FISH Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Begich, Nicholas J. [R-AK-At Large]
- Committees
- Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jun 29, 2026
Bottom line
The FISH Act of 2026 significantly expands U.S. tools and interagency coordination to deter IUU fishing and associated labor abuses by targeting vessels, their owners, and supporting international cooperation.
What it actually does
The Fighting Foreign Illegal Seafood Harvests Act of 2026, or the FISH Act of 2026, aims to strengthen U.S. efforts against illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing globally. It establishes a public IUU vessel list, imposes visa sanctions on beneficial owners of listed vessels, encourages international agreements, enhances Coast Guard enforcement, improves data sharing, and boosts technical assistance to foreign nations' fisheries sectors. The bill also mandates studies on new technology impacts and the influence of Russian and Chinese fishing industries.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that IUU fishing undermines sustainable fisheries, harms legitimate fishers, and is often linked to forced labor and human trafficking, posing threats to maritime security and economic stability. This bill provides critical new tools, including a robust IUU vessel list and visa sanctions, to hold bad actors accountable and protect U.S. economic interests and national security, while promoting global ocean health and human rights.
Opponents contend
No explicit opposition arguments are present in the bill text. Potential arguments from critics might focus on the extraterritorial reach of U.S. sanctions, potential for diplomatic friction with other nations, or concerns about the administrative burden and potential for overreach in identifying and sanctioning vessels and individuals. Some might argue that the measures could inadvertently harm legitimate fishing operations or create barriers to trade.
The bill is moderately complex, requiring a dedicated read to understand its various amendments to existing law and interagency coordination mechanisms.
Section 4, amending Section 608 of the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 1826i)
Creation of a Public IUU Vessel List and Criteria for Inclusion
This section mandates the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with other agencies, to create and publicly maintain a list of foreign vessels, fleets, and their beneficial owners engaged in IUU fishing or supporting it. It specifies clear criteria for inclusion, such as being on an RFMO's IUU list, undermining RFMO measures, or operating in the U.S. EEZ without a permit. It also details procedures for nomination, notification, hearings, and public information disclosure, and establishes that listed entities generally remain on the list permanently unless specific conditions for removal are met.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a public, comprehensive IUU vessel list with clear criteria and due process is essential for transparency and accountability, providing a powerful tool to identify and sanction bad actors and deter illegal fishing activities globally.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that the criteria for inclusion could be overly broad or subject to political influence, potentially leading to the unfair blacklisting of vessels or beneficial owners, and that the 'permanency' clause is too rigid.
Tradeoffs
Balances the need for strong enforcement against potential for diplomatic friction or perceived overreach in international waters.
Section 5
Ineligibility for U.S. Visas and Admission for IUU Vessel Owners
This section makes foreign persons who are owners or beneficial owners of vessels on the newly established IUU vessel list ineligible for U.S. visas, admission, or parole. It also mandates the revocation of any existing visas for such individuals. The President can waive these sanctions in the national interest, and exceptions are provided for intelligence/law enforcement activities, international agreements, safety of vessels/crew, and cases where ownership was established through force or fraud.
Section 7
Increased Coast Guard Boarding and Reporting on IUU Fishing
This section encourages the Commandant of the Coast Guard to increase observations and boardings of vessels suspected of IUU fishing on the high seas. It also requires the Administrator (NOAA) to coordinate with RFMOs to track corrective measures taken by countries whose vessels were boarded. A report to Congress is mandated within three years, detailing bilateral agreements, IUU incidents, vessel statuses, boarding refusals, and potential enforcement actions.
Section 8, amending Section 3551(c) of the Maritime SAFE Act
Expanded Mandate for Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing
This section expands the duties of the Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing to include developing strategies for leveraging enforcement capacity against IUU fishing, particularly for nations identified under existing law, and against associated abuses like forced labor. It directs the Secretary of State to identify RFMOs without high seas boarding programs and address obstacles to their implementation.
Section 9, amending Section 3552 of the Maritime SAFE Act
Enhanced Data Strategies for Combating IUU Fishing and Forced Labor
This section mandates the Interagency Working Group to identify information and resources to prevent IUU fishing and forced labor seafood from entering U.S. commerce, without burdening legitimate seafood. It requires identification of data streams, barriers to sharing, recommendations for joint enforcement protocols, forensic resources, field investigations, automated risk-targeting, and dissemination of analysis, including the establishment of an IUU fishing information sharing center. It also calls for an analysis of other countries' IUU policies.
Section 10
Increased Support for International Fisheries Capacity Building
This section encourages the Secretaries of State and Commerce to increase support for programs providing technical assistance, institutional capacity, and investment to foreign nations' fisheries sectors, focusing on sustainable management and combating IUU fishing and forced labor. The Interagency Working Group is also tasked with analyzing U.S. capacity-building expertise and resources, including avenues for public-private and multilateral collaboration.
Section 11
Strategy for Identifying Forced Labor Seafood
This section directs the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with other relevant agencies, to develop and publish a strategy for utilizing U.S. Government data to identify seafood harvested on foreign vessels using forced labor.
Section 12
Studies on New Technology, Russian/Chinese Fishing Influence, and IUU Impacts
This section mandates several studies: one by the Secretary of Homeland Security on the impact of new technology (drones, AI, satellite Wi-Fi) on IUU fishing and associated crimes; another by the Secretary of State on collaboration between Russian and Chinese fishing industries and China's seafood reprocessing role; and a multifaceted study by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (via NOAA) to quantify IUU fishing, evaluate its costs to the U.S. and global economies, and assess response strategies.
States that, with limited exceptions, a vessel, fleet, or beneficial owner placed on the IUU vessel list 'shall remain on the IUU vessel list.'
Section 4(e)(1)
Why it matters:This is a strong enforcement mechanism, making it difficult for listed entities to escape sanctions. It's a deliberate policy choice, not necessarily evasive, but its full implications might not be immediately obvious.
Case for: Proponents argue that permanent listing (with narrow exceptions) provides maximum deterrence and prevents bad actors from simply reflagging or reorganizing to evade consequences, ensuring long-term accountability.
Case against: Critics might argue that such a permanent listing is overly punitive, lacks sufficient pathways for rehabilitation, and could be disproportionate for certain infractions, potentially leading to diplomatic friction.
Estimated impact: Significant, as it establishes a long-term consequence for entities engaged in IUU fishing, impacting their global operations and potentially their ability to conduct business.
Exempts from visa sanctions any person providing provisions to an IUU-listed vessel if those provisions are for the safety and care of the crew or maintenance of the vessel to avoid environmental damage.
Section 5(d)(3)
Why it matters:This is a humanitarian and practical carve-out, ensuring that sanctions don't inadvertently endanger human lives or cause environmental disasters. It's standard legislative practice to include such exceptions.
Case for: Proponents argue this exception is crucial for humanitarian reasons, preventing the unintended consequence of endangering seafarers or causing environmental harm due to sanctions. It aligns with international maritime law principles.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against humanitarian exceptions. Some might argue it could be exploited, but the narrow framing limits this risk.
Estimated impact: Minor in terms of overall IUU fishing impact, but significant for the welfare of crews on listed vessels and environmental protection.
Explicitly states that the Act's authorities and requirements 'shall not include any authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods or related to sanctions on the importation of goods.'
Section 14
Why it matters:This is a significant limitation on the bill's scope, potentially to avoid conflicts with existing trade laws or to narrow the bill's impact to specific enforcement mechanisms (like visa sanctions) rather than broad trade restrictions. It could be seen as a compromise to gain broader support.
Case for: Proponents might argue this exception streamlines the bill's focus on direct enforcement and individual accountability, avoiding complex trade disputes and ensuring the bill can pass without broader economic implications. It might also prevent unintended harm to legitimate seafood trade.
Case against: Critics might argue that this exception significantly weakens the bill's potential impact by removing a powerful economic lever—the ability to sanction seafood imports from IUU sources. They might contend that without import sanctions, the U.S. is not fully addressing the market for illegally caught fish.
Estimated impact: Substantial, as it explicitly limits the economic tools available under this Act, potentially reducing its overall deterrent effect on the market for IUU seafood.