SACRED Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Suozzi, Thomas R. [D-NY-3]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 9, 2026
Bottom line
This bill creates federal criminal penalties and civil avenues for redress to protect individuals' access to places of religious worship from harassment and obstruction, aiming to safeguard religious freedom.
What it actually does
This bill amends title 18, United States Code, to establish new federal criminal offenses and civil remedies for harassing or obstructing individuals lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise their First Amendment right to religious freedom within 100 feet of a place of religious worship. It specifically prohibits conduct intended to intimidate or obstruct passage causing reasonable fear for physical safety, and intentionally approaching and harassing a person within 8 feet in that zone.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue this bill is crucial for protecting the fundamental First Amendment right to religious freedom, ensuring that individuals can access places of worship without fear of intimidation or harassment. They contend it provides necessary legal tools to address disruptive behaviors that can impede religious practice and create unsafe environments, especially given recent increases in incidents targeting religious institutions.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that existing state and local laws are sufficient to address such conduct, and federalizing these offenses could lead to overreach or infringe upon legitimate protest activities protected by the First Amendment. Concerns could also be raised about the potential for broad interpretation of 'harass' or 'intimidate' to stifle free speech, even if peaceful.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for a reader to understand its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. § 251(a)
Prohibits Intimidation or Obstruction Near Places of Religious Worship
This provision makes it a federal crime to engage in any course of conduct within 100 feet of a place of religious worship with the intent to intimidate or obstruct someone exercising their religious freedom, if it causes reasonable fear for physical safety. It also prohibits intentionally approaching and harassing any person within 8 feet of them within the 100-foot zone.
Supporters argue
Supporters contend this provision directly addresses disruptive and threatening behaviors that prevent people from safely practicing their faith, ensuring that places of worship remain sanctuaries. They argue the specific distance and intent requirements are carefully crafted to protect religious freedom without unduly infringing on other rights.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that the definitions of 'intimidate' and 'harass' could be broadly interpreted, potentially criminalizing peaceful protest or expressive conduct that does not genuinely threaten safety. They may also question the necessity of federal intervention when local laws often address such disturbances.
Tradeoffs
Balances the right to religious freedom and safe access to worship with the First Amendment right to free speech and assembly, particularly regarding protest activities near religious sites.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. § 251(b)
Establishes Criminal Penalties
This section outlines the criminal penalties for violating the prohibited activities. A first offense can result in a fine or up to one year imprisonment, or both. Subsequent offenses carry fines or up to three years imprisonment, or both. Nonviolent conduct has lower maximum penalties ($10,000 fine/6 months for first, $25,000 fine/18 months for subsequent). If bodily injury results, imprisonment can be up to 10 years; if death results, it can be for any term of years or life.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. § 251(c)(1)
Private Right of Action for Victims
This provision creates a private right of action, allowing individuals lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise religious freedom, or the entity owning/operating a place of worship, to sue for relief. Courts can award appropriate relief, including injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, legal costs, and expert witness fees. Plaintiffs can elect statutory damages of $5,000 per violation instead of actual damages.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) and (3)
Enforcement by Federal and State Attorneys General
This allows the U.S. Attorney General to initiate civil actions if there's reasonable cause to believe a person or group is being, has been, or may be injured by a violation. The court can award injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and civil penalties ($10,000-$25,000 per violation). State Attorneys General can also bring similar actions as parens patriae on behalf of their residents.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. § 251(d)
Clarifies Scope and Non-Preemption
This section clarifies that the Act should not be construed to prohibit expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or demonstration) protected by the First Amendment outside places of worship. It also states that the Act does not provide exclusive penalties or remedies and does not preempt State or local laws that offer similar protections.
This subsection defines key terms central to the bill's prohibitions, including 'obstruct,' 'intimidate,' 'harass,' 'course of conduct,' 'serious act,' and 'place of religious worship.' For instance, 'harass' requires a 'serious act' or 'course of conduct' that interferes with freedom of movement and causes reasonable fear of physical harm or substantial emotional distress. 'Serious act' is further defined as a single act of threatening, intimidating, or violent conduct.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. § 251(e)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to consolidate definitions at the end of a section. However, the specific wording of these definitions is critical to the bill's practical impact and could be easily missed by a reader focusing only on the main operative clauses.
Case for: Proponents argue that precise definitions are necessary to ensure legal clarity and prevent arbitrary enforcement, distinguishing between protected speech and genuinely harmful conduct. They contend these definitions provide the necessary legal guardrails.
Case against: Critics might argue that even with definitions, terms like 'substantial emotional distress' or 'threatening, intimidating, or violent conduct' can be subjective and open to interpretation, potentially leading to overreach or chilling effects on speech despite the intent to clarify.
Estimated impact: These definitions will directly determine the scope of prosecutable offenses and civil liabilities under the Act, significantly affecting how broadly or narrowly the law is applied to various forms of expressive conduct near religious sites.