendments to the CAMELS rating system. The goal is to establish clear, reviewable criteria for each CAMELS component, revise factors to reflect material financial condition and risk profile more accurately, and limit the management component assessment to objective measures. It also ensures composite ratings consider compliance with AML/CFT laws and are based on a transparent methodology. Additionally, it amends the 'well managed' definition in the Bank Holding Company Act and Revised Statutes to remove subjective criteria, focusing solely on CAMEL ratings.
Title III, Sec. 302
Fair Audits and Inspections for Regulators' Exams
This section establishes deadlines for federal banking agencies to complete examinations (270 days) and provide final reports (90 days after exit interview or additional information). It creates an Office of Independent Examination Review within the FFIEC, led by a 3-member Board, to investigate complaints, review examination procedures, and conduct quality assurance. Crucially, it grants financial institutions the right to an independent review of material supervisory determinations by this Office, with a de novo standard of review. It also allows institutions to elect a hearing in an appropriate U.S. district court for certain enforcement actions, rather than before the agency.
Title III, Sec. 304
Financial Integrity and Regulation Management (Reputational Risk)
This section includes Congressional findings that reputational risk has been used improperly (e.g., 'Operation Choke Point') and does not contribute to safety and soundness. It defines 'reputational risk' and mandates each Federal banking agency to study its use in supervision. If an agency determines that removing reputational risk from supervision would not threaten safety and soundness, it must remove all references to it from guidance, rules, and examination manuals. Furthermore, such agencies would be prohibited from engaging in rulemaking, supervision, or enforcement activities related to reputational risk, except for unlawful transactions with state sponsors of terrorism or foreign terrorist organizations.
Title IV, Sec. 402
Stop Agency Fiat Enforcement of Guidance
This section requires nine specified financial agencies (including CFPB, HUD, Treasury, FDIC, FHFA, Federal Reserve, NCUA, OCC, SEC) to include a 'guidance clarity statement' prominently on the first page of any guidance they issue. This statement must explicitly state that the guidance 'does not have the force and effect of law and therefore does not establish any rights or obligations for any person and is not binding on the agency or the public.' It also clarifies that noncompliance with guidance does not conclusively establish a violation of applicable law.
Title V, Sec. 501
Bringing the Discount Window into the 21st Century
This section mandates the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to conduct a comprehensive review of the discount window lending programs within 240 days. The review must assess its effectiveness in providing liquidity, technology infrastructure, cybersecurity, inter-agency communication, oversight consistency, interaction with other liquidity providers, operating hours, impact of mobile banking on liquidity risk, and ways to reduce the stigma associated with its usage. Following the review, the Fed must develop a remediation plan for identified deficiencies and enhancements. Annual reports to Congress by the Fed and its Inspector General are required until the plan is fully implemented.
Title VI, Sec. 601
Bank Competition Modernization (Merger Review Exemption)
This section amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Bank Holding Company Act, and Home Owners' Loan Act to exempt certain merger transactions from specific competition reviews. Specifically, if a proposed merger results in an institution with less than $10,000,000,000 in assets and would not create a local monopoly (i.e., only one insured depository institution with a physical presence in any relevant metropolitan statistical area), the responsible agency shall not consider whether the merger would result in a monopoly or substantially lessen competition.
Title VI, Sec. 604
Bank Failure Prevention (Merger Application Deadlines)
This section imposes strict deadlines on federal banking agencies for approving applications related to bank holding company acquisitions, savings and loan holding company acquisitions, and insured depository institution mergers. For all such applications, agencies must grant or deny them within 120 days of initial submission, regardless of whether the record is deemed complete. If an agency fails to make a determination within this period, the application is automatically deemed granted. Agencies can extend the deadline by up to 30 days at the applicant's request. It also sets a 30-day (extendable to 60) period for agencies to notify applicants if their record is incomplete.
Title VII, Sec. 701
Least Cost Resolution Exception
This section amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to allow the FDIC, at its discretion, to select a bank resolution method that is not the least costly to the Deposit Insurance Fund. This exception is permissible if the FDIC and Federal Reserve, in consultation with the Treasury, determine that the additional risks to the Fund are outweighed by the benefits of limiting further concentration of the U.S. banking system in global systemically important banking organizations (GSIBs). The FDIC must establish criteria for a maximum allowable cost and ensure the selected alternative is the least costly among non-GSIB options and does not exceed liquidation cost. Any non-GSIB acquirer must pay an assessment to the Corporation over at least 5 years. A report to Congress is required for each such exception.
Title VIII, Sec. 803
Discretionary Surplus Fund Reduction
This provision reduces the dollar amount specified under section 7(a)(3)(A) of the Federal Reserve Act by $425,000,000. This reduction is slated to take effect on September 1, 2036. This section effectively reduces the amount of surplus funds held by the Federal Reserve that would otherwise be transferred to the Treasury.
This provision amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and Federal Credit Union Act to allow a depository institution or institution-affiliated party, when facing certain administrative enforcement actions (e.g., cease and desist orders, removal orders, civil money penalties), to elect a hearing before an appropriate United States district court instead of the relevant federal banking agency. The district court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate all claims and requested remedies.
Sec. 302(f)
Why it matters:This could be standard legislative practice for amending existing statutes, but the profound shift in enforcement forum choice could also be intentionally placed to receive less scrutiny than if it were a standalone, prominently featured provision, given its potential to fundamentally alter the balance of power in regulatory enforcement.
Case for: Proponents argue that allowing institutions to choose a federal court provides a more impartial and robust forum for due process, ensuring a fair hearing governed by established rules of evidence and civil procedure, rather than an administrative hearing before the agency bringing the charges. This protects institutions from potential agency bias.
Case against: Critics contend that shifting enforcement actions to federal courts could significantly delay resolutions, increase litigation costs for both agencies and institutions, and potentially lead to inconsistent judicial interpretations of complex banking regulations. They argue that administrative agencies possess specialized expertise better suited for these matters.
Estimated impact: This provision could lead to a substantial increase in federal court litigation involving banking enforcement actions and a corresponding decrease in administrative proceedings, with significant implications for the speed and consistency of regulatory enforcement.
This provision reduces the dollar amount specified under section 7(a)(3)(A) of the Federal Reserve Act by $425,000,000, effective September 1, 2036. This effectively reduces the amount of surplus funds held by the Federal Reserve that would otherwise be transferred to the U.S. Treasury.
Sec. 803
Why it matters:This is a classic example of a 'pay-for' or a budgetary maneuver. By placing it at the end of a comprehensive banking bill and giving it a distant effective date, it can be used to claim a fiscal offset without immediate political or budgetary consequences, potentially making the overall bill more palatable to fiscal conservatives.
Case for: Proponents might argue that this is a prudent fiscal measure, ensuring that excess funds held by the Federal Reserve are eventually accounted for in the federal budget, rather than remaining outside direct congressional appropriation or oversight. It could be framed as a responsible way to reduce the national debt or fund other priorities in the long term.
Case against: Critics might argue that this is a budgetary gimmick, as the fiscal impact is pushed so far into the future that it may never materialize or could be reversed by future Congresses. They might also contend that it could be seen as an encroachment on the Federal Reserve's financial independence, even if the amount is relatively small.
Estimated impact: A $425,000,000 reduction in future transfers from the Federal Reserve to the Treasury, effectively increasing the federal deficit or reducing future revenue by that amount, albeit with a significant delay.