Protecting U.S. Farmland and Sensitive Sites From Foreign Adversaries Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 7, 2026
Bottom line
The bill dramatically tightens federal oversight on foreign adversary land purchases in the U.S., aiming to bolster national security and food security by making it much harder for designated adversaries to acquire strategic real estate.
What it actually does
This bill significantly expands the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review and potentially block real estate transactions involving foreign adversary persons. It broadens the definitions of "sensitive site" and "foreign adversary," mandates CFIUS review for "elevated risk real estate transactions" (including agricultural land and property near sensitive sites), and establishes a strong presumption that such transactions pose an unresolvable national security risk unless proven otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill is crucial for national security, preventing hostile foreign governments from acquiring strategic U.S. assets like farmland and land near military bases or critical infrastructure. They contend that current law is insufficient to address the growing threat of foreign adversaries using real estate investments to gain intelligence, disrupt supply chains, or exert undue influence, thereby protecting U.S. food security and military readiness.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill's broad definitions, particularly for "sensitive site" and "foreign adversary," could lead to overreach, stifle legitimate foreign investment, and create unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles. They might also raise concerns about potential discrimination against individuals or entities based on their country of origin, and the impact on property rights or the free market.
The bill is relatively short and its core intent is clear, making it accessible for a reader to grasp its main implications within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2
Expanded Definitions of 'Elevated Risk Real Estate Transaction' and 'Foreign Adversary'
This section defines an 'elevated risk real estate transaction' to include purchases or leases of agricultural land, land at or near air/maritime ports, or land in close proximity to a 'sensitive site' that could allow intelligence collection or expose national security activities. It also explicitly lists specific countries as 'foreign adversaries,' including China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela, and defines 'foreign adversary person' to include entities controlled by these adversaries.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue these definitions are critical to clearly identify and target national security threats posed by specific foreign governments and their proxies, ensuring CFIUS has the necessary scope to act.
Critics contend
Critics may contend that the broad definitions, especially for 'foreign adversary person,' could lead to overreach and unintended consequences, potentially impacting legitimate businesses with indirect ties to listed countries.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the need for clear national security protections against concerns about overly broad restrictions that might deter legitimate foreign investment or create administrative burdens.
Section 2(17)
Expanded Definition of 'Sensitive Site'
This provision dramatically expands the list of what constitutes a 'sensitive site' for CFIUS review purposes. It now includes not only military installations but also military training routes, special use airspace, controlled firing areas, military operations areas, facilities with security clearances, intelligence community facilities, NASA facilities, federally funded research and development centers, university-affiliated research centers, science and technology reinvention laboratories, airports, maritime ports, various electronic and telecommunications facilities (including fiber-optic nodes, data centers, cloud-computing facilities, submarine cable landing stations, and critical communications infrastructure), electric powerplants, and any other site determined by the Secretary of Defense or Homeland Security.
Section 3
Protection of U.S. Food Security
This section amends the Defense Production Act of 1950 to require CFIUS to consider the current and long-term projection of requirements for sources of food, water, and other agricultural products in the United States, both in aggregate and locally/regionally, when reviewing covered transactions. It also specifically directs CFIUS to assess the effects a transaction may have on U.S. food security, including through foreign adversary acquisition of biotechnology related to agriculture.
Section 4
Mandatory Declarations and Expanded CFIUS Jurisdiction for Elevated Risk Real Estate Transactions
This section mandates that parties to an 'elevated risk real estate transaction' (as defined in Section 2) involving a foreign adversary person must submit a declaration to CFIUS. It explicitly brings these transactions under CFIUS's expanded jurisdiction, differentiating them from real estate transactions by non-adversary foreign persons. This means that any purchase or lease of private or public real estate in the U.S. by a foreign adversary person, if it meets the 'elevated risk' criteria, automatically triggers a mandatory CFIUS review.
Section 5
Presumption of Unresolvability for Elevated Risk Real Estate Transactions
This section establishes a strong legal presumption that an 'elevated risk real estate transaction' by a foreign adversary person presents an 'unresolvable risk to national security.' CFIUS is mandated to conduct a national security investigation for such transactions unless it determines, by 'clear and convincing evidence,' that there is no national security risk and notifies Congress. Furthermore, the bill presumes that the risks of these transactions cannot be mitigated or resolved through agreements or conditions, unless CFIUS again finds, by 'clear and convincing evidence,' that a resolution is possible and notifies Congress.
Section 6
Addition of Secretary of Agriculture to CFIUS
This section amends the Defense Production Act of 1950 to add the Secretary of Agriculture as a member of CFIUS. The Secretary of Agriculture will specifically participate in all transactions related to the purchase of agriculture land, agriculture biotechnology, and any other transaction related to the agriculture industry in the United States, as determined by the Secretary.
Section 7
Preservation of State Authority
This section clarifies that nothing in the Act should be construed to preempt or supersede any existing or future State law that restricts or prohibits the purchase, lease, or acquisition of real estate or agricultural land by a foreign adversary person. This preservation of State authority applies as long as the State law is of general applicability within that State and does not target a specific transaction or party.
The definition of 'sensitive site' includes a broad category of 'any electronic or telecommunications facility' if it meets certain criteria (e.g., part of a backbone network, near another sensitive site, submarine cable landing station, processes sensitive information, or deemed critical by FCC). It also includes a catch-all 'any other site, as determined by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Homeland Security.'
Section 2(17)(N) and (P)
Why it matters:The detailed enumeration of telecommunications facilities is standard legislative practice for precision, but the 'any other site' clause grants significant, broad discretionary power to agency heads, which could be seen as potentially evasive of direct legislative debate on specific future inclusions.
Case for: Supporters argue that the broad telecommunications definitions are necessary to address evolving threats to digital infrastructure, and the 'any other site' clause provides essential flexibility for national security agencies to adapt to unforeseen threats without requiring new legislation.
Case against: Critics might argue that the broad telecommunications definitions could capture a vast array of common commercial properties, leading to over-regulation, and the 'any other site' clause grants excessive, unchecked power to executive agencies without sufficient congressional oversight.
Estimated impact: Potentially expands CFIUS's reach to a very large number of commercial properties and grants significant future discretion to executive agencies.
These subsections establish a triple layer of presumptions: (1) an 'elevated risk real estate transaction' requires a national security investigation unless CFIUS determines by 'clear and convincing evidence' it's not a risk; (2) such a transaction is presumed to present an 'unresolvable risk' unless CFIUS determines by 'clear and convincing evidence' it can be resolved otherwise; and (3) such a transaction is presumed to present a risk that 'cannot be resolved through any agreement or condition' unless CFIUS determines by 'clear and convincing evidence' it can be so resolved.
Section 5(a)(3) and 5(b)(9) and 5(c)(3)(E)
Why it matters:This structure is a sophisticated legislative technique to create a very high procedural bar without explicitly banning all transactions. It shifts the burden of proof dramatically, which is a significant policy choice that could be obscured by the technical legislative drafting.
Case for: Supporters argue that this robust set of presumptions is necessary to provide maximum protection against foreign adversary acquisitions, ensuring that only truly benign transactions can proceed and that CFIUS is empowered to act decisively.
Case against: Critics might argue that this creates an almost insurmountable hurdle, effectively acting as a de facto ban on a wide range of transactions, potentially stifling legitimate economic activity and raising concerns about due process given the high evidentiary standard.
Estimated impact: Will likely lead to a significant reduction in approved 'elevated risk real estate transactions' involving foreign adversary persons, effectively making them extremely difficult to complete.