Technical corrections only. The diff includes the specific name of the House Clerk and adds information about the bill's referral to the Senate. No substantive policy changes were made to the bill's text.
SHIELD Against CCP Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]
- Committees
- Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 11, 2025
Bottom line
The SHIELD Against CCP Act creates a dedicated DHS working group to centralize and enhance efforts to counter multifaceted threats from the Chinese Communist Party across various security domains.
What it actually does
This Act establishes a working group within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to counter various threats posed to the United States by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These threats include terrorism, cybersecurity, border and port security, and transportation security. The working group is tasked with assessing DHS efforts, identifying gaps, facilitating inter-component cooperation, and sharing information with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, while also mandating annual threat assessments and research and development into new technologies.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that a dedicated working group is essential to effectively address the growing and complex threats posed by the CCP to U.S. homeland security. They contend that the CCP exploits various vulnerabilities, from immigration systems to economic practices and illicit finance, necessitating a coordinated and focused response within DHS to protect national interests and critical infrastructure.
Opponents contend
Potential opponents might argue that existing DHS structures and interagency task forces are sufficient to address these threats, and creating a new working group could lead to duplication of effort, bureaucratic bloat, or inefficient resource allocation. They might also raise concerns about potential overreach or profiling if not carefully implemented, despite the bill's civil liberties protections.
The bill is concise and clearly structured, making it accessible for a reader to understand its core provisions within a short timeframe.
Section 2(a)
Establishment of the SHIELD Against CCP Working Group
This provision mandates the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a working group within DHS within 180 days of enactment. This group, led by a Director appointed by the Secretary, will focus on countering terrorist, cybersecurity, border and port security, and transportation security threats from the Chinese Communist Party. It also requires sufficient staffing, including a dedicated privacy compliance employee, and allows for detailees from the intelligence community or other federal agencies.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that a dedicated, centralized working group is crucial for a coherent and comprehensive strategy to address the diverse and evolving threats from the CCP, ensuring focused attention and resource allocation.
Critics contend
Critics might suggest that creating new entities can lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies and may not be the most effective way to address complex, cross-cutting threats that could be handled by existing interagency coordination mechanisms.
Tradeoffs
Balances the need for focused attention on CCP threats with concerns about potential bureaucratic expansion and duplication of existing efforts.
Section 2(b)
Comprehensive Assessment and Countering of CCP Threats
This section outlines the core responsibilities of the Working Group. It includes examining and reporting on DHS efforts to counter CCP threats related to immigration system exploitation (identity theft, visa processes, unlawful crossings, human smuggling/trafficking), predatory economic practices (counterfeit goods, forced labor, IP theft), support for fentanyl and illicit drug trafficking, and illicit financial activity by Chinese Money Laundering Organizations. The group must also account for dedicated DHS resources, review existing evaluations, identify policy gaps, and facilitate inter-component cooperation within DHS.
Section 2(c)
Enhanced Information Sharing with Partners
This provision mandates the Working Group, in coordination with the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, to review information on CCP threats gathered from Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners, including the National Network of Fusion Centers. It also requires the Working Group to disseminate relevant threat information back to these partners.
Section 2(d) and 2(f)
Regular Threat Assessments and Technology Development
Section 2(d) requires annual unclassified (with classified annex) reports for five years, assessing CCP threats and the Working Group's activities, submitted to appropriate congressional committees. Section 2(f) mandates DHS, in coordination with the Working Group Director and Under Secretary for Science and Technology, to conduct research and development (R&D) into technologies and techniques to enhance DHS's security and situational awareness against CCP threats.
Section 2(g) and 2(h)
Safeguards and Limited Duration
Section 2(g) explicitly states that all activities under this Act must comply with constitutional, privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections, and may not infringe upon lawful free speech. Section 2(h) establishes a sunset clause, terminating the Working Group seven years after its establishment.
Defines "United States person" by referencing section 1637(d)(10) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2015 (50 U.S.C. 1708(d)(10)). This definition is crucial because Section 2(g) states that the Working Group's activities "may not infringe upon the lawful exercise of free speech by United States persons."
Section 2(i)(5)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice for brevity and consistency across statutes, rather than evasiveness.
Case for: Ensures legal precision and consistency with existing definitions of protected individuals in national security contexts.
Case against: Requires external legal research for full comprehension, potentially obscuring the scope of civil liberties protections for a casual reader.
Estimated impact: Clarifies the scope of individuals whose free speech rights are explicitly protected under this Act, which is fundamental to its implementation.