Protect Liberty and End Warrantless Surveillance Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
- Committees
- Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 5, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to significantly restrict government surveillance powers under FISA Section 702 and prevent warrantless acquisition of commercially available data on U.S. persons, enhancing privacy protections.
What it actually does
This bill proposes significant reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), primarily by prohibiting warrantless queries for the communications of United States persons acquired under Section 702. It also expands the role of amici curiae in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and restricts law enforcement and intelligence agencies from purchasing certain commercially available information, including location data and web browsing history, from data brokers without a court order.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the bill is essential for protecting the Fourth Amendment rights of United States persons by closing loopholes that allow warrantless access to their communications and data. They contend it curbs government overreach, increases transparency and oversight of intelligence activities, and ensures that intelligence agencies operate within constitutional boundaries.
Opponents contend
Critics contend that the proposed restrictions, particularly on Section 702 queries and data acquisition from third parties, could severely hinder national security investigations and intelligence gathering capabilities. They argue that these limitations might create dangerous intelligence gaps, making it more difficult to track foreign adversaries and prevent terrorist attacks.
The bill is moderately complex due to its legal amendments and technical definitions, requiring careful review to grasp its full implications, which may be challenging given typical legislative timelines.
Sec. 101, Title I
Prohibition on Warrantless Queries for United States Persons' Communications
This section amends FISA Section 702 to prohibit officers or employees of the United States from conducting warrantless queries of information acquired under Section 702 if the query is designed to find the contents of communications or information of or about one or more United States persons. Exceptions are provided for concurrent authorization (e.g., a warrant), emergency situations involving imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm, consent, and certain defensive cybersecurity queries. Information obtained through emergency queries without subsequent authorization is generally inadmissible.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision is a critical safeguard against 'backdoor searches' of Americans' data, ensuring that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is upheld even when data is collected under foreign intelligence authorities. It prevents intelligence agencies from circumventing domestic legal protections.
Critics contend
Opponents contend that this prohibition will impede the ability of intelligence agencies to quickly identify and respond to threats, especially when U.S. persons are in communication with foreign targets. They argue that the existing minimization procedures and oversight are sufficient and that a warrant requirement adds unnecessary delays.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the constitutional privacy rights of U.S. persons against the operational flexibility and speed required by intelligence agencies to protect national security. It seeks to prevent potential abuses of foreign intelligence authorities for domestic law enforcement purposes.
Sec. 104, Title I
Expansion of Amici Curiae Role in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Proceedings
This section significantly expands the circumstances under which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) must appoint amici curiae (friends of the court) to assist in proceedings. It mandates appointment for applications or motions that present novel legal interpretations, significant First Amendment concerns, sensitive investigative matters (including those involving public officials, religious organizations, or news media), new technologies, reauthorization of programmatic surveillance, or other novel civil liberties issues. Amici are granted broader access to information and the authority to seek review of FISC decisions in higher courts.
Sec. 202, Title II
Prohibition on Government Purchase of Commercially Available Information
This section amends Title 18, U.S. Code, to prohibit law enforcement and intelligence agencies from obtaining, in exchange for anything of value, certain covered customer or subscriber records or 'illegitimately obtained information' from third-party data brokers. This includes information pertaining to a U.S. person, such as contents of communications, location information, or records obtained in violation of service agreements or privacy policies. The prohibition applies even if the data is indirectly acquired and limits sharing between agencies. Information obtained in violation is inadmissible as evidence.
Sec. 206, Title II
Exclusive Means for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance and Data Acquisition
This section establishes that FISA (Title I and Sections 303, 304, 702, 703, 704, and 705) is the exclusive means for acquiring electronic communications transactions records, call detail records, location information, web browsing history, internet search history, and any other Fourth Amendment-protected information of United States persons or persons inside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes from entities located in the U.S. It explicitly amends Title 18, U.S. Code, to limit other forms of surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.
Sec. 103, Title I
Limitation on Directives to Certain Electronic Communication Service Providers
This section limits the ability of the government to issue directives under FISA Section 702(i) to certain 'covered electronic communication service providers.' Specifically, a directive may only be issued to a provider of the type of service at issue in specific, publicly released Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) opinions from 2022-2023. It also mandates declassification review of the types of services at issue, requires summary descriptions in directives, and establishes FISC notification and review processes, as well as congressional oversight reporting.
Sec. 105, Title I
Extension of FISA Title VII Authorities
This section extends the repeal date for Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (which includes Section 702 authority) from its current sunset to April 20, 2028. It also extends the associated transition procedures.
Defines 'covered person' as a 'United States person' for the purpose of the prohibition on warrantless queries. This seemingly simple definition is crucial because it directly links the new query restrictions to the legal definition of a U.S. person, thereby determining the scope of individuals whose data is protected by the warrant requirement.
Sec. 101(a)(2)(D)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for defining terms within a specific section. However, the impact of this definition is foundational to the entire query prohibition, making its precise wording highly consequential.
Case for: Proponents argue that explicitly defining 'covered person' as a 'United States person' ensures that the new warrant requirements apply broadly to all Americans, preventing any narrow interpretation that might exclude certain individuals from protection.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against the clarity of this definition itself, but opponents of the overall query prohibition would implicitly oppose the broad scope of protection it establishes for U.S. persons.
Estimated impact: This definition ensures that the prohibition on warrantless queries applies to all individuals legally considered U.S. persons, significantly expanding the scope of privacy protection against such queries.
Defines 'illegitimately obtained information' as covered records obtained from service providers in violation of their service agreements or privacy policies, by deceiving the covered person, or through unauthorized accessing of an electronic device or online account. It also includes information collected, processed, or shared in violation of a contract related to the covered record.
Sec. 202(e)(1)(E)
Why it matters:This is a standard drafting technique for defining terms within a complex legal framework. However, the specific inclusion of 'illegitimately obtained information' significantly expands the scope of data that government agencies are prohibited from purchasing, beyond just commercially available records.
Case for: Proponents argue that this definition is crucial to prevent government agencies from purchasing data that was acquired through unethical or illegal means by data brokers, thereby disincentivizing such practices and protecting individuals from exploitation.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against prohibiting the use of illegally obtained data. However, some might argue that the broadness of 'inconsistent with the privacy policy' could create unforeseen challenges for agencies trying to determine the legality of data acquisition by third parties.
Estimated impact: This definition significantly broadens the types of data that law enforcement and intelligence agencies are prohibited from purchasing, extending protections to data acquired through various questionable means by third parties.
Declares that FISA (Title I and Sections 303, 304, 702, 703, 704, and 705) shall be the exclusive means by which any information, records, data, or tangible things are acquired for foreign intelligence purposes from a person or entity located in the United States if the compelled production of such information would require a warrant for law enforcement purposes.
Sec. 206(d)
Why it matters:This is a critical policy statement that aims to close any potential 'gap' or 'loophole' where intelligence agencies might use authorities outside of FISA to compel data that would otherwise require a Fourth Amendment warrant. Its placement within a section on 'limits' rather than as a standalone 'exclusive authority' statement might make its comprehensive nature less immediately apparent.
Case for: Proponents argue that this provision is essential to ensure that the Fourth Amendment's protections are consistently applied to foreign intelligence collection within the United States. It prevents agencies from using less stringent legal authorities to obtain data that would typically require a warrant for domestic law enforcement, thereby upholding constitutional rights.
Case against: Opponents might argue that this provision could create an overly rigid framework, potentially hindering intelligence agencies' ability to adapt to new threats or utilize all available legal tools for foreign intelligence gathering. They might contend that it could lead to delays or missed opportunities in critical national security investigations.
Estimated impact: This provision fundamentally reshapes the legal landscape for foreign intelligence data acquisition within the U.S., mandating FISA as the sole legal pathway for any compelled production of Fourth Amendment-protected information, significantly enhancing privacy protections.