Critical Infrastructure Airspace Defense Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Van Epps, Matt [R-TN-7]
- Committees
- Homeland Security Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 7, 2026
Bottom line
This bill empowers private critical infrastructure entities to actively defend against drone threats, aiming to enhance security but raising questions about airspace control and potential misuse.
What it actually does
This bill grants private owners and operators of designated critical infrastructure facilities the authority to detect, track, and mitigate unmanned aircraft system (UAS) threats, overriding certain federal laws. It mandates the establishment of a national training and certification program for personnel, creates a grant program to help fund counter-UAS technologies, and provides liability protection for authorized actions. The authority is temporary, set to expire in 2031.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue this bill addresses a critical security gap, enabling private entities to protect vital infrastructure like the electric grid from growing UAS threats, which federal agencies and law enforcement currently cannot fully cover. They emphasize the urgent need for prompt action to ensure the reliability and safety of essential services.
Opponents contend
Opponents might raise concerns about privatizing airspace defense, the potential for unintended harm to legitimate drone operations, the risk of collateral damage, and the complexity of coordinating private actions with national airspace management. They may also question the adequacy of training and oversight for such sensitive operations.
The bill is relatively short and its core provisions are clearly articulated, making it accessible for an informed reader to evaluate within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 3(1), amending 6 U.S.C. 124n(a)
Granting Counter-UAS Authority to Critical Infrastructure Owners and Operators
This provision allows private owners and operators of designated critical infrastructure facilities, or their trained security personnel or contractors, to detect, track, and mitigate in-flight unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) threats. It explicitly overrides several federal laws related to airspace interference and computer fraud, providing a legal basis for these defensive actions.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this is essential to close a critical security gap, as current federal authorities are insufficient to protect all critical infrastructure from evolving drone threats. They contend that private entities are best positioned to provide immediate defense for their facilities.
Critics contend
Critics may argue that granting such authority to private entities could lead to a patchwork of enforcement, potential overreach, or accidental interference with legitimate drone operations, creating new risks in the national airspace.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances national security and critical infrastructure protection with concerns over privatizing law enforcement functions and potential impacts on civil aviation and the drone industry.
Section 3(3)(C), inserting new 6 U.S.C. 124n(d)(3)
Establishment of National Certification Program for Counter-UAS Personnel
This section mandates the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with other federal agencies, to establish a national certification program within 180 days of enactment. This program will train and certify personnel from critical infrastructure facilities in legal, operational, and technical proficiency for counter-UAS activities, ensuring they use approved technologies and coordinate with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to protect the national airspace system.
Section 3(7), adding new 6 U.S.C. 124n(j)(3)
Termination of Critical Infrastructure Counter-UAS Authority
The authority granted to critical infrastructure facilities to use counter-UAS technologies is explicitly set to terminate on September 30, 2031. This provision establishes a sunset date for the new powers, requiring future legislative action for any extension.
Section 4
Critical Infrastructure Counter-UAS Grant Program
This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy, to establish a grant program. This program will provide financial assistance to eligible critical infrastructure owners and operators to purchase, install, and operate approved counter-UAS systems. It authorizes $250,000,000 for fiscal years 2027 through 2031 for this purpose.
Section 5
Liability Protection for Authorized Counter-UAS Actions
This section stipulates that any authorized counter-UAS action taken by critical infrastructure owners, operators, or personnel under this Act will be considered a 'Federal action' for liability protection purposes. It grants civil and criminal immunity for such authorized actions, except in cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Any unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft seized by critical infrastructure personnel under this new authority shall be subject to forfeiture under the laws of the jurisdiction where the seizure occurred, consistent with procedures established by the Secretary.
Section 3(2), amending 6 U.S.C. 124n(c)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for specifying the legal handling of seized property, but its implications for drone owners might be missed by a casual reader focusing on the primary grants of authority.
Case for: Proponents would argue this provides a clear legal framework for handling drones deemed a threat, deterring malicious use and ensuring proper disposal or investigation, contributing to overall security.
Case against: Critics might argue that without clear guidelines for what constitutes a 'credible threat' and robust oversight, this could lead to arbitrary seizures and forfeiture of legitimate property, especially given the broad liability protection for private actors.
Estimated impact: Could result in the seizure and forfeiture of an unknown number of drones annually, impacting drone owners who operate near critical infrastructure facilities.
This provision defines 'covered critical infrastructure facility' as a high-risk site designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the Secretary of Energy. It explicitly includes, at a minimum, nuclear generating stations, key substations, transformer stations, and control centers of the bulk power system.
Section 3(9)(C), inserting new 6 U.S.C. 124n(l)(3)
Why it matters:It is standard legislative practice to define terms precisely in a dedicated section. However, the specific inclusion of certain energy infrastructure types is a key policy decision that could be overlooked.
Case for: Proponents argue this focused definition ensures the counter-UAS authority is applied to the most critical and vulnerable assets, prioritizing national security and energy grid reliability where threats are most severe.
Case against: No specific opposition to the definition itself, but some might argue it's too narrow, potentially leaving other critical infrastructure sectors vulnerable, or too broad, depending on their stance on the overall bill's expansion of private authority.
Estimated impact: Narrows the initial scope of the bill's application to specific high-risk energy infrastructure, directly impacting which facilities are eligible for the new counter-UAS authorities and grant funding.
For the purposes of the critical infrastructure authority, 'personnel' means officers, employees, or contractors of the owner or operator of a covered critical infrastructure facility who are assigned duties that include the security or protection of the facility.
Section 3(9)(E), adding 6 U.S.C. 124n(l)(8)(C)
Why it matters:It is standard legislative practice to define terms precisely. However, this specific definition is critical for understanding the scope of individuals who will be trained and authorized to use counter-UAS technologies.
Case for: Proponents would argue this ensures that only individuals with direct security responsibilities are authorized to use counter-UAS technologies, maintaining a clear scope of authority and accountability for sensitive operations.
Case against: No direct opposition, but some might argue it could be interpreted broadly to include a wide range of contractors, potentially diluting accountability if not rigorously managed through the certification program.
Estimated impact: Clarifies who within private entities can exercise the new powers, directly impacting the scope of the training and certification program and the number of individuals authorized to conduct counter-UAS activities.