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H.R. 9687·119th Congress·Introduced Jul 14, 2026

Blocking CCP Spy Tech Act of 2026

IntroducedArmed Forces and National SecurityMajor
View bill text
Sponsor
Rep. Perry, Scott [R-PA-10]
Committees
Armed Services Committee (primary)
Last action
Jul 14, 2026

Bottom line

The bill aims to accelerate and broaden the federal government's process for identifying and restricting Chinese technology deemed a national security threat by specifically targeting a list of companies.

What it actually does

This bill mandates that an appropriate national security agency determine within one year if communications equipment or services from seven specifically named Chinese entities, or their affiliates, pose an unacceptable national security risk. If a risk is found or if no determination is made, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must add these products to its 'covered list,' which restricts the use of federal subsidies for their purchase. Additionally, the bill requires the Secretary of Defense to assess if these entities should be designated as Chinese military companies.

Proponents argue

Proponents argue that this bill is a critical step to safeguard U.S. national security and protect American citizens from potential espionage and data exploitation by entities linked to the Chinese Communist Party. They contend that proactively identifying and restricting such technology is essential to secure critical communications infrastructure and prevent foreign adversaries from gaining undue influence or access to sensitive information. The bill provides a clear mandate and timeline, ensuring timely action on perceived threats.

Opponents contend

Opponents or skeptics might argue that while national security is paramount, specifically naming companies in legislation could set a problematic precedent, potentially leading to retaliatory measures from foreign governments or disrupting global supply chains. They may also raise concerns about the potential for politicizing national security reviews or the economic impact on U.S. businesses that may rely on components or services from the listed entities, even indirectly. Some might also question if existing review mechanisms are sufficient.

The bill is very short and clearly written, making it highly accessible for any reader to understand its core provisions and implications within a few minutes.

Section 2(a)-(b)

Mandatory National Security Risk Determination for Specific Entities

prominently featuredstraightforward

This provision requires an appropriate national security agency to conduct a review within one year of the bill's enactment to determine if communications equipment or services from seven named Chinese companies (Game Science Interactive Co., Ltd., DeepSeek, Unitree Robotics, DEEP Robotics, BrainCo, Inc., Manycore Tech, Inc.) and their subsidiaries or partners, pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the safety of U.S. persons. This is a direct mandate for a specific assessment of these entities.

GroupImpactMechanismScale
GroupU.S. National Security AgenciesImpactIncreased workload and specific mandateMechanismRequired review and determination within one yearScaleDirect operational impact
GroupNamed Chinese Technology Companies (Game Science, DeepSeek, Unitree Robotics, DEEP Robotics, BrainCo, Manycore Tech, and affiliates)ImpactSubject to federal scrutiny and potential restrictionsMechanismTheir products and services are the direct subject of the national security reviewScaleHigh potential economic and reputational impact
GroupU.S. Persons and Critical InfrastructureImpactPotential enhanced securityMechanismIdentification and restriction of risky equipment/servicesScaleBroad, diffuse benefit

Supporters argue

Supporters argue that this provision is crucial for national security, as it forces a timely and focused review of specific entities identified as potential threats. They believe that by naming these companies, the bill ensures that agencies prioritize their assessment and take decisive action to protect U.S. interests from foreign espionage and cyber threats.

Critics contend

Critics might contend that specifically naming companies in legislation could be seen as an overreach or a political move, potentially complicating diplomatic relations and trade. They might argue that existing, more generalized review processes are sufficient and less prone to political interference, or that such a specific mandate could divert resources from other critical national security assessments.

Tradeoffs

The provision balances the desire for targeted national security action against potential diplomatic and trade repercussions, as well as the administrative burden on agencies to conduct specific, time-bound reviews.

Section 2(c)

Inclusion on FCC's Covered List Based on Determinations

prominently featuredmoderately complex

This section outlines the consequences of the national security review. If the national security agency determines that any of the listed equipment or services pose an unacceptable risk, or if it fails to make a determination within the one-year deadline, the FCC must add those items to its 'covered list.' This list, established under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, restricts the use of federal funds for purchasing equipment or services from listed entities. If a negative determination (no risk) is made, the agency must report to Congress, and other national security agencies must review that determination.

Section 3

Determination of Chinese Military Company Status

mentioned in summarystraightforward

This section requires the Secretary of Defense to determine if any of the entities listed in Section 2(b) (Game Science Interactive Co., Ltd., DeepSeek, Unitree Robotics, DEEP Robotics, BrainCo, Inc., Manycore Tech, Inc., and their affiliates) should be identified as a 'Chinese military company operating directly or indirectly in the United States.' This determination is to be made as part of the annual review mandated by Section 1260H(a) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.

About this analysis. AI-Generated from the official bill text and available committee reports. Gaps in available data are noted explicitly. Verify important details with the official Congress.gov record.

On this page

  • Executive summary
  • Key provisions
  • Follow the money
  • Critical analysis
  • Questions to ask
  • Implementation
  • Political analysis
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