Protect Working Musicians Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Ross, Deborah K. [D-NC-2]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 21, 2026
Bottom line
The bill seeks to level the playing field for independent musicians by enabling collective bargaining with major online music platforms and AI developers, potentially altering licensing terms and revenue distribution in the digital music ecosystem.
What it actually does
This bill creates a limited antitrust safe harbor for independent music creator owners, allowing them to collectively negotiate or refuse to license their music with dominant online music distribution platforms and generative artificial intelligence companies. It aims to address the perceived power imbalance where individual creators currently lack leverage against large platforms, provided certain conditions are met, such as negotiations not being limited to price.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the current digital music market is fundamentally imbalanced, with dominant online platforms exploiting a 'notice and takedown' system that renders individual creators powerless to negotiate fair terms. They contend that this bill is essential to restore competitive markets, protect the livelihoods of independent musicians, and preserve music as a cultural treasure by allowing creators to collectively assert their value against powerful tech companies and emerging AI entities.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that this bill could lead to price-fixing or other anti-competitive behaviors, potentially harming consumers through higher licensing costs or reduced access to music if collective refusals to license occur. They may also contend that existing antitrust laws are sufficient and that creating carve-outs could set a dangerous precedent, potentially stifling innovation or creating unnecessary market distortions.
The bill is concise and can be read quickly, allowing ample time for stakeholders to understand its provisions.
Section 3(b)
Establishment of Antitrust Safe Harbor for Independent Music Creator Owners
This provision exempts 'Individual Music Creator Owners' (IMCOs) from antitrust liability when they collectively negotiate music licensing terms or collectively refuse to license their music to 'Dominant Online Music Distribution Platforms' (DOMDPs) or generative AI companies. This means IMCOs can band together without fear of being sued for anti-competitive practices, which would normally be the case for groups of businesses coordinating on pricing or market access, provided negotiations are not limited to price and are nondiscriminatory.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision is crucial for rebalancing power in the digital music market, allowing independent creators to secure fair compensation and terms that reflect the true value of their work. They contend it addresses the market failure created by dominant platforms' unchecked power and the ineffectiveness of individual 'notice and takedown' efforts.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that this safe harbor could lead to collusive behavior, potentially resulting in inflated licensing fees that could harm consumers through higher subscription costs or reduced platform profitability, ultimately stifling innovation in music distribution. They may also raise concerns about the definition of 'dominant' and 'independent,' suggesting it could be arbitrary or lead to unintended consequences.
Tradeoffs
The bill balances the goal of empowering individual creators against the risk of creating new forms of market distortion or anti-competitive practices. It seeks to correct a perceived power imbalance but could inadvertently lead to higher costs for platforms and potentially consumers.
Defines a 'Dominant Online Music Distribution Platform' as an entity with over $100 million in annual music distribution revenues that is *not* eligible for a license under section 114(d)(2) of title 17. Section 114(d)(2) refers to statutory licenses for noninteractive digital audio transmissions (like webcasters). By excluding these, the bill specifically targets interactive streaming services (e.g., Spotify, Apple Music, YouTube) that operate under direct licenses or other arrangements, not compulsory webcasting licenses.
Section 3(a)(2)(C)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to precisely define the scope of the bill's applicability by referencing existing legal frameworks, ensuring it targets the intended entities without affecting others.
Case for: Supporters argue this precise definition ensures the bill targets the specific platforms that exert dominant market power in interactive streaming, which is where the most significant power imbalance for independent creators is perceived.
Case against: Critics might argue that the exclusion could be seen as arbitrary or that it creates an uneven playing field among different types of online music distributors, potentially disadvantaging those who are not covered by the exemption.
Estimated impact: This provision significantly narrows the scope of platforms affected, focusing the bill's impact on the largest interactive streaming services.
One of the conditions for the antitrust safe harbor is that 'the negotiations are not limited to price.' This means that while price can be a component, the collective bargaining must also encompass other terms, such as usage rights, data access, promotional opportunities, or other non-monetary aspects of licensing.
Section 3(b)(1)
Why it matters:This condition might be included to broaden the scope of collective bargaining beyond simple price-fixing, potentially making the safe harbor more palatable from an antitrust perspective by demonstrating a focus on broader market terms.
Case for: Proponents might argue this ensures that creators can negotiate for a holistic set of terms that truly address their needs beyond just monetary compensation, such as fair attribution, control over AI training data, or promotional support.
Case against: Opponents might suggest that this condition could complicate negotiations, making them less efficient, or that it could be a loophole allowing for indirect price coordination under the guise of broader terms.
Estimated impact: This condition shapes the nature and complexity of the collective negotiations, potentially leading to more comprehensive agreements but also potentially more protracted discussions.