Stop the Doxx Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Gottheimer, Josh [D-NJ-5]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 20, 2026
Bottom line
The 'Stop the Doxx Act' aims to protect law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges from targeted harassment and violence by criminalizing the malicious online publication of their personal information and offering security training.
What it actually does
This bill creates a new federal criminal offense for knowingly publishing or making publicly available the personal identifying information of a federal, state, or local law enforcement officer, prosecutor, or judge, or their immediate family members, with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or facilitate violence. It also establishes a civil cause of action for victims and directs the Attorney General to create a training program on personal information security for these public servants.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill is a necessary response to the significant increase in targeted harassment and threats against public servants in the justice system, which often involve the online publication of personal information. They contend that this legislation will deter malicious acts, protect the safety of these individuals and their families, and safeguard the integrity of the justice system by preventing intimidation.
Opponents contend
Opponents or civil liberties advocates might raise concerns that the bill's broad definition of 'personally identifying information' and the subjective nature of 'intent to threaten, intimidate, or facilitate violence' could potentially be used to chill legitimate free speech, public criticism, or the exposure of misconduct by public officials. They may argue it could have unintended consequences for journalists or activists seeking to hold power accountable.
The bill is short and clearly written, allowing for a quick and thorough understanding of its provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 3, adding 18 U.S.C. 1522
Prohibition on Doxxing of Protected Public Servants
This section establishes a new federal crime for anyone who knowingly publishes or makes publicly available the home address, personal phone number, personal email, or other personally identifying information of a federal, state, or local law enforcement officer, prosecutor, or judge, or their immediate family members. The key element is that this act must be done with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or facilitate violence against that person. Penalties range from up to 10 years imprisonment for a first offense to up to 40 years if bodily injury or death results from the offense. Victims can also bring a civil lawsuit for damages and injunctive relief.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that this provision directly addresses a critical vulnerability faced by public servants who are increasingly targeted online. They contend that the 'intent to threaten, intimidate, or facilitate violence' clause is crucial for distinguishing malicious doxxing from legitimate public interest reporting, thereby protecting those who uphold the law.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that despite the intent clause, the broad language around 'personally identifying information' and 'publishes' could be subject to overly broad interpretation, potentially chilling legitimate speech or investigations into public misconduct. They may express concern that proving intent can be challenging and could lead to selective enforcement.
Tradeoffs
This provision navigates the tension between providing robust protection for public servants and their families against malicious online harassment, and safeguarding constitutional free speech rights, particularly when information about public figures is involved. The balance hinges on the interpretation and enforcement of the 'intent' requirement.
Section 4
Personal Information Security Training Program
This section mandates the Attorney General to establish a comprehensive training program for federal, state, and local law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges. The training will focus on protecting personal information online and will be available online and in-person, updated annually, and offered at no cost. The Attorney General is also directed to encourage state and local agencies to require this training as part of their onboarding and continuing education.
The phrase 'other personally identifying information' is not exhaustively defined, leaving its precise scope open to interpretation by courts and prosecutors.
Section 3(a), 18 U.S.C. 1522(a)
Why it matters:This is a common legislative practice to ensure flexibility and address unforeseen forms of personal information. However, it can also be seen as potentially evasive by not providing clear boundaries.
Case for: Supporters argue that this broad phrasing is necessary to ensure the law remains effective against evolving methods of doxxing, as malicious actors constantly find new ways to exploit personal data. A rigid list would quickly become outdated.
Case against: Critics might argue that the lack of a precise definition creates ambiguity, potentially leading to inconsistent application of the law or chilling effects on speech, as individuals may self-censor to avoid inadvertently publishing information that could later be deemed 'personally identifying' under this statute.
Estimated impact: Could significantly broaden the scope of information protected under the law, impacting a wide range of online activities.
The definition of 'publishes' includes 'any other digital or print medium accessible to third parties,' which is a very expansive scope for dissemination.
Section 3(c)(3), 18 U.S.C. 1522(c)(3)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to ensure comprehensive coverage across all potential platforms. It is not necessarily evasive but ensures the law is future-proof against new technologies.
Case for: Proponents assert that this broad definition is essential to prevent malicious actors from circumventing the law by using obscure or emerging platforms not explicitly named. It ensures that the prohibition applies universally across all public dissemination methods.
Case against: Opponents might argue that such a broad definition could inadvertently capture platforms or methods of information sharing that are not typically associated with malicious doxxing, potentially leading to overreach or unintended consequences for legitimate online activities.
Estimated impact: Ensures the law applies to virtually any public sharing of information, significantly expanding its reach beyond common social media platforms.