BINSA Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]
- Committees
- Financial Services Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jun 2, 2026
Bottom line
The bill seeks to safeguard U.S. national security by preventing U.S. capital and intellectual property from contributing to China's dominance in biotechnology through expanded outbound investment screening.
What it actually does
This bill amends title VIII of the Defense Production Act of 1950 to expand the definitions of "prohibited technology" and "notifiable technology" to explicitly include biotechnology, encompassing pharmaceutical products, biological products, and therapeutic compounds. It mandates the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a rule within one year to further define these biotechnology parameters for outbound investment screening and requires the Secretary of Defense to report on the national security implications of U.S. capital flows into China's biotechnology sector.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill is critical for national security, preventing strategic dependency risks similar to those in semiconductors and rare earth elements. They highlight China's deliberate, state-directed strategy to dominate global biotechnology and the accelerating transfer of U.S. pharmaceutical innovation capacity to Chinese entities, which creates strategic vulnerabilities for the United States.
Opponents contend
The bill's findings do not detail explicit opposition arguments. However, potential critics might contend that such broad restrictions could stifle innovation, limit U.S. companies' global competitiveness, and create burdensome compliance requirements, potentially harming U.S. economic interests and global scientific progress.
The bill is concise and clearly structured, allowing an informed reader to quickly grasp its core intent and operative mechanisms.
Section 1
Short Title: Biotech Investment National Security Act of 2026 (BINSA Act)
This section formally names the bill as the "Biotech Investment National Security Act of 2026" or the "BINSA Act." This provides a common and concise reference for the legislation, aiding in public discourse and legislative tracking.
Supporters argue
A clear and memorable name helps in public discourse and legislative tracking, making the bill's purpose easily identifiable.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against short titles, as they are primarily for identification.
Tradeoffs
None apparent.
Section 2
Congressional Findings on Biotechnology and National Security
This section outlines Congress's rationale for the bill, asserting that China is pursuing a state-directed strategy to dominate global biotechnology, including pharmaceutical development and manufacturing. It states that U.S. capital flows are accelerating this acquisition of intellectual property, creating strategic dependency risks comparable to those in semiconductors and artificial intelligence, and necessitating outbound investment screening.
Section 3, paragraphs (1) and (2)
Expansion of 'Prohibited Technology' and 'Notifiable Technology' to Include Biotechnology
This section amends Section 809 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 to explicitly include "Biotechnology" within the definitions of both "prohibited technology" and "notifiable technology." Biotechnology is broadly defined to include the research, development, manufacturing, or commercialization of pharmaceutical products, biological products, and therapeutic compounds, encompassing drug discovery platforms, clinical research and development capabilities, biologics manufacturing, and related intellectual property and know-how.
Section 3, paragraph (3)
Prohibiting Licensing of Prohibited Technology from Covered Foreign Persons
This amendment adds "licensing a prohibited technology from a covered foreign person" to the list of activities covered under Section 809(4)(A) of the Defense Production Act. This means that not only outbound investment but also inbound licensing of prohibited technologies from certain foreign entities would be subject to scrutiny and potential prohibition.
Section 4
Rulemaking by Secretary of the Treasury to Define Biotechnology Parameters
This section mandates the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a rule within one year to further define the parameters of "biotechnology" for the purpose of outbound investment screening. The rule must be developed in consultation with the Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence. It specifically directs consideration of licensing, joint ventures, and equity investments in drug discovery platforms, clinical R&D, and biologics manufacturing as priority categories, while explicitly excluding agricultural biotechnology, industrial fermentation (unrelated to pharma/therapeutics), and basic academic research without direct pharmaceutical/therapeutic application.
Section 5
DoD Report on Capital Flows into China's Biotechnology Sector
This section requires the Secretary of Defense, within 60 days of the bill's enactment, to submit a report to specific congressional committees. The report must assess whether flows of United States capital into China's biotechnology sector, including through licensing transactions with Chinese biotechnology firms, negatively affect U.S. national security and military readiness. The report may include a classified annex.
Expands the scope of activities covered by the Defense Production Act's outbound investment screening to include licensing of prohibited technology *from* a covered foreign person to a U.S. entity, rather than solely focusing on outbound transfers.
Section 3(3)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for amending existing statutes by adding new clauses. It is not necessarily evasive, but its significance could be overlooked due to its placement within a larger section of amendments.
Case for: Supporters would argue this provision is critical for preventing foreign adversaries from strategically offloading problematic technologies or gaining influence over U.S. entities through licensing arrangements, ensuring a comprehensive national security screen.
Case against: Critics might contend that this could inadvertently restrict U.S. companies from accessing valuable intellectual property or technologies developed abroad, even if those technologies are not inherently harmful, potentially hindering U.S. innovation and competitiveness.
Estimated impact: Potentially significant impact on U.S. companies' ability to engage in technology transfer agreements with entities linked to covered foreign persons, particularly in the newly defined biotechnology sector.