A substantive reauthorization and modernization. v2 extends the Defense Production Act's expiration date by five years, establishes a National Defense Executive Reserve, and significantly expands reporting and oversight requirements for the DPA Committee and CFIUS, particularly regarding agricultural land transactions and equity investments. Several appropriations amounts and fiscal years are also updated.
DPA Modernization Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
- Committees
- Financial Services Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 15, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to strengthen the federal government's ability to respond to national defense and emergency needs by modernizing DPA authorities, improving interagency coordination, and addressing critical supply chain vulnerabilities.
What it actually does
This bill, the "DPA Modernization Act of 2026," comprehensively amends and reauthorizes the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA). It renumbers titles and sections, updates presidential authorities related to priorities, allocations, and industrial capacity expansion, and increases financial thresholds for DPA actions. Key changes include establishing a Critical Minerals Resilience Initiative, creating a National Defense Executive Reserve, enhancing the DPA Committee's coordination and reporting, and expanding the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) jurisdiction to include certain agricultural land transactions.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the DPA, a vital tool for national security, requires significant updates to address modern threats, supply chain fragilities, and emerging technologies. They contend that increasing financial thresholds, streamlining decision-making, and improving interagency coordination will make the DPA more effective and responsive. The inclusion of critical minerals and agricultural land in CFIUS review is seen as crucial for protecting national interests against foreign adversaries.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that expanding DPA authorities and increasing financial thresholds could lead to overreach by the executive branch into private markets, potentially distorting economic activity. Concerns could also be raised about the potential for increased government equity investments and the broad discretion given to various committees and fund managers, which might lack sufficient oversight or accountability. Some may also question the effectiveness of new initiatives like the National Defense Executive Reserve.
The bill is moderately complex due to extensive renumbering and detailed amendments, requiring a dedicated reading time to fully grasp its implications, which may exceed the time typically allotted for legislative review.
Section 3(1)(C)
Limitations on Presidential Priorities and Allocations Authority
Amends DPA Section 101(b) to limit the President's powers for controlling civilian market distribution to national emergencies, natural disasters (Stafford Act), or public health emergencies (Public Health Service Act Section 319). It also limits the control period to one year, with a possible 180-day extension requiring a non-delegable report to Congress.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue these limitations provide necessary guardrails on presidential power, ensuring DPA authorities are used only in clearly defined emergency contexts and for limited durations, thereby preventing potential overreach and providing predictability for industries.
Critics contend
Some might argue that these limitations could hinder a rapid and flexible response to unforeseen national security or economic crises, potentially delaying critical interventions if the defined categories are too narrow or the reporting requirements too cumbersome.
Tradeoffs
Balances the need for strong executive authority in emergencies with concerns about potential government overreach and market distortion.
Section 3(1)(D)-(E)
Expedited Procurement of Critical Technologies and Minerals
Amends DPA Section 101(d) to allow the President, in consultation with the DPA Committee, to waive or revise relevant regulations to expedite the procurement of critical technologies or critical minerals.
Section 4(3)(D)
Increased Financial Thresholds for Loan Guarantees
Amends DPA Section 201(d)(1) (formerly 301(d)(1)) to increase the threshold for certain loan guarantees from $50,000,000 to $100,000,000, and shifts the determination authority from the President to the Fund manager of the Defense Production Act Fund. It also removes specific conditions related to private financing.
Section 4(5)(B)
Critical Minerals Resilience Initiative
Establishes the Critical Minerals Resilience Initiative under DPA Section 203(b) (formerly 303). This initiative allows a DPA Committee member, in consultation with the Executive Director and Fund Manager, to make grants, purchases, and commitments to purchase involving entities in the US, NATO countries, or major non-NATO allies. The purpose is to prevent foreign adversary dominance in critical mineral mining/processing and ensure viability through off-take agreements, price floors, or incentives.
Section 4(5)(I)
Waiver to Expedite Procurement for Critical Technologies/Minerals and Permitting of Infrastructure
Adds a new DPA Section 203(i) allowing the President to waive or revise regulations to expedite the procurement of critical technologies or critical minerals, and the permitting of critical infrastructure needed to produce or refine them, when exercising authorities under DPA Sections 201, 202, or 203.
Section 4(5)(J)
Workforce and Skills Gap Identification and Funding for Skilled Labor
Adds a new DPA Section 203(j) requiring federal agencies delegated DPA authority to identify workforce and skills gaps in the domestic industrial base. It also allows agencies to direct a portion of financial assistance to recruit, train, place, or retain workers in defense-critical occupations, with performance standards. Agencies must report on these efforts annually.
Section 4(8)(B)-(D)
DPA Strategy and Supply Chain Security Reports
Amends DPA Section 206 (formerly 706) to require annual DPA strategy reports from agencies, including assessments of industrial base needs, detailed strategies, spending plans, and results of a new 5-year "table-top exercise" simulation. It also mandates a "Strategy on Securing Supply Chains Essential to National Defense" in the first report, focusing on medical materials, critical minerals, and naval shipbuilding capacity, including vulnerability analysis and use of DPA authorities against foreign adversaries.
Section 4(10)
Prohibition on Discrimination Based on Energy Source
Adds a new DPA Section 208, prohibiting the President from denying financial support under DPA Title II (Expansion of Productive Capacity and Supply) for the production of energy (other than energy production itself) based on the energy source involved (exploration, development, production, utilization, transportation, or sale).
Section 4(10)
Limitation on Eligibility for Assistance for Covered Individuals
Adds a new DPA Section 209, making "covered entities" ineligible for DPA Title II assistance. A "covered entity" is one in which a "covered individual" directly or indirectly holds a "significant interest" (20% or more equity). "Covered individuals" include the President, Vice President, DPA Committee members, and their spouses, children, sons-in-law, or daughters-in-law.
Section 5(10)
Outreach Representative for Public Health Emergencies
Amends DPA Section 303 (formerly 703) to allow the FEMA Administrator, in consultation with HHS, to designate an "Outreach Representative" during a public health emergency. This individual, with experience in medical supply production/distribution, acts as a government-wide single point of contact for outreach to manufacturers and suppliers, encouraging partnerships.
Section 5(18)
National Defense Executive Reserve Establishment
Adds a new DPA Section 314 establishing a National Defense Executive Reserve. Its purpose is to improve federal preparedness for national defense emergencies by allowing private sector experts to volunteer, be trained, and temporarily employed in federal positions within agencies like Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security during emergencies. The Director of OPM, in consultation with relevant Secretaries, must issue rules for its operation, including criteria for positions, selection, compensation, training, security clearances, and ethics.
Section 5(20)(B)(i)
CFIUS Review of Agricultural Land Transactions
Amends DPA Section 316(b)(1) (formerly 721) to include the consideration of certain agricultural land transactions by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Specifically, CFIUS must determine if a "reportable agricultural land transaction" (acquisition of agricultural land by a foreign person from China, DPRK, Russia, or Iran, based on intelligence community info, and requiring disclosure under AFIDA) is a covered transaction and if a review is needed. The requirement sunsets when the respective country is removed from the list of foreign adversaries. It also adds the Secretary of Agriculture as a CFIUS member for transactions involving agricultural land, biotechnology, or the agriculture industry.
Section 5(21)(B)-(D)
DPA Committee Restructuring and Enhanced Reporting
Amends DPA Section 317 (formerly 722) to restructure the Defense Production Act Committee. It adds the Fund Manager of the DPA Fund and the Director of OMB as members, designates the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as non-voting Chairperson, and the Director of OMB as the Executive Director. It also significantly expands the annual report requirements to include agency effectiveness evaluations, fraud risk assessments, and National Defense Executive Reserve activities.
Section 5(21)(E)-(J)
DPA Dashboard, Toolkit, Online Resources, and Fraud Risk Management
Adds new subsections to DPA Section 317. It mandates a "Defense Production Act Dashboard" for real-time tracking of actions, a "Toolkit and Online Resources Site" (one-stop shop) for agencies and businesses, and requires the Committee to establish fraud risk management processes and designate a point of contact. It also mandates testimony from the Executive Director and agency heads to Congress after annual reports.
Amends DPA Section 203(c) (formerly 303(b)) by striking "not more than 10 years" and inserting "more than 10 years" for certain contracts. This appears to remove the upper limit on contract duration, allowing contracts to exceed 10 years, which is a significant change from previous limitations.
Section 4(5)(E)
Why it matters:Could be a subtle policy shift to allow longer-term contracts for certain DPA actions, which may be necessary for complex defense projects or critical infrastructure development that require sustained support beyond a decade. Alternatively, it could be a legislative drafting error if the intent was to remove the limit entirely or clarify that contracts *up to* 10 years are allowed.
Case for: Allows for longer-term strategic investments and commitments, which may be necessary for complex defense projects or critical infrastructure development that require sustained support beyond a decade.
Case against: Could lock the government into long-term commitments that become outdated or inefficient, reducing flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances or technological advancements.
Estimated impact: Potentially allows for very large, multi-decade contracts under DPA, impacting the long-term financial commitments of the government.
Adds a new DPA Section 305(f) prohibiting the use of DPA authority to obtain "sensitive personally identifiable information" (SPII), defined as information which, if lost, compromised, or disclosed without authorization, could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual.
Section 5(12)(D)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to add privacy safeguards, but the specific definition and prohibition are important for limiting the scope of broad DPA information-gathering authorities.
Case for: Essential for protecting individual privacy and preventing potential abuse of broad DPA information-gathering authorities.
Case against: No direct opposition, as privacy protections are generally supported.
Estimated impact: Limits the scope of information collection under DPA, potentially preventing overreach into personal data.
Adds a new DPA Section 306(c) stating that a civil action challenging an action taken under the DPA may be brought *only* in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Section 5(13)(C)
Why it matters:Centralizes judicial review, which can be a significant procedural change impacting access to justice and the federal court system.
Case for: Proponents would argue this streamlines judicial review, ensures consistency in legal interpretations of DPA actions, and leverages the D.C. Circuit's expertise in administrative law and federal agency actions.
Case against: Opponents might argue it limits access to justice for affected parties by restricting venue, potentially making it more difficult and costly for individuals or smaller entities outside the D.C. area to challenge DPA actions.
Estimated impact: Centralizes all DPA-related litigation to a single appellate court, potentially impacting legal strategy and costs for challengers.
Amends DPA Section 311 (formerly 711) to significantly increase appropriations for carrying out the Act. It strikes "$133,000,000 for fiscal year 2015" and inserts "$250,000,000 for fiscal year 2026". It also strikes "$117,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2020 through 2024 to carry out title III" and inserts "$5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2026 through 2031 to the Executive Director of the Defense Production Act Committee and the Fund manager of the Defense Production Act Fund to carry out this Act". The latter is a specific allocation for administrative functions of the Committee and Fund Manager.
Section 5(17)(C)
Why it matters:Appropriations figures are often detailed and can be overlooked if not specifically sought out. The shift in allocation for administrative costs is also subtle but represents a dedicated funding stream for DPA governance.
Case for: Proponents argue that increased funding is essential to effectively modernize and implement the DPA, especially with expanded mandates like the Critical Minerals Initiative and the National Defense Executive Reserve. The administrative funding ensures proper oversight and coordination.
Case against: Critics might question the necessity of such a substantial increase in funding, especially the administrative allocation, without clear metrics for return on investment or a detailed breakdown of how the funds will be utilized to achieve specific outcomes.
Estimated impact: $250 million for FY2026 for general DPA activities, plus $30 million ($5M/year for 6 years) for DPA Committee/Fund Manager administration.