STAR Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Soto, Darren [D-FL-9]
- Committees
- Science, Space, and Technology Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 22, 2026
Bottom line
This bill grants new counter-UAS authorities to NASA and private space launch operators to enhance security against drone threats, while establishing oversight and liability frameworks.
What it actually does
The STAR Act authorizes the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and entities licensed for space launch activities to detect, identify, monitor, track, warn, disrupt control of, seize, confiscate, disable, damage, or destroy unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that pose a threat to their critical facilities and assets. It establishes reporting requirements for such actions, outlines liability provisions for UAS operators, and mandates interagency policy coordination for counter-UAS operations.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue the bill is essential for protecting critical national security and economic assets, preventing espionage, sabotage, and ensuring the safety of personnel and expensive equipment at NASA facilities and private space launch sites from the growing threat posed by unauthorized drones. They emphasize the need for immediate, decisive action capabilities to counter evolving UAS threats.
Opponents contend
Opponents might raise concerns about potential overreach of authority, risks to civil liberties and privacy, the possibility of collateral damage from counter-UAS actions, and the lack of clear federal preemption over airspace, potentially leading to conflicts with existing FAA regulations or local jurisdictions. They may also question the broad powers granted to private entities.
The bill is relatively short and its core provisions are accessible, allowing a diligent reader to understand its main impacts within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(a), adding new section 20118(a)-(b) to title 51, U.S. Code
NASA Counter-UAS Authority
This provision grants the NASA Administrator and authorized personnel the power to detect, identify, monitor, track, warn, disrupt control of, seize, confiscate, disable, damage, or destroy unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that pose a threat to the safety or security of designated critical NASA facilities. These actions can be taken without prior consent from the UAS operator.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this authority is crucial for NASA to protect its sensitive research, development, and operational facilities, which are vital for national security and scientific advancement, from potential espionage, interference, or accidental damage by unauthorized drones.
Critics contend
Critics might express concerns about the broad nature of the authority, the potential for misidentification or accidental damage to legitimate UAS operations, and the implications for private property rights in airspace.
Tradeoffs
Balances national security and facility protection with potential impacts on civil aviation and private drone operations.
Section 2(a), adding new section 20118(c) to title 51, U.S. Code
Forfeiture of Seized UAS to the United States
Any unmanned aircraft system or aircraft seized by the NASA Administrator under the authority granted by this act is subject to forfeiture to the United States government. This means the government can permanently take possession of the drone, potentially for evidence or to prevent future misuse.
Section 2(a), adding new section 20118(e) to title 51, U.S. Code
Interagency Policy Coordination
The NASA Administrator must develop uniform policies for counter-UAS actions in coordination with the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. This ensures a consistent federal approach to drone threats and minimizes conflicting authorities.
Section 2(a), adding new section 20118(g) to title 51, U.S. Code
Liability Framework for NASA Actions
This provision states that neither the NASA Administrator nor NASA officers/employees are entitled to absolute or qualified immunity as a defense to liability under this section. However, if a UAS poses a threat and action is taken to mitigate it, the UAS operator is liable for damages caused by such action.
Section 2(b), adding new section 50925(a)-(b) to title 51, U.S. Code
Private Space Launch Counter-UAS Authority
This provision grants "covered entities" (persons or entities licensed under chapter 509 to conduct launch, reentry, testing, or manufacturing activities) and their authorized personnel the same range of counter-UAS actions as NASA (detect, track, disrupt, seize, destroy) to mitigate threats to their "covered property" (real property and airspace used for space launch activities).
Section 2(b), adding new section 50925(c) to title 51, U.S. Code
Forfeiture of UAS to Local Law Enforcement
Any unmanned aircraft system or aircraft seized by a covered entity (private space launch operator) is subject to forfeiture to the local law enforcement agency for the jurisdiction where it was seized. This ensures seized drones are handled by appropriate legal authorities.
Defines "covered facility" for NASA as any facility under NASA's jurisdiction that is identified by the Administrator as critical to a function of the Administration. This grants the Administrator discretion to designate which facilities receive counter-UAS protection.
Section 2(a), adding new section 20118(i)(1) to title 51, U.S. Code
Why it matters:While standard legislative practice to place definitions in a dedicated section, the discretion granted to the Administrator in designating critical facilities is a significant power that could be overlooked.
Case for: Proponents argue this flexibility allows NASA to adapt security measures to evolving threats and prioritize protection for its most vital assets without needing further legislative action for each designation.
Case against: Critics might argue that this grants broad, unchecked power to the Administrator to unilaterally expand the scope of counter-UAS operations without public input or specific congressional approval for each facility.
Estimated impact: Potentially affects the security posture and operational scope of numerous NASA centers and sites across the country, impacting surrounding airspace and UAS operators.
Explicitly states that "Neither the Administrator nor the officers and employees of the Administration are entitled to assert any form of absolute or qualified immunity as a defense to liability under this section" for actions taken under this authority.
Section 2(a), adding new section 20118(g) to title 51, U.S. Code
Why it matters:Could be seen as a measure to ensure accountability, but its placement might downplay its potential impact on federal personnel, potentially making it less visible to a casual reader.
Case for: Proponents argue this ensures a high level of scrutiny and responsibility for NASA personnel when exercising potentially destructive force, preventing arbitrary actions and promoting careful decision-making.
Case against: Critics might contend that removing immunity could make NASA personnel overly cautious, delaying critical responses to genuine threats for fear of personal legal repercussions, thereby undermining the bill's intent to enable swift action.
Estimated impact: Could significantly alter the risk assessment for NASA employees involved in counter-UAS operations, potentially affecting training, protocols, and willingness to act in high-stakes situations.