Technical corrections only. The only change between v3 and v4 is the addition of the Clerk's name, "KEVIN F. MCCUMBER," in the attestation at the end of the bill. There are no substantive policy changes to the legislative text.
SECURE Grid Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Latta, Robert E. [R-OH-5]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 30, 2026
Bottom line
The bill requires states to integrate local grid security and resilience into their energy planning, aiming to bolster national energy infrastructure against diverse threats with guaranteed federal support.
What it actually does
This bill amends the Energy Policy and Conservation Act to mandate that states include the physical security, cybersecurity, and resilience of local energy distribution systems in their State energy security plans. It expands the scope of potential hazards to address supply chain risks for electricity equipment and clarifies that federal assistance for these plans is mandatory, not discretionary.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that strengthening local distribution systems is crucial for overall grid resilience, especially given increasing threats from cyberattacks, physical attacks, and extreme weather. They contend that including these systems in state plans will lead to more comprehensive risk mitigation and better preparedness, protecting communities and critical services.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that this mandate imposes an unfunded burden on states, potentially diverting resources from other critical state priorities, despite the provision for mandatory federal assistance. They might also raise concerns about federal overreach into state-level energy planning or the practical challenges of securing highly distributed local infrastructure.
The bill is concise and can be read and understood quickly, allowing ample time for informed evaluation.
Section 2(1), amending Section 366(a) of EPCA
Defines 'Local distribution system'
This provision adds a new definition to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, specifying that a 'local distribution system' refers to any energy infrastructure owned and operated by an electric utility at a voltage of 100 kilovolts or less. This clarifies the specific scope of infrastructure that states must consider in their energy security plans.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a clear definition is essential for states to accurately identify and address the specific infrastructure components that fall under the new security planning requirements, ensuring consistent application across jurisdictions.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against definitional provisions that clarify scope, unless the definition itself is seen as overly broad or narrow.
Tradeoffs
The tension lies in defining the boundary between local and bulk-power systems, ensuring that the definition captures relevant infrastructure without imposing undue burdens on very small-scale systems.
Section 2(2), amending Section 366(b)(2) of EPCA
Includes equipment suppliers in state plan consultations
This amendment requires states, when developing their energy security plans, to consult not only with owners and operators of energy infrastructure but also with 'suppliers of equipment for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity.' This broadens the range of expertise and perspectives included in the planning process.
Section 2(3)(A), amending Section 366(c)(3) of EPCA
Expands required threat assessment for state plans
This provision significantly expands the types of hazards that State energy security plans must address. It explicitly requires plans to cover physical threats (including weather, physical attacks on local distribution and bulk-power systems), supply chain risks for electricity equipment, and cybersecurity threats (including those to local distribution systems that could impact the bulk-power system).
Section 2(3)(B), amending Section 366(c)(5) of EPCA
Requires risk mitigation for reliability and end-use resilience
This amendment requires state energy security plans to provide a risk mitigation approach aimed at enhancing reliability and 'end-use resilience.' This includes methods for responding to, mitigating, and recovering from the potential hazards identified in the expanded threat assessment.
Section 2(4), amending Section 366(d)(3) of EPCA
Explicitly includes equipment suppliers in federal assistance scope
This provision clarifies that federal financial assistance provided to states for energy security planning can also be used for activities related to 'supplying equipment for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity.' This aligns with the earlier provision requiring consultation with equipment suppliers.
Section 2(5)(D), adding new Section 366(e)(2) of EPCA
State energy security plans not subject to Secretary of Energy approval
This new subsection explicitly states that a State's submission of its energy security plan is 'not required to be approved by the Secretary' of Energy. This maintains state autonomy in developing and implementing their plans, even as federal requirements for content are expanded.
Section 2(6), amending Section 366(f) of EPCA
Changes federal assistance from 'may' to 'shall'
This amendment changes the discretionary language ('may') to mandatory language ('shall') regarding the Secretary of Energy providing technical and financial assistance to states for developing and implementing their energy security plans. This ensures states receive necessary support to meet the new requirements.
Section 2(8), amending Section 366(i) of EPCA
Establishes a sunset date for the section
This provision replaces the existing sunset clause, stating that Section 366 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (which governs State energy security plans) shall expire on September 30, 2031. This sets a definite end date for the federal mandate and associated assistance.
Section 3
Mandates a GAO report on State energy security plans
This section requires the Comptroller General to submit a report to Congress by September 30, 2030, evaluating the efficacy of State energy security plans. The report must include an assessment of how plans have improved risk mitigation, recommendations for improvement, information on federal financial assistance use, and an analysis of the efficacy of the amendments made by this Act.
Changes the word 'may' to 'shall' regarding the Secretary of Energy providing technical and financial assistance to States for energy security plans.
Section 2(6), amending Section 366(f) of EPCA
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for modifying existing statutory language. It's not necessarily evasive but requires careful reading to catch the shift in federal obligation.
Case for: Supporters argue this ensures states receive guaranteed support to meet the expanded federal mandates, preventing resource-constrained states from falling behind.
Case against: Critics might argue it reduces the Department of Energy's flexibility to prioritize assistance based on evolving needs or performance, potentially leading to less efficient resource allocation.
Estimated impact: Shifts federal assistance from discretionary to mandatory, potentially increasing federal outlays for state energy security programs, though specific amounts are not stated in the bill.
Requires states to consult with 'suppliers of equipment for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity' when developing plans and makes activities related to these suppliers eligible for federal assistance.
Section 2(2) and Section 2(4)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for expanding the scope of existing requirements. It's not necessarily evasive but requires attention to detail.
Case for: Proponents argue this is crucial for addressing supply chain vulnerabilities, bringing essential expertise to state planning and allowing federal funds to support broader resilience efforts.
Case against: Some might argue it adds administrative complexity for states and potentially expands the scope of federal involvement into private sector supply chains without clear boundaries.
Estimated impact: Broadens the scope of state planning and federal assistance, potentially leading to more robust supply chain security measures.