No Hostile ONLOOKERS Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Tenney, Claudia [R-NY-24]
- Committees
- Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 13, 2026
Bottom line
This bill aims to enhance national security by restricting intelligence community funding to National Laboratories that do not implement specific security measures against foreign intelligence threats from designated countries, with a limited waiver option.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits elements of the U.S. intelligence community from obligating or expending funds for research, development, or technical support performed by any National Laboratory that permits individuals from designated 'countries of risk' (referred to as 'covered assignees' or 'covered visitors') to access its premises, information, or technology. It includes a waiver provision allowing the head of an intelligence community element to bypass this prohibition under specific certification and justification to congressional intelligence committees.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue this bill is a critical national security measure to prevent foreign adversaries from accessing sensitive research, development, and technical support at U.S. National Laboratories, thereby safeguarding intellectual property and technological advantages vital for national defense and economic competitiveness. It closes a potential vulnerability in the nation's research infrastructure.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that such a blanket prohibition could hinder legitimate scientific collaboration, limit the talent pool available to National Laboratories, or create bureaucratic hurdles that slow down critical research. They may contend it could inadvertently isolate U.S. scientists from valuable international contributions and potentially lead to a 'brain drain' if talented foreign nationals are deterred.
The bill is very short and straightforward, making it highly accessible for any reader to understand its core provisions quickly.
Section 2(b)
Prohibition on Intelligence Community Funding for Non-Compliant National Laboratories
This provision prohibits elements of the intelligence community from spending money on research, development, or technical support at any National Laboratory if that laboratory allows individuals designated as 'covered assignees' or 'covered visitors' from 'countries of risk' to access its facilities, information, or technology. The intent is to prevent foreign adversaries from gaining access to sensitive U.S. research and intellectual property by conditioning intelligence community funding on adherence to specific security measures.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue this provision is essential for national security, directly addressing concerns about foreign intelligence collection and intellectual property theft at sensitive research facilities. It ensures that intelligence community funds are not inadvertently supporting environments vulnerable to espionage, thereby protecting critical technological advantages.
Critics contend
Opponents might contend that this broad prohibition could inadvertently stifle legitimate scientific collaboration, particularly if 'countries of risk' definitions are too expansive or if the administrative burden on National Laboratories to comply is significant, potentially slowing down critical research and hindering scientific progress.
Tradeoffs
This provision navigates the tension between safeguarding national security interests from foreign espionage and maintaining the open, collaborative environment often vital for scientific advancement. It prioritizes security, potentially at the cost of broader international scientific engagement.
Section 2(c)
Waiver Authority for Prohibition
This subsection allows the head of an intelligence community element to waive the prohibition outlined in subsection (b) for specific research, development, or technical support. To do so, they must submit a certification to the congressional intelligence committees stating that the activity is not at risk of collection from a foreign intelligence agency or 'nontraditional intelligence collection,' along with a justification for the waiver. This provides a mechanism for flexibility in exceptional circumstances.
The bill defines 'country of risk,' 'covered assignee,' 'covered visitor,' and 'nontraditional intelligence collection' by referencing Section 6432 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159 and Public Law 119-60). It also defines 'National Intelligence Program' and 'National Laboratory' by referencing other existing statutes.
Section 2(a) Definitions
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for brevity and to maintain consistency with existing legal frameworks, avoiding the reprinting of lengthy definitions and ensuring legal coherence across related statutes.
Case for: Referencing existing definitions streamlines legislation, prevents redundancy, and ensures consistency across related statutes, which is crucial for legal clarity and avoiding conflicting interpretations.
Case against: For a casual reader, this practice makes the bill less accessible, as understanding its full implications requires looking up multiple external legal texts, which can be time-consuming and difficult, potentially obscuring the true reach of the legislation.
Estimated impact: The impact of the bill hinges entirely on the scope of these external definitions, which determine precisely which individuals, countries, and types of intelligence collection are subject to the prohibition. Without consulting these, the bill's practical effect is unknown.