To amend the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to extend the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and for other purposes.
- Sponsor
- Rep. Higgins, Clay [R-LA-3]
- Committees
- Financial Services Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jun 3, 2026
Bottom line
This bill reauthorizes a key foreign intelligence collection program with new civil liberties safeguards, while also including a prohibition on central bank digital currency.
What it actually does
This bill extends the authorities of FISA Section 702 for three years, from June 12, 2026, to June 12, 2029. It introduces new safeguards for U.S. persons, requiring a warrant to intentionally target their communications under Section 702 and mandating attorney approval for FBI queries using U.S. person terms. The bill also establishes new criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosures, queries, or misrepresentations related to FISA information. Additionally, it includes a significant, unrelated provision that prohibits the Federal Reserve from issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) without explicit Congressional authorization, with an exception for open, permissionless, and private digital currencies.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that extending FISA Section 702 is crucial for national security, enabling intelligence agencies to collect vital foreign intelligence on non-U.S. persons located abroad. They contend the new safeguards, such as the warrant requirement for U.S. person communications and enhanced penalties, demonstrate a commitment to protecting civil liberties and preventing abuses, making the reauthorization more palatable. The CBDC prohibition is seen by some as a necessary step to protect financial privacy and prevent government overreach into monetary policy.
Opponents contend
Critics of Section 702 argue that the proposed safeguards do not go far enough to prevent warrantless surveillance of U.S. persons and that the program fundamentally infringes on Fourth Amendment rights. They may view the reauthorization as a missed opportunity for more significant reforms. Opponents of the CBDC prohibition might argue it stifles innovation, limits the U.S.'s ability to compete in the global digital economy, and removes a potential tool for financial inclusion or stability.
The bill is relatively short and its core provisions are discernible, but understanding the full implications requires familiarity with existing FISA law and digital currency concepts.
Section 1
Extension of FISA Section 702 Authorities
This section extends the sunset date for Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, specifically Section 702, from June 12, 2026, to June 12, 2029. This means the authority for the U.S. government to conduct warrantless surveillance of non-U.S. persons located outside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes will continue for an additional three years.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that Section 702 is a critical tool for national security, enabling the collection of vital intelligence on foreign adversaries and terrorists. Extending it ensures the continuity of essential intelligence operations.
Critics contend
Opponents contend that Section 702 has been subject to abuses, particularly in the querying of U.S. person data, and that a clean extension without more robust reforms fails to address civil liberties concerns.
Tradeoffs
Balances the perceived necessity of foreign intelligence collection for national security against concerns about potential overreach and civil liberties.
Section 2(a) and 2(b)
Warrant Requirement for Acquisition of United States Persons' Communications and FBI Data Ingestion Restrictions
This section amends FISA Section 702 to prohibit the intentional targeting of U.S. persons' communications under Section 702. It mandates that if the government wishes to target a U.S. person, it must obtain a warrant under Title I or III of FISA (requiring probable cause of being a foreign power or agent) or a criminal warrant under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (requiring probable cause of a crime). It also restricts the FBI from ingesting unminimized Section 702 information into its analytic repositories unless the targeted person is relevant to an existing, open, predicated full national security investigation, and if the target is a U.S. person, there is probable cause they are a foreign power or agent.
Section 3
Penalties for Unauthorized Disclosure, Query, and Misrepresentation
This section amends FISA to establish new criminal offenses and penalties. It criminalizes knowingly and willfully communicating, publishing, or retaining classified Section 702 information concerning a known U.S. person without authorization. It also creates an offense for willfully conducting an unauthorized U.S. person query of Section 702 data, knowing it doesn't support a duly authorized purpose. Furthermore, it criminalizes knowingly and willfully falsifying records or making material misrepresentations to the FISA Court regarding compliance with Section 702 querying procedures. Penalties range from 2 to 8 years imprisonment and fines.
Section 4
Attendance Procedures for Member Access to FISA Court
This section requires the Attorney General, within 60 days of enactment, to revoke existing procedures (issued by December 31, 2025) and issue new ones. These new procedures must comply with Section 5(d) of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (Public Law 118-49) to ensure Members of Congress and their staff have access to proceedings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR).
Section 5
Requirement for Attorney Approval of FBI Queries Using United States Person Query Term
This section amends FISA Section 702(f)(3)(A)(i) by striking the phrase "supervisor (or employee of equivalent or greater rank) or". This change means that FBI queries of Section 702 data using a U.S. person query term will now require approval from an attorney, rather than just a supervisor or equivalent rank employee.
Section 6
GAO Audit of Section 702 Targeting Procedures
This section mandates that the Comptroller General of the United States (head of the Government Accountability Office, GAO) conduct an audit of the targeting procedures used for Section 702 acquisitions. The audit will examine technical mechanisms, implementation, and operations, with a focus on whether procedures appropriately limit targeting to non-U.S. persons located outside the United States. A report on the audit's results is due to congressional intelligence and judiciary committees within one year.
Section 7
Prohibition on Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)
This section amends the Federal Reserve Act to prohibit the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or a Federal Reserve bank from issuing or creating a "central bank digital currency" (CBDC) or any substantially similar digital asset, either directly or indirectly through an intermediary. A CBDC is defined as a digital asset denominated in U.S. dollars, a U.S. currency, a direct liability of the Federal Reserve System, and widely available to the general public. An exception is made for dollar-denominated currency that is open, permissionless, and private, fully preserving the privacy protections of physical currency. This prohibition sunsets on December 31, 2031.
The FBI may not ingest unminimized Section 702 information into its analytic repositories unless the targeted person is relevant to an existing, open, predicated full national security investigation AND, if the target of the investigation is a U.S. person, there is probable cause that the U.S. person is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
Section 2(a), amending 50 U.S.C. 1881a(n)(1)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative drafting for amending existing law, but the specific conditions for U.S. persons are critical and could be missed by a non-expert.
Case for: Supporters argue this provides a necessary, albeit limited, safeguard against the FBI indiscriminately collecting and retaining U.S. person data from Section 702 acquisitions without a clear national security predicate and probable cause for U.S. person targets.
Case against: Critics might argue that the "probable cause" standard here is still tied to "foreign power/agent" and doesn't fully align with broader Fourth Amendment protections, and that "ingest unminimized information" still allows for collection and retention prior to ingestion.
Estimated impact: Significantly impacts FBI data handling procedures for Section 702 data, potentially reducing the volume of U.S. person data retained and queried without specific justification.
States that nothing in the new subsection (o) (Limitations on Acquisition of Communications of United States Persons) shall be construed to limit the authority of the Government under any applicable laws or the Constitution of the United States.
Section 2(o)(4)
Why it matters:This is a common legislative practice to avoid unintended interpretations that might curtail other existing authorities. However, it can also be used to subtly signal that the new restrictions are not intended to be as absolute as they might appear.
Case for: Proponents would argue it ensures that the new FISA restrictions do not inadvertently undermine other legitimate government authorities, such as those under Title I or III of FISA, or other constitutional powers.
Case against: Opponents might view this as a potential loophole or a way to dilute the impact of the new safeguards, allowing the government to fall back on other authorities to circumvent the spirit of the new warrant requirements.
Estimated impact: Potentially significant, as it could be interpreted to allow parallel construction or other methods of acquiring U.S. person data outside the explicit new warrant requirements of Section 702(o).
The prohibition on CBDC does not apply to any dollar-denominated currency that is "open, permissionless, and private, and fully preserves the privacy protections of United States coins and physical currency."
Section 7(c)
Why it matters:This is a standard way to carve out specific types of digital assets that are not intended to be covered by the general prohibition, reflecting a specific policy stance on privacy and decentralization.
Case for: Proponents argue this exception ensures that the prohibition does not inadvertently stifle private sector innovation in digital currencies that uphold strong privacy principles, aligning with the intent to prevent government-controlled digital money.
Case against: Critics might argue that the terms "open, permissionless, and private" are subject to interpretation and could lead to future legal challenges or loopholes, or that it still restricts the Federal Reserve's ability to innovate in a responsible manner.
Estimated impact: Clarifies the scope of the CBDC prohibition, potentially allowing for the future development of private, decentralized digital dollar alternatives while blocking a direct government-issued CBDC.