BRRRRT Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Hamadeh, Abraham J. [R-AZ-8]
- Committees
- Foreign Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 20, 2026
Bottom line
The BRRRRT Act of 2026 aims to indefinitely extend the operational life and capabilities of the A-10 Warthog aircraft, resisting Air Force plans for divestment by imposing strict conditions and sustainment mandates.
What it actually does
This bill imposes significant restrictions on the Department of Defense's ability to retire or divest A-10 Warthog aircraft, mandating minimum inventory levels and requiring a comprehensive certification of a fully capable replacement before any further divestment can occur. It also directs the Air Force to sustain A-10 training, maintenance, and operational capacity through fiscal year 2033, preserve retired aircraft for potential future use, reconstitute an A-10 demonstration team, and develop plans for competitive experimentation with new technologies relevant to the A-10's mission set.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the A-10 Warthog provides unique and irreplaceable close air support (CAS) and combat search and rescue (CSAR) capabilities vital for the safety and effectiveness of ground troops. They contend that no current or planned aircraft can fully replicate the A-10's combination of survivability, loiter time, and precision firepower, making its continued operation essential until a truly equivalent replacement is fielded and certified by the ground forces it supports.
Opponents contend
Opponents, primarily within the Air Force, contend that the A-10 is an aging platform that is increasingly vulnerable in modern contested airspace and expensive to maintain. They argue that continued investment in the A-10 diverts critical resources from modernizing the fleet with next-generation aircraft and technologies necessary to address future high-end threats, hindering overall Air Force readiness and strategic objectives.
The bill is moderately detailed, but its structure and clear language make it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(a)
Limitation on Divestment of A-10 Aircraft
This provision prohibits the Department of Defense from using funds to retire, divest, or store A-10 aircraft in a way that would reduce the total inventory below the level needed to sustain operational employment, pilot production, operational test, and demonstration requirements through fiscal year 2033. It establishes a minimum inventory requirement of 126 A-10 aircraft and specifies the composition of active and reserve units that must operate them.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision is crucial for maintaining a vital close air support and combat search and rescue capability for ground forces, preventing a premature divestment of an aircraft that has proven its effectiveness in numerous conflicts. They believe it ensures the Air Force cannot unilaterally eliminate a critical asset without a certified replacement.
Critics contend
Critics, primarily within the Air Force, contend that this limitation hinders modernization efforts by forcing the continued operation of an aging platform. They argue it diverts resources from developing and acquiring advanced aircraft better suited for future threats and that the Air Force should have the flexibility to manage its fleet strategically.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the immediate need for proven close air support capabilities for ground troops against the Air Force's long-term strategic goals of modernizing its fleet and investing in next-generation technologies. It creates a tension between maintaining legacy systems and preparing for future warfare.
Section 2(b)
Certification of Fully Capable Replacement Before Further Divestment
This section requires the Secretary of Defense to certify that a fully capable replacement for the A-10 fleet has achieved full operational capability before any of the divestment requirements in subsection (a) can be waived. The certification must include a detailed crosswalk of capabilities, a cost-comparison analysis, a mission hand-off plan, and, critically, written concurrence from the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy (through the Commandant of the Marine Corps), and the Commander of United States Special Operations Command.
Section 2(c)
Preservation of Certain Retired A-10 Aircraft
This provision mandates that the Secretary of the Air Force preserve A-10 aircraft retired during or after fiscal year 2027 in a condition that allows them to be reconstituted for operational use, contingency use, training, testing, heritage demonstration, or transfer to eligible foreign partners. It sets minimum preservation standards, prohibits cannibalization of certain aircraft, and limits irreversible processing until a sustainment roadmap is submitted. It also prioritizes storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona.
Section 3(a)
Limitations on Availability of Funds for Divestment and Training Transition
This section restricts the Air Force's ability to spend funds on A-10 divestment activities by withholding 15% of such funds until a comprehensive sustainment roadmap is submitted to Congress. It also prohibits funds from being used to transition A-10 training functions from Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, to another installation unless specific feasibility and cost conditions are met. Furthermore, it prevents the reduction or elimination of the A-10 weapons instructor course at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.
Section 3(b)
Sustainment Requirements for A-10 Aircraft and Related Training
This section mandates that the Air Force maintain sufficient training, development, test, evaluation, depot-level maintenance, supply, logistics, and contractor capacity to ensure the A-10 fleet remains operationally viable through fiscal year 2033. It sets specific minimum requirements, including qualifying at least 14 pilots annually, training at least four advanced instructors annually, and preserving the A-10 fighter pilot specialty community as a primary career path. It also mandates maintaining core training infrastructure at Davis-Monthan and Nellis Air Force Bases.
Section 3(e)
Program To Preserve Knowledge and History Relating to A-10 Aircraft
This section directs the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a program to preserve technical and historical knowledge related to the operation and sustainment of the A-10 fleet. Led by the Air Force Historical Research Agency, the program will collect oral histories from A-10 personnel, gather technical data and operational records, digitally archive these materials, identify lessons learned, and develop recommendations for transferring this knowledge to successor aircraft programs.
Section 4
Reconstitution of A-10 Demonstration Team
This section requires the Secretary of the Air Force to reconstitute and operate an A-10 demonstration team. The team's purpose is to support public outreach, recruiting, heritage, and official commemorative events, particularly those associated with the 250th anniversary of the United States. Aircraft for the team must be drawn from the existing A-10 inventory and cannot be retired or divested solely for demonstration purposes. The authority for the team terminates on September 30, 2033.
Section 5
Plan for Competitive Experimentation Relating to Autonomous and Nontraditional Capabilities
This section requires the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a plan for competitive experimentation, prototyping, and operational assessment of autonomous, semi-autonomous, artificial intelligence-enabled, and adjunct aircraft capabilities that are relevant to the A-10 mission set. The plan must include opportunities for nontraditional defense contractors, ensure human command and control over critical functions, estimate an annual budget, and consider making A-10 aircraft or components available for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities.
Section 6
Report on A-10 Combat Legacy, Current Operational Use, and Modernization Outlook
This section requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Air Force and relevant commanders, to submit a report by January 15, 2027. The report must detail the A-10's combat employment from Operation Desert Storm through current operations, identify lessons learned for various mission sets (e.g., CAS, CSAR, air-ground integration), assess how these lessons inform future force design, and evaluate potential incremental modernization options for the A-10, including electronic warfare, digital communications, and precision weapons integration.
Section 7
Briefing on Feasibility of Foreign Transfer, Security Cooperation, and Contingency Basing Options for Surplus A-10 Aircraft
This section requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Air Force, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and in consultation with the Secretary of State, to provide a briefing by January 15, 2027. The briefing must assess the feasibility of transferring surplus A-10 aircraft to eligible foreign partners through various mechanisms (e.g., foreign military sales, excess defense articles) or maintaining them in recoverable status for future security cooperation or contingency operations. It must also identify suitable allies, assess associated requirements (training, maintenance, basing), and consider export control and security implications.
Prohibits the use of funds to reduce personnel, training, maintenance, or sustainment activities for A-10 aircraft in a manner that 'presumes future congressional authority to divest such aircraft.'
Section 2(a)(3)
Why it matters:This language is a direct legislative check on executive branch planning. It's standard legislative practice to include such clauses to prevent agencies from preemptively acting on anticipated policy changes, but its specific wording here is a strong signal of congressional intent to control the A-10's fate.
Case for: Supporters argue this prevents the Air Force from undermining the A-10's operational viability through 'death by a thousand cuts' – gradually reducing support in anticipation of eventual divestment, even if Congress has not authorized it. It ensures the Air Force maintains the fleet as if it will continue to operate.
Case against: The Air Force might argue this micromanages their strategic planning and resource allocation. It forces them to maintain capabilities for an aircraft they intend to retire, potentially diverting resources from future-oriented programs and creating inefficiencies.
Estimated impact: This provision has a significant operational and budgetary impact, forcing the Air Force to continue funding and staffing A-10 support functions that it might otherwise be phasing out, potentially costing hundreds of millions over several years.
Requires the written concurrence of the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy (acting through the Commandant of the Marine Corps), and the Commander of United States Special Operations Command for the Secretary of Defense's certification that a fully capable A-10 replacement has achieved full operational capability.
Section 2(b)(2)(E)
Why it matters:While technically phrased, this is a highly consequential provision that fundamentally shifts power dynamics within the Department of Defense. It's standard to detail certification elements, but this specific requirement for inter-service concurrence is a significant legislative assertion of ground force influence over air asset decisions.
Case for: Supporters argue this ensures that the services most reliant on the A-10's unique capabilities have a direct say in whether a replacement is truly adequate. It prevents the Air Force from unilaterally declaring a replacement ready if ground forces believe it will leave them vulnerable.
Case against: The Air Force might argue this gives other services an effective veto over its force structure decisions, potentially delaying modernization and creating inter-service friction. They may contend that the Air Force, as the primary air combat service, should have ultimate authority over its aircraft fleet.
Estimated impact: This provision significantly empowers ground forces, potentially delaying A-10 divestment for years if a consensus on a replacement cannot be reached. It could influence future aircraft procurement and inter-service doctrine development, with impacts potentially in the billions of dollars over the long term.
Requires the Secretary of the Air Force to maintain a fighter pilot specialty community for the A-10 mission set, establishing it as a 'primary area of pilot training, operational experience, and career development rather than a secondary or collateral area.'
Section 3(b)(2)(C)
Why it matters:This is a subtle but powerful legislative directive aimed at preventing the Air Force from gradually phasing out the A-10 by downgrading its importance within pilot career paths. It's standard to specify training requirements, but this level of detail on career development is a direct counter to potential Air Force strategies for divestment.
Case for: Supporters argue this ensures that dedicated expertise for the A-10's unique missions is maintained and that pilots view it as a viable and important career path, preventing a 'brain drain' from the A-10 community. It directly combats attempts to make the A-10 a 'dead-end' assignment.
Case against: The Air Force might argue this interferes with its ability to manage pilot career progression and assign personnel based on broader strategic needs. It could force pilots into a specialty for an aircraft the Air Force intends to retire, potentially impacting morale and overall force flexibility.
Estimated impact: This provision has a significant long-term impact on Air Force personnel management and the retention of specialized A-10 expertise. It ensures a pipeline of qualified A-10 pilots and instructors, potentially costing millions annually in training and retention efforts.
Prohibits the Secretary of the Air Force from initiating any new military construction project for A-10 sustainment unless certifying that existing facilities are insufficient, the project is minimum cost, and it will not materially interfere with the 492d Special Operations Wing at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base.
Section 3(b)(6)
Why it matters:This provision is a legislative guardrail against potential Air Force tactics. It prevents the Air Force from using new military construction as a reason to relocate A-10 functions or to justify excessive spending on an aircraft they want to retire. The specific mention of the 492d Special Operations Wing is a targeted protection for another mission at Davis-Monthan.
Case for: Supporters argue this prevents wasteful spending on new infrastructure for an aircraft the Air Force intends to divest, forcing the use of existing facilities. It also protects the mission of other units at Davis-Monthan from being negatively impacted by A-10-related construction.
Case against: The Air Force might argue this limits their flexibility to efficiently house and maintain the A-10 fleet, potentially forcing them to use suboptimal or more costly existing facilities. It could also be seen as micromanaging base infrastructure decisions.
Estimated impact: This provision could save tens or hundreds of millions of dollars by preventing new military construction projects for A-10 sustainment. It also ensures mission continuity for other units at Davis-Monthan.