Corporate Prosecution Reform Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Scanlon, Mary Gay [D-PA-5]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 15, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to enhance corporate accountability and transparency in federal prosecutions by increasing judicial oversight, creating a dedicated enforcement office, and restricting the use of non-prosecution agreements.
What it actually does
This bill significantly reforms the prosecution of corporate crime by requiring judicial review and approval for deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), establishing an Office of Corporate Enforcement within the Department of Justice, and prohibiting non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) that involve declining prosecution solely for monetary consideration. It also mandates extensive transparency for all corporate prosecution agreements, including retrospective publication.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that this legislation is crucial for closing loopholes that allow corporations to avoid meaningful accountability for serious misconduct. They contend that judicial review will ensure DPAs serve the public interest and adequately compensate victims, while the new enforcement office and transparency requirements will deter corporate recidivism and restore public trust in the justice system.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that requiring court approval for DPAs and restricting NPAs could unduly limit prosecutorial discretion, introduce significant delays into complex corporate investigations, and potentially disincentivize corporate cooperation. They may also raise concerns about the administrative burden on the Department of Justice and federal courts, and the potential for increased litigation.
The bill is relatively short and accessible, allowing an informed reader to grasp its core changes and implications within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2
Sense of Congress on Corporate Crime Prosecution
This section declares Congress's belief that corporate crimes should be prosecuted with the same rigor as individual crimes. It states that deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) should only be used when they serve the public interest, lead to meaningful reforms, and impose penalties sufficient for accountability, victim compensation, and deterrence of future corporate offenses.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this statement provides a clear legislative intent, guiding future enforcement actions and emphasizing a commitment to corporate accountability, ensuring that the executive branch aligns its practices with congressional priorities.
Critics contend
No direct opposition is typically raised against a 'sense of Congress' statement, but those who prefer more prosecutorial discretion might view it as an implicit criticism of current practices or an attempt to micromanage executive functions.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances legislative guidance with executive branch autonomy, aiming to set a clear standard for corporate crime prosecution without directly dictating specific enforcement actions.
Section 3(b)
Judicial Review and Restrictions on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements
This section significantly alters the process for corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) by requiring court approval for all such agreements. It prohibits DPAs for certain severe offenses (e.g., those causing loss of life, serious bodily injury, or related to treason, terrorism, or human trafficking) and for repeat offenders. Courts must ensure DPAs serve the public interest, provide sufficient accountability and victim compensation, and deter future misconduct. Victims are granted specific rights to confer and be heard before a DPA is approved.
Section 4, adding 18 U.S.C. 3781
Guidance for Corporate Prosecution Agreements and Voluntary Disclosures
This section mandates the Attorney General to establish and publish guidance for the use of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), non-prosecution agreements (NPAs), and voluntary disclosure policies related to corporate offenses. The guidance aims to standardize enforcement, ensure compliance, maintain parity across similar offenses, and ultimately achieve substantial justice, prevent corporate recidivism, and deter future offenses. The guidance must be publicly accessible on the Department of Justice website.
Section 4, adding 18 U.S.C. 3782
Establishment of Office of Corporate Enforcement
This section establishes a new, separate, and distinct Office of Corporate Enforcement (OCE) within the Department of Justice. The OCE will be headed by a Director who reports directly to the Deputy Attorney General. The Attorney General is authorized to provide the Office with the necessary professional and clerical staff and consultants to carry out its duties and functions.
Section 4, adding 18 U.S.C. 3783
Monitoring and Reporting by Office of Corporate Enforcement Director
This section outlines the primary duties of the Director of the Office of Corporate Enforcement. The Director is responsible for monitoring the implementation and compliance of all approved deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) related to corporate offenses. If the Director determines that any individual or business entity has violated the terms of such an agreement, they are mandated to report this violation to the Deputy Attorney General.
Section 4, adding 18 U.S.C. 3784
Enhanced Transparency for Corporate Prosecution Agreements
This section mandates the Attorney General to publish comprehensive information about deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) on the Department of Justice's public website. This includes the full text of agreements, details of the defendant and alleged offenses, terms, fines, and any independent monitor agreements. The provision also requires retrospective publication of agreements currently in effect (within one year) and those that were in effect since January 1, 1993 (within three years).
Section 4, adding 18 U.S.C. 3785
Prohibition of Non-Prosecution Agreements for Monetary Consideration
This section largely prohibits the government from entering into non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) with business entities or individuals for corporate offenses if the agreement involves declining prosecution solely in exchange for a fine, penalty, or other monetary consideration. It explicitly exempts court-approved deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), advisory opinions, immunity agreements, civil consent decrees, and plea bargaining agreements. Existing NPAs are not affected by this prohibition.
Section 4, adding 18 U.S.C. 3786
Annual Report to Congress on Corporate Enforcement Agreements
This section requires the Attorney General to submit an annual report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. This report must detail each corporate deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) and non-prosecution agreement (NPA) entered into during the preceding year, any instances of non-compliance, a list of all active agreements, any changes or extensions to these agreements, and a description of terminated agreements, including the defendant's compliance status.
Section 5
Renaming 'White Collar Crime' to 'Cyber and Financial Crime'
This section amends Part MM of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to replace all references to 'white collar crime' with 'cyber and financial crime.' This is a definitional and categorical update to modernize the terminology used in federal law regarding these types of offenses.
Requires the Attorney General to publish comprehensive information on all corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) that were in effect since January 1, 1993, within one to three years of the Act's enactment, in addition to new agreements.
Section 4, adding 18 U.S.C. 3784(a)(2) and (b)(3)
Why it matters:It is standard legislative practice to detail implementation timelines within specific subsections, but its historical scope is particularly noteworthy and could be missed by a casual reader focusing on immediate changes.
Case for: Proponents argue this provides unprecedented historical transparency, allowing for comprehensive public and academic analysis of past corporate enforcement trends, identifying patterns, and ensuring long-term accountability for the Department of Justice's actions.
Case against: Critics might cite the substantial administrative burden and cost for the Department of Justice to compile, review, and publish decades of agreements, some of which may contain sensitive or outdated information that requires careful handling and redaction.
Estimated impact: This will require significant administrative effort and resources for the Department of Justice, but will provide a vast, publicly accessible dataset for scrutiny of corporate enforcement over a 30-year period.
Mandates that before a court can approve a corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), each victim of an alleged offense must be afforded the rights described in 18 U.S.C. 3771 (Crime Victims' Rights Act) AND specifically the right to confer with the government attorney no less than 15 days before the agreement is offered, and the right to be heard by the court or provide written testimony prior to the court's determination.
Section 3(b)(B)(iii)(III)
Why it matters:Detailed procedural requirements are often placed within the specific conditions they govern, which is standard legislative drafting, but the specific 15-day conferral right is a notable addition.
Case for: Proponents argue this significantly strengthens victim participation and ensures their perspectives and needs are directly considered by both prosecutors and the court before a DPA is finalized, enhancing restorative justice and ensuring victims are not marginalized in the process.
Case against: Some might argue that adding specific timelines and court hearing rights for victims could complicate and prolong DPA negotiations, potentially making it harder to reach timely resolutions and increasing the administrative burden on the courts and prosecutors.
Estimated impact: This will lead to increased procedural steps and potential delays in DPA finalization, but will result in significantly enhanced victim empowerment and participation in corporate crime resolutions.
Amends Part MM of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to replace all references to 'white collar crime' with 'cyber and financial crime' in its part heading and throughout the text.
Section 5
Why it matters:Often, such definitional or terminology updates are placed at the end of a bill as a technical amendment, which is standard legislative practice rather than an attempt to hide its impact.
Case for: Proponents argue this modernizes terminology to better reflect the evolving nature of these crimes, particularly the increasing role of technology in financial offenses, making the legal framework more relevant and comprehensive.
Case against: No significant opposition is typically raised against such definitional updates, as they are primarily semantic and administrative, not introducing new policy or enforcement powers.
Estimated impact: Minor administrative adjustments in reporting and categorization for relevant law enforcement agencies and statistical bodies, with no direct fiscal impact.