Protection Against Mass Surveillance Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Burchett, Tim [R-TN-2]
- Committees
- Oversight and Government Reform Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 21, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to restrict government use of advanced surveillance technologies to protect individual privacy and civil liberties by banning their use by federal agencies and prohibiting federal funding for their use by state and local entities.
What it actually does
This bill establishes a broad prohibition on federal agencies from purchasing, deploying, operating, accessing, or contracting for automated surveillance systems that identify, track, or record individuals. It specifically targets technologies such as automated license plate recognition (ALPR), facial recognition, and other biometric identification methods. Furthermore, it prevents state, local, and tribal governments from using federal funds for these prohibited systems and mandates the deletion and inadmissibility of any data obtained in violation of the act.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the bill is essential to protect fundamental privacy rights and civil liberties from the pervasive threat of government mass surveillance. They contend that technologies like facial recognition and ALPR create a 'surveillance state' where individuals can be tracked without suspicion, leading to potential abuses, errors, and a chilling effect on free speech and assembly. Proponents emphasize the importance of preventing the government from collecting and retaining vast amounts of personal data without clear legal justification or oversight.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that such a sweeping prohibition would severely hinder law enforcement and national security efforts, making it significantly more difficult to track criminals, respond to threats, and solve serious crimes. They may contend that these technologies are vital tools for modern policing and intelligence gathering, and that existing legal frameworks or more targeted regulations are sufficient to address privacy concerns without a blanket ban that could compromise public safety.
The bill is very short and clearly written, making it highly accessible for a quick and comprehensive understanding by any informed reader.
Section 2(a)
Prohibition on Federal Agency Use of Automated Surveillance Systems
This provision broadly bans federal agencies from acquiring, deploying, operating, accessing, or contracting for automated surveillance systems that identify, track, or record individuals. This includes specific technologies like automated license plate readers (ALPR), facial recognition, and other biometric identification methods (e.g., fingerprint, iris, voice, gait). It also covers any technology capturing, analyzing, or retaining personally identifiable information for the purpose of conducting persistent or mass surveillance.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue this is a crucial step to safeguard individual privacy and prevent the development of a pervasive surveillance state. They highlight the potential for abuse, errors, and chilling effects on free speech and assembly that these technologies pose when used by government.
Critics contend
Opponents may argue this provision ties the hands of federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, limiting their ability to investigate crimes, prevent terrorism, and ensure public safety in an increasingly digital world by removing valuable investigative tools.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances individual privacy and civil liberties against government investigative capabilities and public safety concerns, requiring agencies to find alternative methods for intelligence gathering.
Section 2(b)
Restriction on Federal Funding for State and Local Surveillance
This section extends the prohibition to state, local, and tribal governments, preventing them from using federal funds to purchase, deploy, operate, access, or contract for the same automated surveillance systems outlined in subsection (a). This ensures that federal money does not indirectly support the use of these technologies by lower levels of government, creating a consistent policy against mass surveillance.
Section 3(a)
Mandatory Deletion of Unlawfully Acquired Data
This provision requires the head of any federal agency that obtains data in violation of the Section 2(a) prohibition to delete that data not later than 30 days after it is obtained. The aim is to prevent the retention and potential future use of any data collected through prohibited surveillance methods, reinforcing the intent of the ban.
Section 3(b)
Inadmissibility of Unlawfully Acquired Data
This provision states that any data obtained by the Federal Government in violation of Section 2(a) may not be admitted into evidence in any court or administrative proceeding. This acts as an exclusionary rule, deterring federal agencies from using prohibited surveillance systems by nullifying the evidentiary value of any data collected through such means, thereby upholding constitutional protections.