Strategic Unmanned Systems Partnership Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Kaptur, Marcy [D-OH-9]
- Committees
- Armed Services Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jun 30, 2026
Bottom line
The Strategic Unmanned Systems Partnership Act aims to formalize and accelerate defense innovation collaboration between the U.S. and Ukraine, focusing on unmanned systems and counter-UAS technologies, by establishing a dedicated working group and frameworks for co-development and acquisition.
What it actually does
This bill establishes a United States-Ukraine Strategic Defense Innovation Working Group, co-chaired by various U.S. Department of Defense officials, to explore co-development, co-production, acquisition, and transfer of "covered systems" (expendable unmanned systems and counter-UAS capabilities). The Working Group is tasked with analyzing lessons from Ukraine's defense industry, identifying high-utility Ukraine-designed systems for U.S. forces, developing technology transfer frameworks, and assessing the feasibility of testing U.S. systems in Ukraine.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue this bill is crucial for leveraging Ukraine's battlefield innovations in unmanned systems, which have proven highly effective in active combat, to enhance U.S. defense capabilities and industrial base. They contend it will streamline the acquisition of cutting-edge, low-cost, expendable systems, foster mutual technology transfer, and strengthen the strategic partnership between the two nations against common adversaries.
Opponents contend
Critics might raise concerns about the potential for intellectual property disputes, the security risks associated with sharing advanced defense technologies, or the financial implications of co-development and acquisition without clear cost-sharing agreements. Some may also question the practicality of integrating Ukraine-designed systems into the U.S. defense apparatus given existing statutory requirements and procurement processes.
The bill is concise and clearly written, making it accessible for a quick read, but its implications warrant deeper consideration of the strategic and operational details.
Section 3(a)
Formation of US-Ukraine Strategic Defense Innovation Working Group
This section mandates the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to establish a working group with Ukrainian stakeholders within 90 days. The group's purpose is to explore pathways for co-development, co-production, acquisition, and transfer of "covered systems" and related technology transfer frameworks.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a dedicated working group is essential to formalize and accelerate critical defense innovation partnerships, ensuring both nations can rapidly adapt to evolving threats and leverage each other's strengths in unmanned systems.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against the establishment of a working group itself, though concerns might arise regarding its scope, composition, or potential bureaucratic overhead.
Tradeoffs
The tension lies in balancing the urgency of defense innovation with the complexities of international collaboration, bureaucratic processes, and ensuring equitable benefit sharing.
Section 3(b) and 3(c)
Leadership and Participants of the Working Group
This section specifies that the Working Group will be co-chaired by key U.S. Department of Defense officials, including the Under Secretary of Defense, Director of the Defense Innovation Unit, Director of Joint Interagency Task Force 401, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and Commander of Joint Special Operations Command. It also seeks participation from Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, military forces, Brave1 Defense Tech Cluster, and the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center.
Section 4(a)
Core Mandates for US-Ukraine Defense Innovation Collaboration
The Working Group is tasked with systematically analyzing lessons from Ukraine's military and defense industry regarding covered systems, identifying Ukraine-designed systems with high operational utility for U.S. forces, and recommending their incorporation into U.S. programs. It must also develop defense trade agreements, including mutual data exchange protocols and joint intellectual property frameworks, and assess the feasibility of testing U.S.-manufactured covered systems in Ukraine.
Section 5(a)
Accelerated Acquisition and Co-production of Ukraine-Designed Systems
This section directs the Working Group co-chairs to prioritize Ukraine-designed covered systems that have demonstrated high operational utility. This prioritization includes analyzing statutory requirements, identifying authorities to accelerate joint ventures or licensed production, accelerating traditional procurement, conducting supply chain assessments, identifying co-development costs, and outlining steps for scaled production in the U.S., leveraging civilian manufacturing.
Section 5(b)
Exploring Non-Traditional Pathways for Ukraine-Designed Systems
For Ukraine-designed covered systems that do not meet existing statutory fielding requirements, the Working Group is directed to explore alternative pathways for their deployment. These pathways include SkyFoundry, the UAS Marketplace, and Drone Dominance, which are likely existing or proposed programs designed to streamline the adoption of unmanned systems.
Section 6
Congressional Oversight and Progress Reporting
The Working Group is required to provide an initial strategy briefing to the congressional defense committees within 120 days of enactment. Subsequently, it must submit semiannual reports detailing progress, including lists of prioritized systems, acquisition authorities used, supply chain analyses, frameworks for co-development, and regulatory barriers. Reports must be unclassified with a classified annex if needed.
Section 7
Sunset Clause for the Working Group
The Working Group is set to terminate five years after the date of the Act's enactment. However, the Secretary of Defense can extend its existence for an additional year if it is deemed vital to national security, with a written justification submitted to the congressional defense committees.
Defines "covered system" broadly to include unmanned systems designed for limited missions, expendable in high-threat environments, and characterized by low per-unit cost relative to target value. It explicitly includes enabling software/hardware, various unmanned vehicles (aerial, underwater, surface), counter-unmanned systems capabilities (early warning, jamming, interceptors), and command and control architecture for integrated operation.
Section 2(2)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to define terms upfront, but its breadth and specificity are highly consequential.
Case for: Proponents would argue that a broad and inclusive definition ensures the Working Group can address the full spectrum of relevant unmanned and counter-unmanned technologies, allowing for flexibility as innovation evolves.
Case against: Critics might argue that such a broad definition could lead to mission creep or dilute the focus of the Working Group, making it harder to prioritize specific, high-impact technologies.
Estimated impact: This definition fundamentally shapes the technological focus of U.S.-Ukraine defense innovation, potentially directing significant future investment and strategic attention towards expendable, low-cost unmanned systems and counter-UAS capabilities.
Mandates the Working Group to develop a mutual technology transfer framework that includes mutual data exchange protocols for secure sharing of battlefield and military information (like telemetry data and electronic warfare signal profiles), and joint intellectual property ownership frameworks that protect background IP while facilitating co-development and co-production.
Section 4(a)(4)(A)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to detail components of broader agreements, but the specifics here are highly technical and critical for actual collaboration.
Case for: Proponents would argue that these specific frameworks are essential for genuine, deep collaboration, enabling secure information sharing and fair intellectual property management, which are cornerstones of effective co-development.
Case against: Critics might raise concerns about the inherent risks in sharing sensitive battlefield data and the complexities of managing joint intellectual property, especially with a nation in active conflict, potentially exposing vulnerabilities or creating future disputes.
Estimated impact: These frameworks are foundational for any meaningful technology transfer and co-production, potentially enabling significant advancements but also posing considerable legal and security challenges.