Put America on Commission Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
- Committees
- Small Business Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Feb 20, 2026
Bottom line
The bill incentivizes the reporting of COVID-related small business loan fraud by offering financial awards to whistleblowers and establishing a dedicated SBA office and fund to facilitate fraud recovery.
What it actually does
This bill amends the Small Business Act to establish an Office of Whistleblower Awards within the Small Business Administration (SBA). This office is tasked with administering a program to pay financial awards to individuals who provide original information leading to convictions or settlements related to COVID loan fraud. It also creates a dedicated Whistleblower Award Fund and imposes a new civil monetary penalty on those found guilty of such fraud.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill is a critical tool for recovering billions of dollars in taxpayer money lost to widespread COVID loan fraud. They contend that leveraging private citizens with insider knowledge, through financial incentives, is an effective way to uncover complex financial misconduct that might otherwise go undetected, thereby enhancing accountability and deterring future fraud.
Opponents contend
Opponents might raise concerns about the potential for an increase in frivolous or low-quality whistleblower claims, which could burden the SBA and Inspector General's resources. Some might also argue that the creation of a new office adds unnecessary bureaucracy, or that existing fraud detection and enforcement mechanisms are sufficient without establishing a new, incentivized program.
The bill is relatively concise and its core provisions are clearly articulated, making it accessible for a reader to understand its main intent and mechanisms within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2, amending Small Business Act, new Section 49(a)-(b)
Establishment of Office of Whistleblower Awards
This provision creates a new Office of Whistleblower Awards within the Small Business Administration's Office of Performance, Planning, and the Chief Financial Officer. This office will be managed by a competitive service employee and will be responsible for administering the whistleblower program established by the bill.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a dedicated office is essential for effectively managing whistleblower submissions, coordinating with the Inspector General, and ensuring timely processing of awards, thereby maximizing fraud recovery efforts.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that creating a new office adds bureaucratic overhead and that existing Inspector General offices could absorb these functions without establishing a separate entity.
Tradeoffs
The tension is between creating a dedicated, specialized unit for efficiency and avoiding redundant bureaucratic structures within the federal government.
Section 2, amending Small Business Act, new Section 49(c)
Whistleblower Award Payments and Criteria
This section outlines the core function of the new office: to pay awards to whistleblowers. Awards are granted for original information leading to convictions or settlements in 'COVID loan actions.' The award amount is 10% of collected funds for U.S. nationals/entities and 15% for foreign nationals/entities, paid from a dedicated fund. It also specifies that in cases of multiple whistleblowers, only the one making the most substantial contribution receives the award.
Section 2, amending Small Business Act, new Section 49(d)(6)
Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Protections
This provision prohibits discrimination or other prejudicial actions against individuals who make, are perceived as about to make, or assist in making a disclosure under this section. It grants individuals who experience such retaliation the right to seek relief using the rights, procedures, burdens of proof, and remedies outlined in section 5323(g) of title 31, United States Code.
Section 2, amending Small Business Act, new Section 49(f)
Establishment and Use of Whistleblower Award Fund
This section establishes a revolving 'Whistleblower Award Fund' in the Department of the Treasury. This fund will be used to pay whistleblower awards and cover the operating expenses of the Office of Whistleblower Awards. All amounts collected from persons convicted or settling in COVID loan actions, including civil monetary penalties, will be deposited into this fund. Any remaining amounts not used for awards or expenses will be deposited into the general fund of the Treasury.
Section 2, amending Small Business Act, new Section 49(g)
New Civil Monetary Penalty for COVID Loan Fraud
This provision imposes a new civil monetary penalty on any person finally convicted or entering a settlement/plea agreement related to a COVID loan action. The penalty is 30% of the aggregate principal amounts of the loans involved in the fraud. The Administrator of the SBA is responsible for assessing and collecting these penalties, which are then deposited into the Whistleblower Award Fund.
Defines 'original information' as information derived from independent knowledge or analysis, not previously known to the Administrator or Inspector General (unless the whistleblower is the original source), not exclusively from public allegations (unless the whistleblower is a source), and crucially, provided *after* the enactment date or by means other than a general fraud hotline.
Section 2, amending Small Business Act, new Section 49(k)(4)
Why it matters:While standard legislative practice to define terms at the end, the specific criteria for 'originality' are fundamental to eligibility and could be easily missed, particularly the exclusion of information provided via general hotlines.
Case for: Supporters argue that a strict definition of 'original information' is necessary to ensure that awards are only given for genuinely new and valuable intelligence, preventing individuals from simply reporting publicly available information or information already under investigation.
Case against: Critics might argue that the definition could be too restrictive, potentially excluding valuable information that is partially known or that whistleblowers might have learned through channels that are not strictly 'independent' but still contribute to fraud detection. The exclusion of hotline reports might also be seen as counterintuitive.
Estimated impact: Directly impacts the eligibility of all potential whistleblowers, determining who can receive awards and thus the effectiveness of the incentive structure.
The authority under this section terminates on the date the last 'COVID loan action' that was timely filed is finally resolved (conviction unappealable or appeals process completed). However, authority continues for award claims that are being appealed or are appealable at that time.
Section 2, amending Small Business Act, new Section 49(j)
Why it matters:While a sunset clause is common, its specific trigger tied to the *last* COVID loan action resolution means the program could persist for many years, which might be a point of contention if it were more prominently featured.
Case for: Proponents would argue that the sunset clause ensures the program is temporary and focused specifically on COVID loan fraud, preventing it from becoming a permanent fixture beyond its intended scope.
Case against: Critics might argue that tying the sunset to the *last* action makes the termination date highly uncertain and potentially very distant, effectively making it a long-term program for an issue that should be resolved more quickly.
Estimated impact: Determines the ultimate duration of the Office of Whistleblower Awards and the Whistleblower Award Fund, potentially extending their operation for decades depending on the pace of legal resolutions.
Mandates that the Administrator issue rules requiring the Inspector General (IG) to indicate if original information was the basis, in whole or in part, of a COVID loan action. Crucially, if the IG indicates that this cannot be disclosed, the information is *deemed* to have not been the basis for the action.
Section 3(b) (Rulemaking for Contribution Determination)
Why it matters:It's a procedural detail regarding how the IG's input is formalized, but it has significant implications for whistleblowers. The 'deemed not to be the basis' clause is a critical legal nuance that could affect award outcomes.
Case for: Supporters would argue this provides a clear process for integrating the IG's expertise into the award determination, while the 'deemed not to be the basis' clause protects sensitive investigative information from disclosure.
Case against: Critics might argue that the 'deemed not to be the basis' clause could unfairly disadvantage whistleblowers if the IG's inability to disclose is due to administrative reasons rather than the information's actual lack of contribution, potentially reducing transparency and trust in the process.
Estimated impact: Directly affects the success rate of whistleblower claims, as the IG's determination is central to whether an award is paid.