CHARGE Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 12, 2026
Bottom line
This bill seeks to safeguard the U.S. electrical grid from potential cyberattacks or disruptions by banning EVs and related critical components from adversarial foreign manufacturers.
What it actually does
The CHARGE Act amends federal law to prohibit the sale, offer for sale, introduction into interstate commerce, or import of electric vehicles (EVs) or EV equipment, including specific vehicle charge power control components, if they are manufactured in whole or in part by a "foreign entity of concern." This aims to prevent potential vulnerabilities to the U.S. electrical grid through vehicle-to-grid (VTG) technology, which allows EVs to connect to and interact with the power grid.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue the bill is a critical national security measure, preventing foreign adversaries from exploiting vehicle-to-grid technology to destabilize the U.S. electrical infrastructure. They emphasize the potential for coordinated attacks via remotely updated vehicle software to cause widespread power outages, citing the significant economic and safety risks outlined in the bill's findings, including a hypothetical future blackout in Europe.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill could limit consumer choice, increase costs for electric vehicles, and potentially slow the adoption of EVs and the development of vehicle-to-grid technologies, which are crucial for grid resilience and renewable energy integration. They might also contend that existing cybersecurity measures or alternative regulatory approaches could address the risks without a blanket ban, or that the definition of "foreign entity of concern" is too broad or could be politically weaponized, leading to unintended trade disputes.
The bill is concise and can be read quickly, allowing ample time for stakeholders to understand its direct provisions and their immediate implications.
Section 3(a)
Defines Key Terms for Electric Vehicle Security
This section adds specific definitions to Title 49 of the U.S. Code, including "electric vehicle," "foreign entity of concern," and "vehicle charge power control component." The definition of "electric vehicle" refers to an existing statutory definition, "foreign entity of concern" refers to an existing comprehensive statutory definition, and "vehicle charge power control component" is newly defined to include critical onboard systems managing energy flow between the EV battery and the vehicle's energy port, such as onboard chargers and battery management controls. These definitions are foundational for the subsequent prohibitions.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that clear, specific definitions are essential for effective regulation and enforcement, ensuring that the scope of the prohibition is well-understood and targeted at critical components that could pose national security risks.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that relying on external definitions for "foreign entity of concern" could lead to ambiguity or political manipulation, potentially broadening the scope of the ban beyond its intended national security focus and creating uncertainty for businesses.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the need for precise legal language to enable effective enforcement against the potential for complexity or broad interpretation of referenced external definitions, which could have wide-ranging economic impacts.
Section 3(b)
Prohibits Sale and Import of EVs and Components from Foreign Entities of Concern
This provision amends existing law (Section 30112(a) of title 49, United States Code) to prohibit the sale, offering for sale, introduction into interstate commerce, or import into the United States of any electric vehicle or electric vehicle equipment if it is manufactured, in whole or in part, by a "foreign entity of concern." The prohibition also extends to any vehicle that uses a "vehicle charge power control component" manufactured by such an entity. This directly targets the supply chain of EVs and their critical grid-interfacing hardware, aiming to prevent potential vulnerabilities from reaching the U.S. market.
The bill includes a finding that states: "On April 28, 2025, the electrical grid that services large portions of Spain and Portugal failed to maintain frequency and voltage resulting in a 16-hour nationwide blackout, the largest power failure in Europe in over 20 years."
Section 2, paragraph (6)
Why it matters:This is not standard legislative practice. It appears to be a rhetorical device used by the bill's drafters to create a sense of urgency and demonstrate a hypothetical, severe consequence that the bill aims to prevent. It functions as a speculative "future history" intended to justify the bill's necessity and underscore the potential for catastrophic grid failure.
Case for: Proponents would argue that this finding illustrates a plausible and severe threat, emphasizing the critical need for proactive measures to protect national infrastructure from similar incidents, even if they are hypothetical at the time of drafting. It serves as a powerful cautionary tale.
Case against: Opponents might criticize this as an alarmist tactic, using a fictional future event to justify potentially restrictive legislation without concrete evidence of a past threat directly linked to foreign EVs. It could be seen as an attempt to bypass rigorous debate on actual, documented risks by invoking a dramatic, unproven scenario.
Estimated impact: This finding itself has no direct fiscal impact but aims to influence public and legislative perception of the bill's importance, potentially leading to significant economic impacts if the bill passes due to its influence on policy decisions.