STEADFAST Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Bice, Stephanie I. [R-OK-5]
- Committees
- Committee on House Administration (primary)
- Last action
- May 14, 2026
Bottom line
The STEADFAST Act redirects federal election funding from presidential campaigns to state election security efforts, with a strong emphasis on specific security measures and voter identification requirements.
What it actually does
This bill, the Securing Tech and Election Administration Defenses For All States and Territories Act (STEADFAST Act), converts the existing public financing program for presidential election campaigns into a new program providing grants to states for election system security. It establishes an "Election Security Fund" funded by taxpayer designations (replacing the Presidential Election Campaign Fund check-off) and general fund appropriations. States can use these grants for voting equipment, cybersecurity, and physical security, but not for general election administrator training or litigation. Priority for funding is given to states that use paper ballots, verify citizenship for voter registration, and require specific photo identification at polling places.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue this bill addresses critical vulnerabilities in election infrastructure by redirecting funds from an underutilized presidential campaign financing system to tangible security enhancements. They contend that focusing on secure voting equipment, robust cybersecurity, and strict voter ID requirements will bolster public confidence in election integrity and prevent fraud, particularly by ensuring only eligible citizens vote.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that tying election security grants to specific state-level policies, such as photo ID laws and citizenship verification methods, could politicize election administration and create barriers to voting for eligible citizens. They may also contend that prohibiting funds for general election administrator training limits states' flexibility to address their most pressing needs and that the shift in funding mechanism could reduce overall resources for federal elections.
The bill is relatively short and its core provisions are clearly laid out, making it accessible for an informed reader to evaluate within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(a)(1), adding Chapter 97 to Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code of 1985
Establishment of Election Security Program and Fund
This provision creates a new "Election Security Program" and "Election Security Fund" within the Internal Revenue Code. It mandates the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to establish a program to make payments to eligible states for activities promoting federal election security, specifically by updating voting systems to meet security standards. The fund will be used to carry out this program.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this is a necessary modernization, redirecting funds from an outdated system to address contemporary threats to election integrity. They contend it empowers the EAC to play a more direct role in securing federal elections.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that this shifts federal resources away from a legitimate, albeit underutilized, mechanism for campaign finance reform, potentially making presidential campaigns more reliant on private funding.
Tradeoffs
The bill trades the public financing of presidential campaigns for direct federal investment in state-level election security infrastructure.
Section 9051(b) of the new Chapter 97
Eligibility Criteria for State Grants
To receive a payment, a state must submit an application to the EAC including a plan for fund use, a certification that it does not permit non-citizens to vote in any state election, and assurances for reporting on fund usage. The EAC may require other information.
Section 9051(c) of the new Chapter 97
Specific Uses of Election Security Grant Funds
States can use funds for acquiring voting equipment, cybersecurity, physical security for equipment storage, modernizing voting systems, purchasing/printing secure paper ballots, and securing electronic poll books. However, funds cannot be used for general election administrator training (only equipment-specific training is allowed) or for litigation costs or judgments.
Section 9051(e) of the new Chapter 97
Funding Priority for States with Specific Election Practices
The EAC must give priority for payments to states that use paper ballots verifiable by voters and suitable for post-election audits, actively use resources (like SAVE and SSNVS) to prevent non-citizens from voting, and require specific forms of valid photo identification (e.g., driver's license, passport, military ID, Tribal ID, but not educational institution IDs) to obtain a ballot at a polling place.
Section 3(a) and 3(b), adding Sections 9014 and 9043 to Chapters 95 and 96 of Subtitle H of the IRC
Termination of Presidential Campaign Public Financing Programs
This provision explicitly terminates the Presidential Election Campaign Fund and the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account for any presidential election or nominating convention occurring after the date of the bill's enactment. It also directs the Secretary of the Treasury to transfer any remaining funds from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund to the newly established Election Security Fund.
The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) may not certify a vendor as qualified if that vendor directly provided funds to a State or unit of local government to support the administration of an election for Federal office.
Section 9051(d)(2)(A) of the new Chapter 97
Why it matters:This is likely a targeted response to recent controversies surrounding private funding of election administration. Its placement in technical certification criteria makes it less visible than a standalone prohibition.
Case for: Proponents argue this prevents conflicts of interest and ensures that election administration remains a public function, free from the perceived influence of private entities, regardless of their intentions.
Case against: Critics might argue that this provision could limit the pool of available and experienced vendors, especially if some have historically provided support to election offices, and could be seen as an overreach in restricting private philanthropic efforts to assist underfunded election systems.
Estimated impact: This could significantly alter the landscape of election technology and service providers, potentially excluding major players who have engaged in such funding in the past.
The amendment changing the taxpayer designation from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund to the Election Security Fund applies to taxable years ending after December 31, 2025.
Section 2(b)(3)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice for specifying applicability.
Case for: Proponents would argue this provides a clear timeline for the transition, allowing taxpayers and the IRS to prepare for the change in designation.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against standard effective date provisions, though critics of the overall bill might see it as another step towards implementing a flawed policy.
Estimated impact: This sets the precise start date for the new funding stream, meaning the Election Security Fund would begin receiving designated taxpayer funds from the 2026 tax year onwards (filed in 2027).