Technical corrections only. The diff reflects the bill's procedural movement from being engrossed in the House (v3) to being received and referred to a committee in the Senate (v4), including updated legislative headers and attestations. No substantive policy changes were made between v3 and v4.
ALERT Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Graves, Sam [R-MO-6]
- Committees
- Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 15, 2026
Bottom line
The ALERT Act comprehensively overhauls aviation safety regulations and practices for civil and military operations, driven by NTSB recommendations following a fatal midair collision.
What it actually does
This bill, known as the ALERT Act, mandates extensive aviation safety reforms for both civil and military aircraft operations, primarily in response to the January 29, 2025, midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). It requires new collision prevention technologies for various aircraft, updates air traffic control procedures and training, modifies helicopter routes around DCA, and establishes new safety management and data sharing requirements for the Department of Defense.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue this bill is a critical, comprehensive response to a tragic accident, directly implementing numerous urgent safety recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). They contend it will significantly enhance the safety of the national airspace system, prevent future midair collisions, and restore public trust in aviation by addressing systemic failures in technology, training, and operational procedures for both civilian and military flights.
Opponents contend
Critics may contend that while safety is paramount, the aggressive timelines and extensive mandates could pose significant financial and logistical burdens on aircraft operators, manufacturers, and government agencies. Concerns might also be raised about potential impacts on military operational flexibility or the risk of unintended consequences from rapidly implemented technological and procedural changes, particularly regarding human factors and system integration.
This is a lengthy and highly technical bill, requiring substantial time for a thorough review. Its complexity means a casual reading would likely miss critical details and interdependencies between provisions.
Sec. 102, Title I
Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa Upgrades
This section mandates the establishment of an aviation rulemaking committee to develop recommendations for requiring selected aircraft (those already required to have TCAS) to be equipped with an upgraded Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa (ACAS Xa). This new system must integrate and use both ADS-B In and transponder interrogations, providing visual and audible alerts to pilots. The Administrator is required to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking within 32 months of enactment, with a final rule to follow, setting deadlines for equipage by December 31, 2031, for new and existing aircraft.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that upgrading to ACAS Xa is essential for preventing midair collisions by providing pilots with more accurate and timely traffic and resolution advisories, especially in complex airspace. They highlight that integrating ADS-B In data will significantly improve situational awareness and reduce reliance on visual separation, directly addressing NTSB recommendations.
Critics contend
Opponents may argue that the mandated equipage deadlines are aggressive and could strain the aerospace supply chain and maintenance facilities, leading to increased costs for operators. They might also raise concerns about the feasibility of retrofitting older aircraft and the potential for new systems to introduce unforeseen human factors challenges without adequate testing and training.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the urgent need for advanced collision avoidance technology with the practical challenges and costs of developing, certifying, manufacturing, and installing these systems across a diverse fleet within a tight timeframe.
Sec. 103, Title I
Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems for Rotorcraft
This section requires the Administrator to finalize and publish minimum operational performance standards for Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xr (ACAS Xr) for rotorcraft by December 31, 2026. An aviation rulemaking committee will then be established to recommend requiring selected rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft operating in Class B airspace to be equipped with ACAS Xr, which uses ADS-B In and a second independent data source. A notice of proposed rulemaking is due within 24 months of enactment, with a final rule to follow, setting deadlines for equipage by December 31, 2031.
Sec. 104, Title I
Collision Prevention Systems for Covered Aircraft
This section mandates that the Administrator issue a final rule within two years, effective by December 31, 2031, requiring all non-military aircraft (except those already covered by ACAS Xa requirements) that are equipped with ADS-B Out to also be equipped and operating with collision prevention technology. This technology must include ADS-B In, use ADS-B data for situational awareness and traffic advisories, and provide audible alerts. The rule allows for portable or panel-mounted displays if they provide an equivalent level of safety.
Sec. 111, Title I
Operational Rates at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
This section requires the Administrator to assess the aircraft arrival rate at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) within 30 days of enactment, considering factors like airspace complexity, airfield limitations, and air carrier scheduling. Following this assessment, the Administrator must initiate a rulemaking to update federal regulations (14 CFR Part 93, Subpart K) to require allocated instrument flight rules (IFR) operations at DCA to be prescribed in periods not greater than 30 minutes, ensuring the airport does not exceed safe capacity.
Sec. 118, Title I
Further Modifications to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Area Helicopter Routes
This section requires the Administrator, within 90 days of enactment, to evaluate charted helicopter routes near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) using a safety risk management process. Based on these evaluations, the Administrator must immediately revise routes as necessary to ensure physical deconfliction with fixed-wing aircraft at all times, or implement operating procedures requiring positive controller control for safe deconfliction. A report on these evaluations and revisions, including safety risk management documentation, must be submitted to Congress within 120 days of completion.
Sec. 124, Title I
Safety Culture and Safety Management Review
This section mandates that the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation initiate an audit of the safety culture and safety management systems (SMS) of the FAA's Air Traffic Organization and Aviation Safety Management Organization within 30 days of enactment. The audit must evaluate system effectiveness, data sharing, identification of pre-accident risks, compliance with existing procedures (e.g., helicopter route reviews, drug/alcohol testing), and whether there are fears of retaliation for reporting risks. The IG must report findings and recommendations to Congress within one year, with the Secretary of Transportation responding within 120 days.
Sec. 127, Title I
Closure of Helicopter Route 4
This section permanently prohibits operations on the segment of Helicopter Route 4 located between Hains Point and the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge in the District of Columbia, as it existed on January 29, 2025. This segment is to remain eliminated from helicopter charts.
Sec. 201, Title II (adding 10 U.S.C. 2656)
Memorandum of Agreement on DoD Aircraft Operations
This section requires the Secretaries of Transportation and Defense to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) by September 30, 2026. The MOA must accommodate safe operations for DoD special mission aircraft not equipped with collision prevention technologies or ADS-B Out, while also establishing policies for the proper maintenance and routine verification of these systems on other DoD aircraft. It specifically mandates that, with limited exceptions for special missions, DoD manned rotary wing aircraft operating in the National Capital Region (NCR) must actively transmit ADS-B Out, and other DoD aircraft must be equipped with collision prevention technology by December 31, 2031.
Sec. 201, Title II (adding 10 U.S.C. 2658)
Manned Rotary Wing Aviation Safety Management System for DoD
This section requires each military department to establish or update a robust manned rotary wing aviation safety management system (SMS) by March 1, 2027. These systems must have clearly delineated responsibilities, adequate staffing and resources, and be functionally integrated with relevant units. The Secretary of Defense must also conduct a survey of rotary aircraft flight crews to identify effective safety reporting systems and address barriers to their use, with reports to Congress on implementation and findings.
Sec. 201, Title II (adding 10 U.S.C. 2660a)
Barometric Altimeters Guidance and Training
This section requires the Secretary of Defense to promptly update and maintain DoD manuals for manned rotary wing aircraft. These updates must provide clear guidance on the expected standard margin of error for barometric altimeters and the total potential error from additional aircraft equipment (e.g., external stores support systems). The updates must incorporate external data sources, including historical flight data monitoring, to better understand total potential error in various aircraft configurations. Within 30 days of updating the manuals, appropriate refresher training for affected flight crews is required.
Sec. 201, Title II (adding 10 U.S.C. 2660c)
Notifications and Reports on Near-Miss Events in National Capital Region
This section requires the Secretary of Defense to notify the House and Senate Armed Services Committees within one week of any 'covered near-miss event' involving a DoD aircraft in the National Capital Region (NCR). The Secretary must also establish a definition for 'close proximity encounter' for this purpose within 60 days. Biannual reports for two years, then annually, must be submitted to these committees detailing the number, causes, and modifications to standard operating procedures to address such events.
Prohibits the use of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data by any person, governmental agency, or entity to identify aircraft for the purpose of obtaining revenue from the owner or operator without their consent. It also amends 49 U.S.C. 46101(c)(1) to extend this prohibition to any Federal, State, local, territorial, or Tribal official, not just the FAA Administrator.
Sec. 105, Title I
Why it matters:This is likely a policy rider addressing concerns about the commercial exploitation of publicly broadcast ADS-B data, which is a separate issue from collision avoidance but related to the broader ADS-B ecosystem. Expanding the prohibition to all government officials is a significant legal clarification.
Case for: Proponents argue this protects the privacy and commercial interests of aircraft owners and operators from unauthorized data exploitation. They contend it prevents entities from profiting off publicly available flight data without consent, which could otherwise lead to unfair targeting or revenue generation schemes.
Case against: Critics might argue that restricting the use of publicly broadcast data, even for revenue purposes, could limit innovation in aviation services or reduce transparency in certain contexts. However, the core argument against unauthorized revenue generation is strong.
Estimated impact: Significant impact on data analytics companies, flight tracking services, and potentially other entities that might seek to monetize ADS-B data. It reinforces privacy protections for aircraft operators.
Defines 'special mission' for Department of Defense aircraft, which allows for exemptions from certain collision avoidance technology and ADS-B Out requirements. Crucially, it excludes 'unclassified flights,' 'flight crew proficiency flights,' and the transportation of any Government official other than a head of an executive department, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a commander of a combatant command, or any other individual designated by the President for purposes of this paragraph.
Sec. 201, Title II (adding 10 U.S.C. 2655(12))
Why it matters:The precise scope of 'special mission' is critical for balancing national security needs with civil aviation safety. By defining it here, the bill sets clear boundaries for when DoD aircraft can operate with reduced visibility, potentially limiting what might otherwise be a broader exemption. The Presidential designation carve-out is a specific political allowance.
Case for: Proponents argue this definition provides necessary flexibility for genuine national security missions while preventing the misuse of 'special mission' exemptions for routine military flights or non-critical VIP transport. The Presidential designation allows for unforeseen, high-level needs.
Case against: Critics might argue that the 'Presidential designation' clause could still be broadly interpreted or misused, creating a loophole for certain flights to operate with reduced transparency. They might also contend that 'unclassified flights' should always adhere to civil aviation safety standards without exception.
Estimated impact: Directly impacts the number and type of DoD flights that can operate with ADS-B Out turned off, particularly in sensitive airspace like the National Capital Region. It enhances transparency for most DoD flights while preserving critical national security capabilities.
A 'Rule of Construction' that clarifies the division of authority between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation/FAA Administrator. It explicitly states that nothing in the new chapter (Chapter 158) vests FAA authority in DoD or vice-versa, limits FAA's authority for air traffic control, or requires DoD aircraft to compromise operational security during combat operations. Crucially, it states that any rule, guidance, or carriage requirement from other provisions of law applies to DoD aircraft *only* through a process established in the required Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).
Sec. 201, Title II (adding 10 U.S.C. 2660e)
Why it matters:This section is critical for managing the inter-agency dynamics between DoD and FAA. It ensures that while DoD must comply with new safety standards, it does so through a negotiated process (the MOA) that respects its unique operational security needs, rather than being unilaterally subjected to FAA regulations. This is a key compromise point.
Case for: Proponents argue this ensures that national security operations are not inadvertently compromised by civil aviation regulations, while still committing DoD to enhanced safety. It provides a clear framework for inter-agency coordination and respects the distinct authorities of each department.
Case against: Critics might argue that requiring all civil aviation rules to be filtered through a DoD-FAA MOA could introduce delays or allow DoD to selectively apply safety standards, potentially undermining the intent of universal safety enhancements. However, the provision also states FAA's authority to ensure safe minimum separation remains unlimited.
Estimated impact: Shapes the entire implementation of Title II by defining the legal and procedural relationship between DoD and FAA regarding aviation safety. It ensures DoD's compliance with new safety mandates is integrated into its existing operational framework.