Ban Chinese Communist and Islamist Home Ownership Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Roy, Chip [R-TX-21]
- Committees
- Foreign Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 19, 2026
Bottom line
This bill aims to restrict foreign ownership of U.S. housing by entities deemed hostile to national security, requiring both a ban on future purchases and forced divestiture of existing properties.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits individuals who are citizens of "foreign countries of concern" (unless also U.S. citizens), corporations with ownership by such individuals or foreign entities of concern, foreign adversaries, and state sponsors of terrorism from purchasing housing in the United States. It also mandates that these "covered persons" divest any currently held housing within two years of enactment, selling it exclusively to U.S. citizens or corporations.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that foreign ownership of U.S. housing, particularly by adversarial nations and entities, poses a national security risk and contributes to housing affordability crises for American citizens. They contend that restricting such ownership protects critical infrastructure, prevents potential espionage, and ensures that the housing market serves the interests of U.S. residents.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that such a broad prohibition could violate international trade agreements, lead to retaliatory measures from other countries, and potentially devalue properties subject to forced divestment. Concerns could also be raised about the practicalities and legal challenges of enforcing divestiture, as well as potential discrimination against individuals based on their country of origin.
The bill is very short and straightforward, making it highly accessible for a quick review.
Section 2(a)
Prohibition on Housing Purchases by Covered Persons
This section makes it illegal for any "covered person" to buy housing in the United States starting from the bill's enactment date. A "covered person" includes citizens of foreign countries of concern (unless they are also U.S. citizens), corporations with any ownership by such individuals or foreign entities of concern, foreign adversaries, state sponsors of terrorism, and their agents or affiliates.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this is a crucial step to prevent hostile foreign actors from gaining a foothold in U.S. communities and potentially using property for nefarious purposes, while also addressing concerns about foreign investment driving up housing costs.
Critics contend
Critics might contend that this provision could be overly broad, potentially impacting individuals with minimal ties to adversarial governments, and could lead to unintended economic consequences or legal challenges based on discrimination.
Tradeoffs
Balances national security concerns and housing affordability against potential impacts on international relations, property rights, and the risk of broad application.
Section 2(c)
Mandated Divestiture of Existing Housing
Within two years of the bill becoming law, any "covered person" who currently owns housing in the United States must sell that property. The sale must be made exclusively to a citizen or corporation of the United States, ensuring that the divested assets do not transfer to other foreign entities.
Section 2(d)
Key Definitions for Scope and Enforcement
This section defines critical terms like "covered person," "foreign adversary," "foreign country of concern," "foreign entity of concern," "housing," "state sponsor of terrorism," and "United States." Notably, "foreign country of concern" and "foreign entity of concern" refer to definitions within the CHIPS and Science Act, linking this bill's scope to existing federal classifications of adversarial nations.
The terms "Foreign Country of Concern" and "Foreign Entity of Concern" are defined by reference to Section 10612(a)(1) and (2) of the CHIPS and Science Act (42 U.S.C. 19221).
Section 2(d)(3) and (4)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to avoid redundancy and maintain consistency across federal law. However, it requires extra effort for a reader to fully grasp the bill's scope.
Case for: Using existing definitions provides legal consistency and leverages established frameworks for identifying countries and entities deemed of concern, streamlining the legislative process.
Case against: It increases the complexity for a lay reader, making it harder to immediately understand which specific countries or entities are targeted without external research.
Estimated impact: Directly determines which foreign nations and entities are subject to the housing purchase ban and divestiture requirements, significantly shaping the bill's practical effect.