Protecting Kids from Creeps Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Perry, Scott [R-PA-10]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jun 3, 2026
Bottom line
The bill criminalizes the involvement of registered sex offenders in surrogacy agreements, imposing significant penalties on agencies, employees, and offenders, while voiding any agreements made in violation of its provisions.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits surrogacy agencies and their employees from facilitating, and sex offenders from entering into, surrogacy agreements. It establishes severe criminal penalties for violations, makes any such unlawful agreements void and unenforceable, and stipulates that convicted agencies will lose their 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status and eligibility for federal grants. Custody of children born from voided agreements would be determined by state law based on the child's best interests.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill is a crucial step to protect vulnerable children by preventing individuals with a history of sex offenses from obtaining children through surrogacy. They contend that the severe penalties and federal oversight are necessary to ensure child safety and prevent potential harm, closing a perceived loophole that could be exploited by dangerous individuals.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill represents an overreach of federal authority into an area traditionally governed by state family law, potentially creating conflicts and legal complexities. Concerns could also be raised about the constitutionality of broadly restricting reproductive rights for a class of individuals, and the potential for unintended negative consequences, such as prolonged custody battles for children born under voided agreements.
The bill is exceptionally short and clearly written, allowing for a quick and comprehensive understanding of its provisions.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. 2260B(a)
Prohibition on Surrogacy Agencies Facilitating Agreements with Sex Offenders
This provision makes it a federal crime for a surrogacy agency to knowingly or recklessly facilitate a surrogacy agreement if one of the parties to that agreement is a sex offender. Agencies acting recklessly face imprisonment for not less than 10 years, while those acting knowingly face not less than 20 years, in addition to fines.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that this provision directly targets the entities that could enable sex offenders to obtain children through surrogacy, providing a strong deterrent and ensuring accountability within the industry to safeguard children.
Critics contend
Opponents may argue that the penalties, particularly for 'reckless' conduct, are excessively harsh for agencies and could lead to over-cautious behavior, potentially limiting access to surrogacy for legitimate prospective parents or causing unintended discrimination.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the imperative to protect children from potential harm against the operational risks and legal burdens placed on surrogacy agencies, which may face challenges in verifying the full history of all parties.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. 2260B(b)
Prohibition on Surrogacy Agency Employees Facilitating Agreements with Sex Offenders
This section criminalizes the act of an employee of a surrogacy agency who knowingly facilitates a surrogacy agreement involving a sex offender. An employee convicted under this provision faces imprisonment for not less than 20 years, in addition to fines.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. 2260B(c)
Prohibition on Sex Offenders Entering Surrogacy Agreements
This provision directly prohibits any individual who is a sex offender from knowingly entering into a surrogacy agreement. A sex offender convicted of violating this prohibition faces imprisonment for not less than 20 years, in addition to fines.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. 2260B(d) and (e)
Loss of Tax-Exempt Status and Federal Funding for Convicted Agencies
A surrogacy agency that is convicted of an offense under this section will become ineligible for status as an exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1984. Additionally, such a convicted agency will be ineligible to receive any federal grants.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. 2260B(f) and Section 4
Voiding of Unlawful Surrogacy Agreements and Custody Determination
Any surrogacy agreement entered into in violation of this section is declared void and unenforceable. For a child born under such an unlawful agreement, legal custody will be decided based on the best interests of the child under the law of the state where the surrogate parent resides, with no effect given to the voided surrogacy agreement or any other purported custody understanding.
The bill defines 'sex offender' by referencing section 113 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (34 U.S.C. 20913), meaning an individual who is, or at any time was, required to register under that federal law.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. 2260B(g)(2)
Why it matters:Referencing existing federal law for definitions is standard legislative practice, intended to ensure consistency and avoid redundancy, rather than being evasive.
Case for: Supporters argue that using an established federal definition ensures consistency with existing child protection frameworks and clearly identifies the class of individuals targeted by the bill.
Case against: Critics might argue that requiring external legal knowledge to understand the full scope of the definition makes the bill less accessible to the general public and potentially to those directly affected.
Estimated impact: This definition broadly applies to all individuals currently or previously required to register as sex offenders under federal law, encompassing a significant population.
The definition of 'surrogacy agency' explicitly includes 'any officer of such agency,' thereby extending criminal liability to individuals in leadership positions within these organizations.
Section 2, adding 18 U.S.C. 2260B(g)(3)(B)
Why it matters:This inclusion is a common legislative technique to ensure accountability at the leadership level, rather than being an attempt to hide a provision.
Case for: Proponents argue that including officers ensures that agency leadership cannot evade responsibility for violations, promoting a culture of compliance from the top down and preventing corporate shields from protecting culpable individuals.
Case against: Opponents might contend that this could be overly broad, potentially holding officers liable for actions they were not directly involved in, depending on the interpretation of 'facilitates' and the officer's knowledge.
Estimated impact: Expands the scope of criminal liability to include individuals in leadership roles within surrogacy agencies, increasing the personal risk for those managing these organizations.