Technical corrections only. The diff reflects the bill's progression from "Reported in House" (v2) to "Engrossed in House" (v3), including the addition of a 'Passed the House of Representatives' attestation. No substantive policy changes were made between v2 and v3.
Fraud Prevention and Accountability Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Sessions, Pete [R-TX-17]
- Committees
- Oversight and Government Reform Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jun 11, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to centralize and strengthen federal efforts to detect, prevent, and recover fraudulent payments and improper spending across all government programs through enhanced data analytics, interagency coordination, and a permanent oversight body.
What it actually does
This bill establishes new, permanent government-wide fraud prevention and program integrity functions within the Department of the Treasury's Fiscal Service, including administering the Do Not Pay system and a voluntary data analysis program. It also creates a permanent Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery (IGFAR) to oversee "covered funds" across the government, taking over from the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC). Furthermore, it grants the Treasury Secretary new authorities for data sharing to prevent fraud and mandates legislative recommendations for future large spending bills to embed fraud prevention from the outset.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the bill creates a much-needed permanent infrastructure to combat the pervasive problem of fraud, waste, and abuse in federal spending, building on lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic response. They contend that centralizing data analysis and oversight functions will improve efficiency, prevent billions in improper payments, and ensure taxpayer dollars are spent as intended, rather than relying on ad-hoc committees for future emergencies.
Opponents contend
Critics might raise concerns about the potential for overreach by a centralized Inspector General, the privacy implications of expanded data sharing across government agencies and with private entities, or the cost of establishing new permanent federal offices. Some may also argue that existing agency-specific Inspector Generals are sufficient, and a new government-wide entity could create bureaucratic redundancies or dilute accountability.
The bill is moderately dense but readable for an informed audience, requiring about 20 minutes to grasp its core provisions and implications.
Section 2, amending 31 U.S.C. 306.
Permanent Governmentwide Fraud Prevention and Data Analysis Program
This provision establishes a permanent set of functions within the Treasury Department's Fiscal Service. These functions include administering the "Do Not Pay" system and creating a voluntary government-wide data analysis program. This program will use data sharing and analytical services to help federal, state, and local governments detect fraud and prevent improper payments, but explicitly not for policy analysis or enforcement actions.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this creates a crucial, permanent infrastructure for proactive fraud prevention, leveraging data and technology to protect taxpayer money more effectively than current fragmented efforts.
Critics contend
Some might express concern about the scope of data collection and sharing, even if voluntary, and the potential for mission creep beyond fraud prevention into areas that could impact legitimate beneficiaries.
Tradeoffs
Balances the need for robust fraud prevention with concerns about data privacy and the administrative burden on agencies to participate in voluntary programs.
Section 3, adding 31 U.S.C. 317.
Creation of a Permanent Governmentwide Oversight Body
This section establishes a new, permanent Office of the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery (IGFAR) within the Department of the Treasury. The IGFAR, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, will conduct and coordinate audits and investigations of "covered funds" across the entire federal government. This includes providing support to agency-specific Inspectors General, identifying major risks, promoting best practices, and coordinating with the Department of Justice to detect and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of federal funds.
Section 3, 31 U.S.C. 317(l)(2).
Expansive Scope of Inspector General's Authority
This provision broadly defines "covered funds" that fall under the IGFAR's oversight. It includes funds from specific major legislative acts (like CARES, American Rescue Plan, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Inflation Reduction Act, CHIPS Act), Small Business Administration loans, unemployment compensation, any federal award of $50,000 or more, any intramural research payment, and any emergency spending related to disaster relief or economic recovery. This expansive definition ensures a wide-ranging mandate for the new IG, covering a significant portion of federal expenditures.
Section 4, amending 31 U.S.C. 321(a) by adding paragraph (11).
Embedding Fraud Prevention in Future Major Legislation
This provision requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with OMB and the new IGFAR, to provide legislative recommendations to Congress for any future supplemental appropriations bills totaling over $100 billion, or new programs with over $100 million in annual spending. These recommendations must ensure that existing fraud prevention functions are used, adequately resourced, and that best practices for fraud prevention, payment integrity, and spending transparency (including harmonized reporting and sub-recipient transparency) are embedded from the outset of new legislation.
Section 5.
Sunset of Temporary Pandemic Oversight Body
This section explicitly terminates the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) on December 31, 2028, and transfers all its assets, obligations, and personnel to the newly established Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery (IGFAR). This effectively transitions the temporary pandemic-focused oversight body into a permanent, broader government-wide fraud prevention and recovery entity, aiming to preserve institutional knowledge and infrastructure developed during the pandemic response.
Changes the authorization for the governmentwide data analysis center from "may" to "shall."
Section 2(c), amending Section 6(c)(1) of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA).
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for technical amendments to existing law. It's not necessarily evasive, but its significance can be missed.
Case for: Supporters would argue this strengthens the mandate for the data analysis center, ensuring its establishment and operation are not discretionary but required, thereby solidifying the foundation for government-wide fraud prevention efforts.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against such technical strengthening of mandates, especially for a program aimed at efficiency and fraud prevention.
Estimated impact: This change ensures the data analysis program within the Fiscal Service is a mandatory, rather than optional, function, providing a more stable basis for its operations and interagency cooperation.
Allows the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery (IGFAR) to employ annuitants (individuals receiving a civil service retirement annuity) for oversight of covered funds, subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 9902(g) as if the Office were the Department of Defense.
Section 3(e)(3), adding 31 U.S.C. 317(e)(3).
Why it matters:This is a technical provision to grant specific hiring flexibility, common in legislative drafting. It's not inherently evasive.
Case for: Proponents would argue this flexibility is crucial for the IGFAR to quickly staff up with experienced personnel, particularly those with specialized knowledge in auditing, investigations, and financial analysis, who may already be retired from federal service. This leverages institutional knowledge.
Case against: Some might argue that employing annuitants could limit opportunities for new hires or raise questions about the long-term career paths within the new office, though this is a minor concern compared to the benefit of expertise.
Estimated impact: This provision facilitates the rapid and effective staffing of the IGFAR, especially during its initial establishment and for complex investigations, by allowing it to draw on a wider pool of experienced talent.
States that the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery shall obtain legal advice from a counsel either reporting directly to the Inspector General or another inspector general within the executive branch.
Section 3(b)(6), adding 31 U.S.C. 317(b)(6).
Why it matters:This is a standard detail for establishing an IG office, ensuring access to independent legal advice. It's not evasive.
Case for: Supporters would argue this ensures the IGFAR has access to independent legal counsel, which is critical for maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of its audits and investigations, free from potential influence from the Treasury Department's general counsel.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against ensuring independent legal counsel for an Inspector General, as it is a best practice for oversight bodies.
Estimated impact: This provision reinforces the independence of the IGFAR by guaranteeing access to dedicated or independent legal advice, crucial for its role in investigating fraud across multiple agencies.