Technical corrections only. The changes between v3 and v4 reflect the bill's procedural movement from the House of Representatives to the Senate, including the addition of the Senate referral information and the name of the House Clerk. There are no substantive policy changes in the bill text.
DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]
- Committees
- Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 8, 2025
Bottom line
The bill aims to sever financial ties between the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. higher education institutions that maintain relationships with specific Chinese government-linked entities, citing national security concerns.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits institutions of higher education that maintain any contractual, agreement-based, or gift-based "relationship" with a Confucius Institute, Thousand Talents Program, or broadly defined "Chinese entity of concern" from receiving funds from the Department of Homeland Security. It establishes a waiver process, requiring robust safeguards and a determination that the relationship serves U.S. national security interests or poses no risk.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue this bill is a critical national security measure to protect sensitive research, data, and federally funded activities at U.S. universities from potential exploitation by entities linked to the Chinese government or military. They contend that Confucius Institutes and programs like the Thousand Talents Program serve as vehicles for foreign influence, intellectual property theft, and espionage, and that restricting federal funding incentivizes institutions to sever these problematic ties.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill's broad definitions, particularly for "Chinese entity of concern" and "relationship," could inadvertently penalize legitimate academic collaborations and limit valuable cultural and scientific exchange. They may also raise concerns about the administrative burden on institutions to comply and the potential for a chilling effect on international partnerships, asserting that existing safeguards might be sufficient or that a blanket ban is an overreach.
The bill is short and relatively straightforward, making it accessible for a quick read and evaluation.
Section 2(b)
Ineligibility for DHS Funds
This provision makes any institution of higher education ineligible to receive funds from the Department of Homeland Security if it has a contract, agreement, or receives gifts from a Confucius Institute, a Thousand Talents Program, or a "Chinese entity of concern." This restriction takes effect 12 months after the bill's enactment and can be lifted if the institution terminates the problematic relationship.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision directly addresses national security risks by compelling institutions to choose between federal funding and potentially compromising foreign relationships. It creates a clear incentive to protect U.S. intellectual property and research from foreign adversaries.
Critics contend
Critics might contend that this provision is overly broad, potentially forcing institutions to end beneficial academic or cultural exchanges that pose no genuine security threat. They may argue it could isolate U.S. academia and hinder global research collaboration.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances national security imperatives against academic freedom and the benefits of international collaboration, potentially forcing institutions to make difficult choices regarding funding sources and partnerships.
Section 2(c)
Secretary of Homeland Security Waiver Authority
This section allows the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to waive the funding restrictions for up to one year, renewable annually. A waiver requires the institution to have robust safeguards against unauthorized access to sensitive research and for the relationship to be in U.S. national security interests or pose no national security risk. Congress must be notified 30 days before a waiver takes effect.
Defines "Chinese entity of concern" very broadly to include any university or college in the PRC involved in military-civil fusion, the Chinese defense industrial base, affiliated with specific government/party organizations (e.g., State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for the National Defense, Central Military Commission), undermining the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, aiding Uyghur persecution, engaging in election interference disinformation, or affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Section 2(a)(1)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice places definitions at the beginning, but the breadth of this particular definition is highly consequential for the bill's overall impact.
Case for: Proponents argue this broad definition is essential to comprehensively address the multifaceted threats posed by the Chinese government's influence and control over its academic and research institutions, ensuring that the restrictions are not easily circumvented.
Case against: Critics might argue that the definition is so expansive it could inadvertently capture institutions or collaborations that pose no direct security threat, leading to over-compliance and a chilling effect on legitimate academic engagement.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the scope of U.S. higher education institutions' relationships that could trigger DHS funding ineligibility, impacting potentially hundreds of Chinese universities and their U.S. partners.
Defines "relationship" as any contract awarded, agreement entered into, as well as any in-kind donation or gift, received from a Confucius Institute or Chinese entity of concern.
Section 2(a)(4)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice for defining terms.
Case for: Proponents argue that including gifts and in-kind donations is crucial to prevent circumvention of the restrictions, as foreign influence can be exerted through various informal financial and material contributions.
Case against: Opponents might argue that this broad definition could create an excessive reporting burden for institutions, requiring them to track even minor, non-contractual interactions or gifts that may not pose a significant national security risk.
Estimated impact: Expands the types of interactions that trigger funding ineligibility, requiring institutions to meticulously track all forms of support from the specified Chinese entities.