ICE Out of Our Faces Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Jayapal, Pramila [D-WA-7]
- Committees
- Homeland Security Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Feb 5, 2026
Bottom line
The bill enacts a comprehensive ban on biometric surveillance by ICE and CBP within the U.S., aiming to enhance privacy and civil liberties by restricting federal immigration enforcement tools.
What it actually does
This bill, titled the 'ICE Out of Our Faces Act,' prohibits U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) from acquiring, possessing, accessing, or using biometric surveillance systems or information derived from them within the United States. It mandates the deletion of all such previously collected data within 30 days of enactment and establishes a private right of action for individuals harmed by violations, allowing for damages and injunctive relief.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that biometric surveillance technologies, particularly facial recognition, pose significant threats to civil liberties, privacy, and can lead to discriminatory practices and mass surveillance. They contend that a prohibition is necessary to prevent potential abuses by immigration enforcement agencies and to protect individuals from pervasive government tracking without adequate oversight or consent.
Opponents contend
Opponents would likely argue that these technologies are crucial tools for national security, border protection, and effective immigration enforcement, enabling agencies to identify individuals, prevent illegal activities, and manage complex operational environments. They might assert that a blanket ban would severely hamper the ability of ICE and CBP to carry out their missions, potentially compromising public safety and national security.
The bill is short and clearly written, making it accessible for a quick and informed evaluation by any interested reader.
Section 2
Definitions of Biometric Surveillance and Covered Officers
This section defines key terms such as 'biometric surveillance system' (computer software for facial or other biometric recognition in real-time or on recordings), 'facial recognition' (automated processes for identification or inferring characteristics from faces), and 'covered immigration officer' (personnel from CBP, ICE, or those deputized under 8 U.S.C. 1357(g)). It also defines 'other biometric recognition' to include gait and voice recognition, specifically excluding fingerprints or palm prints not ascertained from a distance.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that clear and comprehensive definitions are essential to prevent agencies from circumventing the intent of the law by using similar, but technically different, surveillance technologies. The specific exclusion of certain biometric data (like non-remote fingerprints) clarifies the bill's focus on more intrusive, distance-based surveillance.
Critics contend
Opponents might contend that overly broad definitions of 'biometric surveillance' could inadvertently restrict legitimate and necessary law enforcement tools, or that the specific carve-outs create loopholes that could be exploited, leading to an inconsistent application of the law.
Tradeoffs
The definitions balance the desire for comprehensive privacy protection with the need to clearly delineate what is prohibited, avoiding ambiguity that could lead to either overreach or under-enforcement. The tension lies in ensuring the definitions are broad enough to be effective without being so expansive as to hinder unrelated, non-intrusive identification methods.
Section 3(a)
Prohibition on Biometric Surveillance Use by ICE and CBP
This provision makes it unlawful for any covered immigration officer to acquire, possess, access, or use any biometric surveillance system or information derived from such a system operated by another entity, specifically within the United States. This creates a direct and comprehensive ban on the use of these technologies by ICE and CBP personnel in domestic operations.
Section 3(b)
Mandated Biometric Data Deletion
This subsection requires that all information collected by a covered immigration officer for use in, or derived from, a biometric surveillance system, including data collected before the date of the bill's enactment, must be deleted within 30 days of the Act's effective date. This ensures that not only future use but also past data collection is addressed.
Section 3(c)(1)
Exclusionary Rule for Illegally Obtained Biometric Evidence
This subsection establishes that any information obtained by the Federal Government in violation of this Act is not admissible as evidence in any criminal, civil, administrative, or other investigation or proceeding. An exception is made for judicial investigations or proceedings specifically alleging a violation of this section, allowing such evidence to be used to prove the violation itself.
Section 3(c)(2)
Private Right of Action and State Enforcement
This subsection establishes that a violation of the Act constitutes an injury, granting aggrieved individuals the right to sue the Federal Government for relief. It also empowers State Attorneys General to bring civil actions on behalf of their residents. Successful plaintiffs can be awarded actual damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and injunctive relief.
Section 3(d)
Civil Penalties for Violating Officers
This subsection specifies that any covered immigration officer who violates the Act may be subject to various disciplinary actions, including retraining, suspension, or termination, as determined in an appropriate tribunal and subject to applicable due process requirements. This provision aims to hold individual officers accountable for non-compliance.
The definition of 'other biometric recognition' explicitly states it 'does not include identification based on fingerprints or palm prints not ascertained from a distance.'
Section 2(4)(B)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to precisely define the scope of a prohibition, clarifying what is *not* covered to avoid unintended consequences or overreach.
Case for: Proponents would argue this carve-out is necessary to allow for traditional, less intrusive biometric identification methods (like fingerprinting at a station) that are widely accepted and distinct from the mass surveillance concerns associated with remote biometric recognition.
Case against: Critics might argue that any biometric data collection carries privacy risks, and this carve-out could be seen as a potential loophole, though the 'not ascertained from a distance' clause significantly limits its scope.
Estimated impact: This carve-out ensures that established, non-remote fingerprint and palm print collection methods, commonly used in law enforcement and immigration processing, remain permissible, preventing a broader disruption to existing identification protocols.
The prohibition on biometric surveillance is explicitly limited to use 'in the United States.'
Section 3(a)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to define the jurisdictional scope of a law, clarifying where the prohibition applies.
Case for: Proponents would argue that focusing the prohibition within the U.S. addresses the most pressing civil liberties concerns for residents and visitors on U.S. soil, while acknowledging that different legal frameworks might apply to operations outside the country.
Case against: Critics might argue that this limitation creates a loophole, allowing ICE and CBP to continue using or acquiring biometric surveillance systems for operations conducted outside the U.S., potentially impacting individuals who may later enter the country or be subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
Estimated impact: This limitation means the bill does not restrict ICE or CBP's use of biometric surveillance for operations conducted entirely outside the geographical boundaries of the United States, such as international intelligence gathering or operations in foreign countries.