RESCUE Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Kean, Thomas H. [R-NJ-7]
- Committees
- Foreign Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 26, 2026
Bottom line
The RESCUE Act seeks to economically isolate Rosatom and reduce global reliance on Russian nuclear energy in response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine.
What it actually does
This bill mandates comprehensive sanctions against Russia's State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom and any foreign entities that engage in new nuclear reactor construction or significant transactions with Rosatom. It aims to decouple the United States and its allies from the Russian nuclear energy sector, requiring the President to develop a strategy for this transition and to report on the existing U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that this bill is a crucial step to cut off a significant revenue stream to the Russian Federation, diminish its malign influence in the global energy sector, and enhance international energy security by diversifying nuclear energy supply chains away from a hostile state. They contend it aligns U.S. policy with its values regarding international law and non-proliferation.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that imposing broad sanctions on Rosatom could disrupt global nuclear fuel and technology supplies, potentially raising energy costs for U.S. allies heavily dependent on Russian nuclear technology. They may also contend that such measures could inadvertently complicate international nuclear safety and non-proliferation efforts by limiting engagement channels with a major nuclear power.
The bill is moderately complex but provides sufficient detail for an informed reader to understand its core implications within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2
U.S. Policy on Russian Nuclear Energy Sector
This section establishes the official policy of the United States to end its reliance on Russia's nuclear energy sector, including Rosatom, due to Russia's war against Ukraine. It commits the U.S. to work with allies to find alternative nuclear energy suppliers, limit Russia's revenue through sanctions and export controls against Rosatom, and prevent Rosatom from being used as a tool of malign international influence.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that this policy statement clearly articulates the U.S. stance against Russia's use of its nuclear energy sector for malign purposes and provides a necessary framework for subsequent actions to enhance global energy security and uphold international law.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against a policy statement itself, though the underlying policy goals and their implementation may be contested by those concerned about global energy market stability.
Tradeoffs
The policy balances the imperative to counter Russian aggression with the practical challenges of transitioning away from a globally integrated nuclear energy supplier.
Section 3
Presidential Strategy for Decoupling from Russian Nuclear Energy
This provision requires the President to submit an annual strategy to Congress for four years, starting 180 days after enactment. The strategy must detail plans to help U.S. allies find alternative nuclear energy suppliers, permanently decouple the U.S. from the Russian nuclear industry, and replace Rosatom as the primary entity for reactor safety, operation, and overhaul services for Russian-designed reactors. It also requires descriptions of vulnerabilities in allied nuclear supply chains, consultations with allies, proposed assistance to the IAEA's low-enriched uranium fuel bank, and efforts to prevent sanctions evasion.
Section 4(a)
Mandatory Sanctions on Rosatom and Related Entities
This section mandates that 180 days after the bill's enactment, the President must impose sanctions on any foreign person determined to operate in the Russian Federation's state-owned nuclear energy sector (e.g., Rosatom). Sanctions also apply to foreign persons who knowingly engage in new nuclear reactor construction contracts, significant related transactions, or provide construction services for such reactors involving the sanctioned Russian entities. Additionally, any foreign person owned, controlled, or directed by a sanctioned entity will also face sanctions.
Section 4(c)
Correspondent and Payable-Through Account Restrictions
This provision grants the President the authority to prescribe regulations that prohibit or impose strict conditions on foreign financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States. This authority applies if the President determines that the foreign financial institution has, after the date of enactment, facilitated the activities of any foreign person sanctioned under Section 4(a) (i.e., Rosatom or its associated entities).
Section 4(d)
Conditions for Sanctions Termination
This provision outlines the specific conditions under which the President may terminate the sanctions imposed on Rosatom-related entities. These conditions include Russia ceasing hostilities and withdrawing all forces from Ukraine's internationally recognized territory, Rosatom not misusing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Russia not funding its illegal occupation with Rosatom proceeds, Russia's full compliance with strategic arms treaties, and Rosatom's nuclear material transfers not contributing to nuclear weapons or illicit nuclear activity in third countries. The President must certify these conditions to Congress 30 days prior to termination.
Section 4(f)(2)
Waiver for Medical and Industrial Isotope Production
This provision allows the President to waive the application of sanctions for transactions related to the production of medical isotopes or industrial isotopes. This waiver can be granted for periods not exceeding one year, renewable for up to seven years, provided the President determines that domestic medical or industrial isotope production is insufficient to meet U.S. requirements and certifies to Congress that the U.S. is taking measurable steps to establish supply chains not reliant on Rosatom or other Russian sources.
Section 4(g)(1)(D)
Exception for Critical Reactor Safety and Security
This provision explicitly states that the sanctions imposed under this Act shall not apply to any activities that are required for the safe operation of nuclear reactors, including critical reactor safety, safeguards, and security, in cases where there are no alternative suppliers available. This ensures that essential services and materials for maintaining nuclear safety are not disrupted by the sanctions.
Section 6
Review of U.S.-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
This section declares U.S. policy that any nuclear cooperation agreement (known as a '123 Agreement') must serve U.S. national security interests and advance non-proliferation principles. It then requires the Secretary of State to submit a report within 90 days on the existing 2011 U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement. This report must assess the agreement's benefits to U.S. national security and non-proliferation objectives, and detail Rosatom's activities related to the misuse of nuclear material in Ukraine, funding Russia's illegal occupation, nuclear testing, transfers to third countries that contribute to nuclear weapons activity, and support for China's nuclear expansion.
Sanctions shall not apply to activities required for the safe operation of nuclear reactors, including critical reactor safety, safeguards, and security, in which there are no alternative suppliers.
Section 4(g)(1)(D)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to group all exceptions together, but its importance for global nuclear safety might be overlooked by a casual reader focusing on the main sanctions provisions.
Case for: Proponents argue this exception is vital to prevent unintended nuclear safety crises globally, particularly in countries operating Russian-designed reactors that may rely on Rosatom for unique parts or services. It ensures that the pursuit of sanctions does not inadvertently create dangerous situations.
Case against: No specific case against this provision, as nuclear safety is a universally accepted priority. However, some might argue that the definition of 'no alternative suppliers' could be interpreted broadly, potentially creating a loophole.
Estimated impact: Prevents potential disruptions to the safe operation of numerous nuclear power plants worldwide, mitigating risks of accidents or security breaches.
The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations promulgated under subsection (d) to carry out this section.
Section 4(h)(2)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative drafting practice to avoid reprinting lengthy statutory language, but it requires external knowledge to understand the full scope of potential legal consequences.
Case for: Proponents argue that referencing existing, well-established penalties under IEEPA ensures consistency and leverages a proven enforcement framework for sanctions violations, providing clear legal consequences for non-compliance.
Case against: No specific case against referencing existing law, but critics of sanctions regimes generally might argue that the penalties are too severe or that the broad authority granted under IEEPA can be overused.
Estimated impact: Violations can lead to significant civil penalties (up to $356,574 per violation or twice the amount of the transaction) and criminal penalties (up to $1 million fine and 20 years imprisonment), deterring non-compliance.
The authority to impose sanctions under this section shall terminate on the date that is 7 years after the date of enactment of this Act.
Section 4(j)
Why it matters:While some sunset clauses are prominently featured, placing it at the end of a detailed section can make it less visible, potentially downplaying the temporary nature of the authority.
Case for: Proponents argue that a sunset clause ensures that the sanctions authority is reviewed periodically by Congress, allowing for adjustments based on evolving geopolitical circumstances and the effectiveness of the measures. It prevents indefinite application of potentially disruptive sanctions.
Case against: Critics might argue that a 7-year sunset is too short for a complex issue like decoupling from a major nuclear supplier, potentially creating uncertainty for long-term planning and investment in alternative supply chains. Others might argue it's too long if the situation resolves sooner.
Estimated impact: Limits the duration of the sanctions regime to a maximum of 7 years, requiring future legislative action to extend or modify it.