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4 versions
CosmeticWhat changed in REFERRED IN SENATEcompared with ENGROSSED IN HOUSE (Apr 28, 2025)

Technical corrections only. The changes between v3 and v4 are administrative, reflecting the bill's passage from the House of Representatives to the Senate and the addition of the Clerk's name. There are no substantive policy changes in the bill text.

H.R. 906·119th Congress·Introduced Jan 31, 2025

Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act

Passed HouseScience, Technology, CommunicationsMajor
View bill text
Sponsor
Rep. Wittman, Robert J. [R-VA-1]
Committees
Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
Last action
Apr 29, 2025

Bottom line

The bill mandates increased transparency regarding foreign adversary ownership and control in U.S. communications infrastructure by requiring the FCC to publish and maintain a public list of affected entities.

What it actually does

This bill directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to establish and annually update a public list of entities holding FCC licenses or authorizations that have certain ownership or control by foreign adversaries, referred to as 'covered entities' from 'covered countries'. It mandates an initial list within 120 days for specific license types and requires the FCC to conduct rulemaking within 18 months to expand reporting requirements for all other authorizations, with those entities to be added to the list subsequently.

Proponents argue

Supporters argue that this bill is a crucial national security measure, enhancing the transparency of foreign ownership in critical U.S. communications infrastructure. By identifying entities with ties to adversarial nations, it helps safeguard against potential espionage, sabotage, or undue influence, thereby protecting national security and the integrity of communication networks.

Opponents contend

Critics might contend that while the intent is valid, the bill could impose significant administrative burdens on the FCC and compliance costs on a broad range of legitimate businesses, potentially deterring foreign investment in the U.S. communications sector. Concerns could also be raised about the potential for stigmatization of listed entities, regardless of actual national security risk.

The bill is very concise and clearly written, allowing for a quick and thorough understanding of its provisions by an informed reader.

Section 2(a)

Initial Publication of List for Specific FCC Licenses

prominently featuredstraightforward

This provision mandates that within 120 days of the bill's enactment, the FCC must publish a list on its website. This initial list will include entities holding specific types of FCC licenses—those for spectrum auctions (47 U.S.C. 309(j)) or under the Cable Landing Licensing Act—if a 'covered entity' holds a reportable equity or voting interest, or if a national security agency determines a 'covered entity' exerts control over them.

GroupImpactMechanismScale
GroupFederal Communications Commission (FCC)ImpactIncreased administrative burdenMechanismRequired to compile and publish a list of entities based on existing data and national security agency input.ScaleModerate
GroupEntities holding specified FCC licenses with foreign ownership from 'covered countries'ImpactIncreased public scrutiny and transparencyMechanismTheir ownership information will be publicly listed, potentially leading to reputational or commercial impacts.ScaleSpecific
GroupAppropriate national security agenciesImpactExpanded role in identifying foreign controlMechanismEmpowered to determine if a 'covered entity' exerts control, regardless of equity/voting interest.ScaleModerate
GroupThe publicImpactIncreased access to informationMechanismPublic availability of the list provides greater transparency regarding foreign ownership in critical infrastructure.ScaleBroad

Supporters argue

Proponents argue this provision is a critical first step to immediately enhance national security by shining a light on foreign adversary involvement in key communications sectors, leveraging existing data for rapid implementation.

Critics contend

Opponents might argue that relying on existing reporting may not be comprehensive enough, or that the initial scope is too narrow, potentially missing other critical areas of foreign influence.

Tradeoffs

This provision balances the urgency of national security concerns with the practical limitations of immediate data collection, focusing on readily identifiable entities while planning for broader coverage.

Section 2(b)

Rulemaking for Broader FCC Authorization Reporting

prominently featuredmoderately complex

This section directs the FCC to issue new rules within 18 months of enactment. These rules are designed to obtain information to identify any entity holding *any* FCC authorization, license, or other grant of authority (beyond those covered in Section 2(a)(1)) that has a reportable equity or voting interest by a 'covered entity.' Once these rules are issued, the FCC must add these newly identified entities to the public list within one year.

Section 2(d) and 2(e)

Annual Updates and Key Definitions

mentioned in summarystraightforward

This section mandates that the FCC update the public list of foreign-owned entities at least annually to ensure its accuracy and relevance. It also defines critical terms used throughout the Act: 'appropriate national security agency' (referencing existing law), 'Commission' (the FCC), 'covered country' (referencing 10 U.S.C. 4872(f)(2), which specifies certain foreign nations), and 'covered entity' (the government of a covered country, an entity organized under its laws, or its subsidiary, regardless of where the subsidiary is organized).

FOUND

This subsection states that any collection of information conducted or sponsored by the Commission to implement this section does not constitute a collection of information for the purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).

Section 2(c)

Why it matters:This exemption is a common legislative tool used to streamline the implementation of new federal mandates, particularly when perceived as urgent or related to national security. It allows the FCC to proceed with information collection without the typical public notice and comment period required by the PRA, which is designed to minimize reporting burdens on the public.

Case for: Supporters would argue that exempting this information collection from the PRA is necessary to expedite the FCC's ability to gather critical national security data. The standard PRA process can be lengthy, and bypassing it ensures a more rapid response to potential foreign threats in communications infrastructure.

Case against: Critics might contend that this exemption bypasses an important safeguard designed to protect businesses and individuals from undue federal reporting burdens. Without PRA review, there is less opportunity for public input on the necessity, scope, and efficiency of the information collection, potentially leading to overreach or inefficient data requests by the FCC.

Estimated impact: This provision significantly reduces regulatory hurdles for the FCC in implementing the bill's data collection mandates, but it also removes a key mechanism for public and industry stakeholders to influence the design and burden of new reporting requirements.

About this analysis. AI-Generated from the official bill text and available committee reports. Gaps in available data are noted explicitly. Verify important details with the official Congress.gov record.

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