Securing Innovation and Research from Adversaries Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]
- Committees
- Science, Space, and Technology Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 19, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to protect U.S. federally funded research from foreign adversaries by restricting collaborations with entities deemed national security risks, while providing a waiver mechanism for critical exceptions.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits the use of federal funds for any research collaboration between individuals or entities receiving federal research awards and foreign entities or individuals listed on various U.S. Government restricted entity lists. It mandates the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to issue government-wide implementation guidance and establishes a waiver process for exceptions deemed necessary for national security or essential scientific purposes.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue this bill is crucial for safeguarding national security, protecting valuable intellectual property, and preventing foreign adversaries from exploiting U.S. research investments. They contend it ensures that taxpayer money does not inadvertently support entities that pose a threat to American interests or national security, thereby preserving U.S. technological and scientific leadership.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that such broad prohibitions could stifle legitimate scientific collaboration, hinder global research progress, and potentially lead to unintended consequences for beneficial international partnerships. They may also raise concerns about the extensive scope of 'restricted entity lists' and the potential for overreach, bureaucratic hurdles, or a chilling effect on academic freedom and open scientific exchange.
The bill is concise and clearly structured, allowing for a quick and thorough reading to understand its core provisions and implications.
Section 2(a)
Prohibition on Federally Funded Research Collaborations
This section establishes the core prohibition, stating that no federal funds awarded through grants, contracts, or other financial assistance may be used by a recipient to enter into, support, or carry out any research collaboration with an entity or individual listed on a U.S. Government restricted entity list. This directly prevents U.S. taxpayer money from being used for research partnerships with designated adversarial foreign entities.
Supporters argue
Supporters contend this prohibition is a vital national security measure to prevent intellectual property theft, safeguard sensitive research, and ensure U.S. research benefits U.S. interests, not those of foreign adversaries. They argue it closes a critical vulnerability in the U.S. research ecosystem.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that such a broad prohibition could create significant administrative burdens for researchers and institutions, potentially isolating U.S. science from valuable global contributions, even from individuals not directly involved in adversarial activities. They may also raise concerns about the potential for over-classification of entities.
Tradeoffs
This provision navigates the tension between robust national security protection and the traditional openness of scientific research. It prioritizes security by restricting collaborations but risks limiting the scope of potential research partnerships.
Section 2(c) and 2(e)
Government-wide Implementation Guidance and Comprehensive Definitions
This provision mandates the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), in consultation with federal research agencies, to issue government-wide guidance for implementing the prohibition. This guidance will ensure standardized compliance requirements, definitions, and enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, the bill provides extensive definitions for 'research collaboration' (including joint projects, data sharing, personnel exchanges, and any other arrangement determined by agency heads) and lists 15 specific 'United States Government restricted entity lists' that trigger the prohibition, along with a catch-all for future designations.
Section 2(d)
Federal Agency Waiver Authority and Congressional Reporting
This section grants the head of a federal agency the authority to waive the prohibition under subsection (a) on a case-by-case basis. A waiver can be granted if it is determined to be necessary for U.S. national security interests or if the research collaboration is essential for a clearly defined scientific, public health, or national security purpose that cannot reasonably be achieved without such collaboration. Agencies are required to submit a written notification to Congress within 30 days of granting a waiver, detailing the identity of the subject, the justification for the waiver, and any mitigation measures implemented.
The definition of 'research collaboration' is exceptionally broad, encompassing not only joint research activities and co-authorship but also data sharing, material transfer, personnel exchanges, visiting scholar appointments, joint supervision of students, and a catch-all for 'any other arrangement determined by the head of the relevant Federal research funding agency to constitute research collaboration.'
Section 2(e)(1)
Why it matters:The comprehensive nature is standard legislative practice to prevent loopholes, but the 'any other arrangement' clause grants significant, potentially opaque, discretionary power to agency heads, which could be seen as a way to expand the scope without explicit legislative detail.
Case for: Proponents argue that such a broad definition is necessary to ensure the prohibition is robust and covers all potential avenues through which sensitive information or technology could be transferred to adversarial entities, reflecting the multifaceted nature of modern scientific collaboration.
Case against: Critics contend that this expansive definition could lead to over-interpretation and a 'chilling effect' on legitimate, informal academic exchanges or early-stage collaborations, creating undue administrative burdens and potentially stifling scientific progress by making researchers overly cautious about any international interaction.
Estimated impact: Potentially broad impact on the day-to-day interactions of researchers, requiring increased scrutiny on informal communications and exchanges, and potentially leading to a more risk-averse approach to international engagement.
The bill enumerates 15 specific U.S. Government restricted entity lists, including those from the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Defense, and State, as well as lists related to specific acts (e.g., Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, various National Defense Authorization Acts). It also includes a catch-all provision for 'Any other entity list designated by the President, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Secretary of Defense.'
Section 2(e)(3)
Why it matters:While precision through referencing existing lists is standard legislative practice, the extensive nature and the open-ended catch-all clause could be seen as creating a highly complex and ever-expanding regulatory landscape that is difficult for external parties to monitor and comply with without significant dedicated resources.
Case for: Proponents argue that this comprehensive enumeration provides clarity and ensures robust coverage, including all known adversarial entities and allowing for future additions as threats evolve, thereby maximizing the effectiveness of the prohibition.
Case against: Critics contend that the complexity and dynamic nature of these numerous lists create significant compliance challenges for research institutions, requiring constant monitoring, legal interpretation, and potentially specialized software or personnel, which could be a substantial unfunded burden.
Estimated impact: Significant administrative burden on institutions to monitor and comply with a multitude of evolving lists, potentially leading to increased operational costs for research administration and compliance.