To amend the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to extend the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 through April 20, 2029, and for other purposes.
- Sponsor
- Rep. Higgins, Clay [R-LA-3]
- Committees
- Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 27, 2026
Bottom line
This bill seeks to reauthorize a key foreign intelligence surveillance tool while introducing new safeguards and accountability measures regarding the collection and use of information pertaining to U.S. persons.
What it actually does
This bill extends the authority of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) until April 20, 2029, which allows the government to conduct surveillance on non-U.S. persons located abroad for foreign intelligence purposes. It introduces a new warrant requirement for intentionally targeting the communications of U.S. persons under Section 702, restricts the FBI's ingestion and querying of unminimized U.S. person data, and establishes new criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosures or queries of such information. Additionally, it mandates new procedures for congressional access to the FISA Court and requires a Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of Section 702 targeting procedures.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that Section 702 is a vital tool for national security, enabling the collection of foreign intelligence on non-U.S. persons located abroad, and that these amendments strike a necessary balance by adding robust protections for U.S. persons' privacy and enhancing oversight. They contend the warrant requirement and increased penalties address past abuses and build trust, ensuring the authority can continue responsibly.
Opponents contend
Opponents may argue that the proposed warrant requirement for targeting U.S. persons is insufficient or that Section 702 itself is fundamentally flawed and should not be reauthorized without more significant reforms. Some civil liberties advocates might contend that the bill does not go far enough to prevent "backdoor searches" of American data or that the provided defenses for new criminal penalties could undermine accountability.
The bill is short and relatively straightforward for those familiar with FISA, allowing for quick evaluation of its key provisions and their implications.
Section 1(a)
Extension of FISA Title VII Authorities
This section extends the sunset date for Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), specifically Section 702, from April 30, 2026, to April 20, 2029. This means the government's authority to conduct surveillance on non-U.S. persons located outside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes will continue for an additional three years.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Section 702 is indispensable for gathering vital foreign intelligence on terrorists, spies, and cyber attackers operating abroad, protecting national security. Without it, critical intelligence gaps would emerge, leaving the nation vulnerable.
Critics contend
Critics contend that Section 702 has been subject to abuses, particularly concerning the incidental collection and querying of U.S. persons' data, and should not be reauthorized without more fundamental reforms to protect civil liberties and prevent government overreach.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the imperative of maintaining national security intelligence capabilities against concerns about potential overreach and privacy implications for U.S. persons whose communications may be incidentally collected.
Section 2(a)
Restriction on FBI Ingestion of Unminimized Information
This amendment prohibits the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from ingesting unminimized information acquired under Section 702 into its analytical databases unless the targeted person is relevant to an existing, open, and predicated full national security investigation. If the subject of such an investigation is a U.S. person, the investigation must be supported by probable cause.
Section 2(b)
Warrant Requirement for Direct U.S. Person Targeting
This new subsection explicitly prohibits any U.S. Government officer or employee from intentionally targeting for acquisition the communications of a U.S. person under a Section 702 authorization. Instead, if there is probable cause that a U.S. person is a foreign power/agent or is committing a crime, the government must seek a warrant or other appropriate order under existing FISA titles (Title I, III, or 703-705) or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 2(c)
Exclusionary Rule for Unlawfully Acquired U.S. Person Data
This amendment states that any information concerning a U.S. person acquired under Section 702 cannot be used as evidence against that person in a criminal proceeding if it was acquired in violation of the new warrant requirement established in subsection (o) of Section 702.
Section 3
Enhanced Penalties for FISA Misconduct
This section amends FISA to establish new criminal offenses and penalties. It targets unauthorized disclosure or retention of classified Section 702 communications involving known U.S. persons (up to 8 years imprisonment), unauthorized U.S. person queries by government employees (up to 2 years), and falsifying records or misrepresenting compliance to the FISA Court regarding Section 702 queries (up to 2 years). It also defines defenses for these offenses.
Section 4
Improved Congressional Access to FISA Court
This section mandates the Attorney General to revoke existing procedures (issued by December 31, 2025) and issue new ones within 60 days of enactment. These new procedures must ensure that Members of Congress and specified staff have access to any proceeding of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR), complying with section 5(d) of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (Public Law 118-49).
Section 5
Attorney Approval for FBI U.S. Person Queries
This section amends Section 702(f)(3)(A)(i) of FISA by striking "supervisor (or employee of equivalent or greater rank) or", effectively removing the option for a supervisor to approve a U.S. person query and requiring approval from an attorney for such queries by the FBI.
Section 6
GAO Audit of Section 702 Targeting Procedures
This section mandates the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct an audit of the targeting procedures used for acquisitions under Section 702, including technical mechanisms, implementation, and operations. A report on the audit's results, analyzing whether procedures appropriately limit targeting to non-U.S. persons outside the U.S., must be submitted to relevant congressional committees within one year.
The amendments made by this Act take effect on the earlier of the date of enactment of this Act or April 29, 2026.
Section 1(b)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for specifying the commencement of a new law, particularly when aiming to prevent a lapse in authority. It's a technical detail rather than a policy debate point.
Case for: This provision ensures the continuity of Section 702 authority, preventing a lapse even if the bill passes slightly after the previous sunset date, thereby avoiding disruption to critical national security operations.
Case against: While generally procedural, an early effective date could be seen as limiting the time for public or congressional review of the bill's full implications, though in this context it's primarily about preventing a lapse.
Estimated impact: Ensures the Section 702 authority does not lapse, maintaining operational continuity for the U.S. Intelligence Community.
This subsection provides specific defenses for the new criminal offenses related to unauthorized queries and misrepresentations. For unauthorized queries, a defense exists if the query was authorized by a supervisor, attorney, or Senior Executive Service member, or was for a duly authorized purpose. For misrepresentations, a defense exists if authorized by a supervisor, attorney, or SES member, or if made based on a good faith understanding of authorities and facts known at the time.
Section 3(c)
Why it matters:It is standard legislative practice to define the scope of criminal liability and provide carve-outs for legitimate actions taken by government employees, ensuring that the law targets malicious intent rather than good-faith errors.
Case for: Proponents argue these defenses protect government employees from prosecution for actions taken in good faith or with appropriate authorization, preventing a chilling effect on legitimate intelligence work and ensuring analysts can perform their duties without undue fear.
Case against: Critics might argue these defenses could create loopholes, making it harder to prosecute individuals for abuses, especially the "good faith understanding" defense for misrepresentations, potentially undermining the intent of increased accountability.
Estimated impact: These defenses shape the practical enforceability of the new criminal penalties, potentially limiting successful prosecutions to cases of clear malicious intent or gross negligence, rather than unintentional errors.