Election Infrastructure Integrity Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Norman, Ralph [R-SC-5]
- Committees
- Committee on House Administration (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 26, 2026
Bottom line
The bill mandates a public database of election system vendors and their ownership, with a significant penalty of federal funding loss for non-compliant states.
What it actually does
This bill, the "Election Infrastructure Integrity Act," requires the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to create and maintain a public database of private vendors involved in federal election systems. States and local governments must submit detailed information about these vendors, including contracts and ownership, to the EAC within 30 days of each federal election. Non-compliant states will be ineligible for federal election administration funds.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue this bill enhances transparency and security in federal elections by shedding light on the private companies that develop and maintain critical election infrastructure. They contend that knowing who owns and contracts with these vendors, especially regarding foreign interests, is vital for public trust and national security, ensuring the integrity of the electoral process.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that the reporting requirements, particularly the 30-day post-election deadline, could be overly burdensome for state and local election officials, especially smaller jurisdictions with limited resources. They may also raise concerns about the potential for proprietary information to be exposed through contract disclosures, even with security exceptions, and the broad definition of "election system" could lead to extensive data collection.
The bill is very concise and can be read quickly, allowing ample time for detailed consideration of its implications.
Section 2(a), inserting new Section 305(a) into HAVA.
Mandate for Public Election Vendor Transparency Database
This provision directs the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to create and maintain a publicly accessible online database. This database will list all private companies that provide, support, or maintain any part of the election systems used in federal elections, based on information submitted by state and local governments.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that a public database is essential for increasing transparency and public confidence in election systems. They believe that knowing which private entities are involved in election infrastructure is a fundamental step towards ensuring election integrity and accountability.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that simply creating a database without clear standards for data verification or security protocols for the information itself could lead to misinformation or expose vendors to undue scrutiny without proper context.
Tradeoffs
The tension lies between the public's right to know and the potential for misinterpretation or misuse of raw vendor data without proper context or analysis by the EAC.
Section 2(a), inserting new Section 305(b) and (c) into HAVA.
Mandatory Information Submission by Election Jurisdictions
This provision requires every state and local government responsible for federal elections to submit specific information about their election system vendors to the EAC. This submission must occur within 30 days after each federal election and must include the vendor's identity, contract terms (with security exceptions), and detailed ownership information, including parent companies, beneficial owners, and any foreign ownership or controlling interests.
Section 2(a), inserting new Section 305(d) into HAVA.
Withholding of Federal Election Administration Funds for Non-Compliance
This provision establishes a significant penalty for states that fail to comply with the vendor information submission requirements. If a state does not meet the mandates of this section, it will be prohibited from receiving any federal funds under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) or any other federal law intended for the administration of federal elections.
Defines "election system" broadly to include voting systems, election management systems, voter registration websites or databases, electronic pollbooks, systems for tabulating or reporting election results, election agency communications systems, and "any other information system (as defined in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code) that the Commission identifies as central to the management, support, or administration of a Federal election."
Section 2(a), inserting new Section 305(e)(2) into HAVA.
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to place definitions at the end of a section. However, its breadth means its implications might not be immediately apparent.
Case for: Proponents argue that a broad definition is necessary to ensure comprehensive transparency across all critical components of modern election infrastructure, preventing loopholes that could allow significant vendors to escape scrutiny.
Case against: Critics might argue that the definition is excessively broad, potentially encompassing minor IT services or administrative tools not directly related to vote casting or tabulation, thereby imposing unnecessary reporting burdens on jurisdictions and vendors. The "any other information system" clause gives significant discretion to the EAC.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the scope of vendor reporting beyond just voting machines to nearly all digital infrastructure supporting elections.