Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
- Committees
- Financial Services Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Feb 20, 2026
Bottom line
The bill seeks to bolster U.S. policy and resources to counter the Iranian regime's repression, expand internet access for the Iranian people, and target the financial networks of corrupt Iranian officials.
What it actually does
This bill aims to enhance U.S. efforts to support human rights and internet freedom in Iran and hold the Iranian regime accountable. It expands reporting requirements on internet access and censorship circumvention technologies, increases funding for the Iran Internet Freedom Grant Program, and directs the Defense Innovation Unit to develop low-cost internet access solutions. Additionally, it mandates a report on corrupt Iranian oligarchs and parastatal entities, establishes an Iran Kleptocracy Initiative within FinCEN, and grants Congress new authority to request presidential determinations on sanctions for human rights abuses.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill is a crucial step to support the Iranian people's struggle for human rights, dignity, and self-determination against a repressive regime. They contend that expanding internet freedom and holding corrupt officials accountable will empower dissidents, facilitate access to uncensored information, and weaken the regime's ability to suppress its population. The bill is seen as reinforcing U.S. commitment to democratic values and deterring further violence against protesters.
Opponents contend
Specific opposition arguments to this newly introduced bill are not yet publicly documented. However, potential critics might raise concerns about the effectiveness of such measures in achieving desired outcomes without escalating regional tensions, or question the feasibility and security implications of certain internet circumvention technologies. Some might also argue that broad sanctions could inadvertently harm the general Iranian population rather than solely targeting the regime.
The bill is relatively concise and structured, making it accessible for a thorough review within a reasonable timeframe for an informed reader.
Section 3(a)
Expansion of Internet Freedom Report Requirements
This provision amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 to require expanded reporting on internet freedom in Iran. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the FCC and Treasury, must assess the feasibility of direct-to-cell wireless communications, analyze the impact of drone-based platforms and signal jamming, and survey telecommunications providers in Iran, including their ownership and control implications for communications freedom.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that comprehensive intelligence on Iran's internet infrastructure and censorship capabilities is essential for developing effective circumvention strategies and supporting the Iranian people's right to free expression.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against enhanced intelligence gathering and reporting, though some might question the practical effectiveness or resource allocation for such detailed assessments.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the need for detailed intelligence to counter censorship with the resources required for extensive interagency reporting and analysis.
Section 3(b)
Extension and Increased Funding for Iran Internet Freedom Grant Program
This provision extends the authorization for the Iran Internet Freedom Grant Program and significantly increases its funding. It authorizes an additional $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2030, building upon existing authorizations. This funding is intended to support initiatives that facilitate internet access and censorship circumvention for the people of Iran.
Section 3(c)
Defense Innovation Unit's Role in Internet Access Technologies
This section directs the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to support the development of low-cost, scalable, and rapidly deployable technologies to counter internet shutdowns in Iran. The DIU is tasked with prioritizing technologies like low-Earth orbit satellite internet, mesh networking, and portable communication systems, collaborating with industry and academia, and conducting pilot programs. It also mandates collaboration with the Defense Acquisition University on acquisition processes and requires annual reporting to Congress.
Section 4(a)
Report on Corrupt Iranian Oligarchs and Parastatal Entities
This section mandates the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, to submit a detailed report on senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in Iran, including their net worth, relationship to the ruling elite (specifically mentioning President Masoud Pezeshkian), sources of income, and non-Iranian business affiliations. It also requires an assessment of Islamic Republic of Iran parastatal entities, their leadership, beneficial ownership, and business affiliations, as well as the exposure of U.S. economic sectors to these entities and the potential impacts of imposing further sanctions.
Section 4(b)
Establishment of Iran Kleptocracy Initiative within FinCEN
This section amends title 31, United States Code, to establish the Iran Kleptocracy Initiative within the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). The Initiative is tasked with investigating, exposing, disrupting, and prosecuting corruption, money laundering, and racketeering by Iranian government officials and their associates. Its responsibilities include identifying and cataloging assets, coordinating with allies for asset forfeiture, publishing findings on corrupt practices, and collaborating with law enforcement for prosecutions. It also mandates annual reports to Congress on its activities.
Section 5
Congressional Nomination Authority for Sanctions
This section grants the chairman or ranking minority member of specified congressional committees the authority to request a presidential determination on whether a foreign person has knowingly provided material support for the Iranian regime's human rights abuses, censorship, or repression. Upon receiving such a request, the President must determine if the conduct occurred and submit a written justification detailing whether sanctions have been or will be imposed under existing Iranian Human Rights Abuses Sanctions Regulations.
Section 6
Sense of Congress on Iran Broadcasting and Human Rights Assistance
This section expresses the sense of Congress that U.S. policy should promote and provide government and international broadcasting efforts to counter Iranian regime censorship, support independent Iranian journalists and media outlets (including grants for equipment, training, and secure communication), coordinate with international partners to amplify credible independent media, and produce annual performance metrics for audience reach and content impact.
This provision amends Section 5124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (22 U.S.C. 8754a) to expand reporting requirements on internet freedom in Iran.
Section 3(a)(1)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for updating existing law, ensuring continuity and integration into the current legal framework.
Case for: Supporters would argue that amending existing law is an efficient way to update policy without creating redundant statutes, ensuring that new requirements build upon established reporting mechanisms.
Case against: Critics might argue that such amendments make it harder for the public to track legislative changes, as the full impact requires cross-referencing multiple legal texts.
Estimated impact: Expands the scope of U.S. intelligence and analysis on Iranian internet infrastructure and censorship, informing future policy decisions and resource allocation.
This subsection defines 'Islamic Republic of Iran parastatal entities' as entities in which the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has at least a 25 percent ownership interest and that had 2024 revenues of approximately $2,000,000,000 or more.
Section 4(a)(3)(B)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for defining terms that apply to a specific section, but its precise financial threshold is highly consequential.
Case for: Proponents would argue that a clear, quantifiable definition ensures that the report and subsequent actions target only the most significant entities closely tied to the regime, avoiding overreach.
Case against: Critics might argue that the $2 billion revenue threshold is arbitrary or could be manipulated, potentially allowing some influential entities to escape scrutiny if their ownership or revenue structure falls just outside the defined parameters.
Estimated impact: This definition directly limits the scope of the Treasury's report and potential future sanctions, focusing efforts on Iran's largest state-affiliated economic actors.
The conduct described for congressional nomination authority includes 'any conduct sanctionable under part 562 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to Iranian Human Rights Abuses Sanctions Regulations).'
Section 5(b)(2)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative drafting to incorporate existing legal frameworks by reference, ensuring consistency and avoiding redundancy. However, it requires specialized knowledge to fully understand.
Case for: Supporters would argue that referencing existing regulations ensures that the new congressional authority aligns with established sanctions policy and legal precedent, providing a consistent framework for enforcement.
Case against: Critics might contend that such cross-referencing makes the bill less transparent to the public and requires legal expertise to fully comprehend the implications of the congressional nomination authority.
Estimated impact: Significantly broadens the scope of conduct that Congress can compel the President to review for sanctions, encompassing a wide range of human rights abuses and repression activities already covered by U.S. law.