FREEDOM Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Harder, Josh [D-CA-9]
- Committees
- Agriculture Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 20, 2026
Bottom line
The FREEDOM Act aims to accelerate energy and mineral project development by reducing regulatory uncertainty, imposing strict timelines on federal agencies, and providing financial recourse for project delays or permit revocations.
What it actually does
This bill amends several energy and mineral leasing acts to significantly streamline federal permitting processes for energy, carbon capture, and mineral projects. It establishes strict deadlines for agency authorizations, creates a compensation program for project sponsors who incur losses due to agency delays or revocations, and limits federal agencies' ability to halt or revoke permits for 'fully permitted projects.' The bill also introduces expedited judicial review for permitting disputes and restricts the scope of injunctive relief for third-party challenges.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the current federal permitting system is plagued by delays and uncertainty, leading to catastrophic financial losses for energy projects, deterring critical infrastructure investment, and undermining U.S. energy security and economic competitiveness. They contend that this bill will reduce the cost of building energy and mineral infrastructure, thereby lowering costs for American families and businesses, and ensuring a more reliable energy supply.
Opponents contend
Opponents would likely argue that the bill severely curtails essential environmental reviews and public participation, potentially leading to increased environmental damage and reduced public health protections. They may also contend that the compensation program creates a moral hazard, shifting financial risks from private developers to taxpayers, and that limiting agency discretion and judicial remedies undermines critical checks and balances.
The bill is moderately long and technically dense, requiring significant time to understand its full implications, especially for those unfamiliar with administrative law and energy permitting processes.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle A, Sec. 12001(4)
Definition of 'Covered Energy Project'
This provision broadly defines 'covered energy project' to include activities involving the construction of infrastructure for developing, producing, generating, storing, transporting, or distributing energy; capturing, removing, transporting, or storing carbon dioxide; or mining, extracting, beneficiating, or processing minerals. This broad scope ensures the bill's streamlining provisions apply to a wide range of projects.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a broad definition is necessary to address permitting delays across all critical energy and mineral sectors, ensuring comprehensive regulatory relief and promoting investment in diverse technologies essential for national security and economic growth.
Critics contend
Critics might contend that such a broad definition risks applying a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to projects with vastly different environmental footprints and regulatory complexities, potentially leading to inadequate review for certain sensitive projects.
Tradeoffs
The tension lies between providing comprehensive regulatory relief to a wide range of industries and ensuring that the specific environmental and social considerations of diverse project types are adequately addressed within the streamlined framework.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle B, Sec. 12101(c)
Categorical Exclusions for Low-Disturbance Activities
This provision requires the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture to develop or adopt categorical exclusions under NEPA for 'low-disturbance activities' necessary for eligible projects. These activities include individual surface disturbances of less than 5 acres, activities on previously disturbed land, maintenance, preliminary geotechnical investigations, and meteorological tower construction/removal. This aims to fast-track environmental reviews for minor project components.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle C, Sec. 12202-12205
De-Risking Compensation Program Establishment
This subtitle establishes a De-Risking Compensation Program within the Department of Energy to provide compensation to project sponsors for 'unrecoverable losses' suffered due to specific agency actions, inactions, or delays. Triggering events include permit revocations, missed deadlines, or unreasonable delays that render a project unviable. Claims are heard by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and compensation is paid from a dedicated fund supported by project sponsor premiums and appropriations.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle D, Sec. 12302
Enforceable Authorization Deadlines
This provision establishes strict deadlines for federal agencies to issue final decisions on authorizations for covered energy projects: 90 days for 'routine authorizations' and 1 year for 'complex authorizations' (or 2 years if an Environmental Impact Statement is required). Failure to meet these deadlines is considered a final agency action that can be challenged in court as 'unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,' subject to limited exceptions.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle D, Sec. 12303
Reviewing Court-Approved Contractors
If an agency fails to meet a deadline, a reviewing court may authorize the project sponsor to hire a qualified contractor to complete necessary analyses or documentation. These contractors operate under agency technical guidance but maintain independence, and their work product is deemed received by the agency and included in the administrative record. The costs of these contractors are paid by the relevant lead agency from the Permitting Performance Fund, with provisions for project sponsor reimbursement for advance payments.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle E, Sec. 12404(c)
Civil Penalties for Agency Noncompliance
This provision mandates that a reviewing court assess a civil penalty against any agency found to have failed to comply with a court-ordered schedule or deadline. Penalties range from $1,000 to $100,000 per day of noncompliance, payable only from the agency's unobligated general management account. These collected penalties are deposited into the Permitting Performance Fund.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle E, Sec. 12405(d)
Limited Vacatur and Injunctive Relief for Third-Party Challenges
For civil actions brought by persons other than project sponsors (e.g., environmental groups) challenging complex authorizations, courts are significantly limited in their ability to vacate or enjoin agency actions. A court may only vacate or enjoin if it finds 'specific, imminent, and irreparable environmental harm' that cannot be reasonably avoided or mitigated through narrower relief, additional mitigation, or expedited correction of deficiencies.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle F, Sec. 12501
Limitations on Agency Actions Against Fully Permitted Projects
This section prohibits federal agencies or officials from issuing orders to terminate construction or operation, revoking permits, or taking other actions to halt, suspend, delay, or terminate 'fully permitted projects' (those with a substantial majority of authorizations). Such actions are only allowed if there is a 'clear, immediate, and substantiated harm' with no other viable alternative, or if an authorization is illegal and the action is the only remedy. It also prevents agencies from petitioning a court for voluntary remand of an authorization without the project sponsor's consent.
Section 4(a)(1)
Annual Geothermal Leasing and Replacement Sales
This provision amends the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 to require the Secretary of the Interior to conduct geothermal lease sales annually, rather than every two years. Furthermore, if a lease sale is cancelled or delayed, the Secretary must conduct a replacement sale within 180 days, and that replacement sale cannot be cancelled or delayed.
Section 4(b)(1) & (2)
Permitting Compliance on Non-Federal Land for Oil & Gas and Geothermal
These provisions exempt certain oil and gas and geothermal activities on non-Federal surface estates from Federal drilling permit requirements. This applies when the Federal Government owns less than 50% of the minerals (oil/gas) or subsurface geothermal estate, and does not own or lease the surface estate. Instead, State or Tribal permits are relied upon, with requirements for lessees to notify the Secretary of Interior and provide access for inspection and enforcement of Federal lease terms. These provisions do not apply to Indian lands.
This provision allows for judicial review of a lead agency's designation of an authorization as a 'complex authorization' if the designation is made based on project-specific factors not explicitly listed in the bill.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle D, Sec. 12301(d)(3)(B)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for defining the scope of judicial review, but its placement might obscure its significance in allowing challenges to agency classifications that directly impact project timelines.
Case for: Supporters would argue this ensures agencies cannot arbitrarily classify authorizations as 'complex' to extend deadlines without proper justification, providing an important check on agency discretion.
Case against: Critics might argue that allowing judicial review of such designations could introduce another layer of litigation and delay, undermining the bill's goal of streamlining processes.
Estimated impact: Provides a specific avenue for project sponsors to challenge agency decisions that could prolong permitting timelines, potentially leading to more efficient classification of authorizations.
This provision significantly limits the ability of courts to vacate or enjoin all or part of a final agency action in civil actions brought by third parties (non-project sponsors) challenging complex authorizations. Such relief is only available if there is 'specific, imminent, and irreparable environmental harm' that cannot be avoided or mitigated by narrower relief.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle E, Sec. 12405(d)
Why it matters:This is a substantively consequential change to judicial remedies, often phrased in technical legal language. Its placement might be intended to make it less conspicuous than if it were in a section explicitly titled 'Limits on Environmental Lawsuits.'
Case for: Proponents argue this prevents environmental lawsuits from being used as a tool for indefinite project delays, ensuring that only truly catastrophic and unmitigable harms can halt projects that have already undergone extensive review.
Case against: Critics contend this provision severely weakens judicial oversight and environmental protection, making it nearly impossible for courts to stop projects that are found to be illegal or environmentally damaging, even if the harm is substantial but not 'imminent and irreparable' in a narrow legal sense.
Estimated impact: This provision could drastically reduce the effectiveness of environmental litigation in halting or significantly altering energy and mineral projects, shifting the balance of power towards project developers.
This provision prohibits any agency from petitioning a court for voluntary remand of an authorization for a 'fully permitted project' (one that has received a record of decision) unless the project sponsor consents to the petition.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle F, Sec. 12501(c)
Why it matters:This is a technical legal constraint on agency discretion. Its placement might be intended to be less conspicuous than if it were a standalone section, despite its significant policy implications.
Case for: Proponents argue this prevents agencies from unilaterally reopening settled decisions, which can lead to indefinite delays and regulatory uncertainty for projects that have already secured all necessary approvals.
Case against: Critics contend this provision severely limits an agency's ability to correct errors, adapt to new information, or address unforeseen environmental or safety concerns that may arise after a project is permitted, even if the agency itself identifies a need for further review.
Estimated impact: Significantly reduces agencies' flexibility to revisit or correct past permitting decisions for major projects, even if new information or legal interpretations suggest a need for re-evaluation.
This provision mandates the Secretary of the Treasury to transfer funds from the general management account of any agency found liable for an unreasonable delay to the Permitting Performance Fund. The amount transferred is proportional to the agency's 'covered workload' relative to all agencies.
Section 3, Title XII, Subtitle D, Sec. 12304(c)
Why it matters:This is a highly impactful financial accountability mechanism, but its technical nature and placement within funding details might make it less obvious to a casual reader than a direct statement about agency penalties.
Case for: Proponents argue this provides a direct and powerful financial incentive for agencies to adhere to permitting timelines, ensuring that the costs of delays are borne by the responsible agencies rather than project sponsors or taxpayers.
Case against: Critics might contend that this could severely deplete agency operating budgets, particularly for smaller agencies, potentially impairing their ability to perform other critical functions or even conduct thorough reviews in the future, creating a perverse incentive to rush decisions.
Estimated impact: Establishes a direct financial penalty mechanism for agencies that cause unreasonable delays, potentially leading to significant transfers of funds from agency operating budgets.