Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
- Committees
- Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 12, 2026
Bottom line
The Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2026 seeks to enhance privacy protections for U.S. persons by imposing stricter warrant requirements and oversight on government surveillance activities, while also extending Section 702 of FISA for four years.
What it actually does
This bill proposes significant reforms to federal surveillance authorities, primarily focusing on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Section 702, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and other intelligence activities. It introduces warrant requirements for accessing U.S. person data, prohibits federal law enforcement from purchasing personal data from data brokers, and establishes new oversight and accountability mechanisms for intelligence agencies.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill strikes a necessary balance between national security and civil liberties, addressing past abuses and ensuring constitutional protections for Americans. They contend that the reforms, particularly the warrant requirement for U.S. person queries under Section 702 and the prohibition on data broker purchases, are essential to restore public trust and prevent warrantless surveillance of citizens. The extension of Section 702, coupled with these reforms, is presented as a pragmatic approach to preserve a vital intelligence tool while safeguarding privacy.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill's new warrant requirements and restrictions on data acquisition could unduly hamper intelligence agencies' ability to quickly identify and neutralize foreign threats, potentially creating intelligence gaps. They may also contend that the existing oversight mechanisms are sufficient and that further restrictions could compromise national security operations, especially given the dynamic nature of global threats. Some might also criticize the four-year extension of Section 702, arguing for a shorter period or more fundamental changes.
The bill is lengthy and complex, requiring substantial time to read and understand its numerous amendments to existing statutes, which may challenge timely public and legislative review.
Sec. 101, Title I
Warrantless Query Prohibition for U.S. Person Data
This section prohibits federal officers from accessing 'covered information' (communications content and data requiring a probable cause warrant for law enforcement) returned by a 'covered query' (using a U.S. person term or for a significant purpose of retrieving U.S. person info) unless a warrant, emergency, or consent exception applies. It also mandates documentation for all queries and access, ensuring a clear record of government searches.
Supporters argue
This provision is crucial for protecting the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. persons, ensuring that their communications are not searched without a warrant, even if incidentally collected under Section 702. It directly addresses a significant loophole that has led to documented abuses and erosion of public trust.
Critics contend
Critics may argue that requiring a warrant for U.S. person queries could impede timely intelligence analysis, particularly in fast-moving national security investigations, potentially allowing threats to materialize while agencies seek authorization. They contend that existing minimization procedures are sufficient.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances national security intelligence needs against individual privacy rights and Fourth Amendment protections, aiming to prevent warrantless searches of U.S. person data while preserving the underlying Section 702 authority.
Sec. 103, Title I
Prohibition on Reverse Targeting
This section amends FISA Section 702 to explicitly prohibit intentionally targeting a non-U.S. person located outside the U.S. if a 'significant purpose' of that acquisition is to acquire information of a particular, known U.S. person. Exceptions are made for emergencies involving imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm, or when the U.S. person has provided consent to the targeting.
Sec. 111, Title I
Section 702 Reauthorization
This section extends the authority of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 until April 20, 2030. Section 702 is a critical authority allowing the government to target non-U.S. persons located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information, which often results in the incidental collection of U.S. person communications.
Sec. 201, Title II
Prohibition on Federal Law Enforcement Purchase of Personal Data from Data Brokers
This section prohibits federal law enforcement agencies from obtaining 'covered personal data' (personal data linked to a U.S. person or device in the U.S.) from 'covered organizations' (data brokers) in exchange for anything of value. It includes exceptions for certain data compilations, whistleblower disclosures, cost reimbursement under legal process, employment-related use, background checks with consent, and lawfully obtained public data (with specific attestations, but excluding biometric and location information). It also prohibits agencies from receiving such data from other governmental entities if it was obtained in violation of this rule.
Sec. 301, Title III
Warrant Requirement for U.S. Person Targeting
This section repeals existing FISA sections 703, 704, and 705 and replaces them with a new Section 703. This new section mandates a warrant or emergency authorization under FISA (or a criminal warrant) for federal officers to intentionally target a U.S. person for foreign intelligence purposes if the acquisition involves communications content, location information, web browsing history, internet search history, or occurs under circumstances with a reasonable expectation of privacy. It also sets similar requirements for pen register/trap and trace devices.
Sec. 303, Title III
FISA Application Accuracy Certification
This section adds a new Title IX to FISA, requiring federal officers making FISA applications to include a description of 'accuracy procedures' used and a certification that they have collected and reviewed supporting documentation for factual assertions, all information that might call into question accuracy or reliability of sources, and any prior relationships with the target. Judges must find these procedures are actual 'accuracy procedures' as defined before issuing an order.
Sec. 402, Title IV
Warrantless Query Prohibition for U.S. Person Data (Non-FISA)
This section extends the prohibition on warrantless queries for 'covered information' of U.S. persons to data acquired for foreign intelligence purposes *other than* under FISA. It mirrors the exceptions (warrant, emergency, consent, defensive cybersecurity) and documentation requirements of Section 101, but applies them to intelligence collection activities outside of FISA, ensuring consistent privacy protections across various intelligence authorities.
Sec. 601, Title VI
ECPA Warrant Requirement for Sensitive Data
This section amends the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to require a warrant for governmental entities to obtain historical location information, web browsing records, and search query records. It also amends 18 U.S.C. 3117 to require a warrant for installing or directing the installation of a tracking device, with emergency exceptions. It further requires a warrant for prospective disclosure of web browsing records and location information from online service providers.
Sec. 701, Title VII
Protection of Vehicle Data from Federal Warrantless Searches
This section creates a new Chapter 124 in Title 18, U.S. Code, prohibiting federal investigative or law enforcement officers from accessing 'covered vehicle data' (onboard and telematics data from noncommercial vehicles) without a warrant. Exceptions are provided for prior consent (with specific, explicit requirements), emergencies involving immediate danger of death or serious physical injury, and event data recorder access for motor vehicle safety as authorized by existing law.
Defines 'covered person' for Title VII of FISA (and by extension, for Title I and Title IV of this Act) as a U.S. person or a person known or believed to be located in the United States at the time of query/acquisition. This definition is crucial because it determines the scope of U.S. person protections throughout the bill.
Sec. 2(a)(2) and (b)(2)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to define terms upfront, but its broad application to multiple titles makes it highly consequential for the entire bill's protective scope.
Case for: This definition provides essential clarity and consistency for who receives U.S. person protections across different surveillance authorities, ensuring that the bill's safeguards are applied uniformly.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against the clarity of definitions, but the breadth of the definition itself is a key policy choice that some might argue is too expansive or too narrow in its application.
Estimated impact: High, as it underpins many of the bill's core privacy protections for U.S. persons across FISA and other intelligence collection activities.
This section amends FISA Sections 701(b)(4) and 801(6) to narrow the definition of 'electronic communication service provider' (ECSP) by striking subparagraph (E) and related language. This effectively removes entities that merely have access to equipment on which communications are transmitted or stored (e.g., landlords, commercial property owners) from being compelled to provide assistance under Section 702 directives. It also nullifies directives issued to such entities since April 20, 2024.
Sec. 109, Title I
Why it matters:This is a technical amendment to a definition, common for legislative drafting, but the policy impact of limiting the scope of compelled assistance is substantial and addresses specific concerns about overreach.
Case for: This provision prevents the government from compelling assistance from a broad range of entities not traditionally considered communication service providers, thereby limiting the scope of Section 702's reach and protecting property owners from undue burden and privacy intrusion.
Case against: Intelligence agencies might argue that this narrows their ability to obtain necessary assistance from entities that facilitate communications, potentially creating intelligence gaps or increasing the difficulty of certain foreign intelligence collection operations.
Estimated impact: Medium, as it limits the universe of entities subject to Section 702 directives, reducing potential burdens on non-traditional providers.
This section adds a new definition of 'derived' to FISA Section 101, stating that information or evidence is 'derived' from an electronic surveillance, physical search, or acquisition under FISA if the Government would not have originally possessed it 'but for' that action, regardless of claims of attenuation, inevitable discovery, or re-obtainment through other means. This significantly strengthens the exclusionary rule for illegally obtained FISA evidence.
Sec. 304, Title III
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to define terms upfront, but its legal implications are far-reaching, directly impacting prosecutorial tools and the balance between security and civil liberties.
Case for: This provision ensures that illegally obtained evidence under FISA cannot be laundered through legal fictions like 'attenuation' or 'inevitable discovery,' thereby upholding constitutional protections and deterring unlawful surveillance by removing the incentive to collect data illegally.
Case against: Law enforcement and intelligence agencies might argue that this overly strict definition could lead to the exclusion of critical evidence in criminal proceedings, even if the connection to the original unlawful surveillance is remote or if the evidence would have been discovered anyway through legitimate means.
Estimated impact: High, as it directly impacts the use of FISA-derived evidence in legal proceedings, potentially leading to the suppression of evidence in cases where violations occur.