Protecting Americans from Doxing and Political Violence Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Khanna, Ro [D-CA-17]
- Committees
- Committee on House Administration (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 22, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to enhance the personal safety and privacy of Members of Congress, their families, and staff by restricting the public disclosure and commercial trade of their sensitive personal information, and broadly restricts data brokers from trading sensitive data of all U.S. persons.
What it actually does
This bill establishes protections for "covered information" (e.g., home addresses, phone numbers, personal email, financial details, children's identification, geolocation data) of "at-risk individuals" (Members of Congress, their immediate family, and designated congressional staff). It prohibits government agencies from publicly posting this information and requires them to remove it upon request. It also makes it unlawful for data brokers to knowingly sell or trade covered information of any "covered person" (any individual in the U.S. or U.S. person). Other businesses are prohibited from publicly posting or transferring such information for at-risk individuals upon written request.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill is a necessary measure to protect public servants and their families from increasing threats of doxing, harassment, and political violence. They contend that the proliferation of personal information online makes individuals vulnerable and that this legislation provides essential safeguards, allowing elected officials and staff to perform their duties without fear for their personal safety or that of their loved ones. Furthermore, the broad data broker prohibition extends crucial privacy protections to all Americans.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that while the intent to protect individuals is valid, the broad scope of "covered information" and the restrictions on data brokers could inadvertently stifle legitimate public interest reporting or access to information that is traditionally considered public. Concerns could also be raised about potential overreach or the creation of a special class of citizens with enhanced privacy rights not afforded to the general public, and the practical challenges of enforcing such broad prohibitions on data brokers.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(b)
Government Agencies Prohibited from Publicly Posting Covered Information
This provision allows "at-risk individuals" (Members of Congress, their immediate family, and designated staff) to notify government agencies of their status and request that their "covered information" (e.g., home address, personal phone, children's details) be marked as private. Government agencies are then prohibited from publicly posting or displaying this information and must remove it from publicly available content within 72 hours of a request.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this is a direct and effective way to prevent doxing and harassment originating from government-held public records, which can be easily exploited by malicious actors. It provides a clear mechanism for public servants to protect their privacy.
Critics contend
Some might argue that this creates a two-tiered system where public officials receive greater privacy protections than ordinary citizens, potentially limiting transparency regarding public figures. Concerns about the administrative burden on agencies might also be raised.
Tradeoffs
Balances the privacy and safety of public officials against the principle of public access to government records and transparency.
Section 2(c)
Centralized Request Mechanism for Privacy Protections
This section allows at-risk individuals to make privacy requests directly or through a designated agent. Crucially, it authorizes the Sergeant at Arms and Chief Administrative Officer (for the House) or Sergeant at Arms and Secretary (for the Senate) to make these requests on behalf of Members, designated staff, and their immediate families. These legislative officers can also provide a list of protected individuals to government agencies and data brokers, which is deemed to satisfy individual notice requirements.
Section 2(d)(1)(A)
Unlawful for Data Brokers to Sell Covered Information of Covered Persons
This provision makes it unlawful for a "data broker" (a commercial entity profiting from selling personal information of non-customers) to knowingly sell, license, trade, or purchase "covered information" (e.g., home address, personal phone, financial details) of a "covered person" (any individual in the U.S. or U.S. person). The Attorney General or a State Attorney General can file actions for injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce this.
Section 2(d)(1)(B) and 2(d)(2)
Restrictions on Public Posting and Transfer of Covered Information by Other Businesses
This provision prohibits any "person, business, or association" (excluding data brokers, which are covered separately) from publicly posting or displaying "covered information" of an "at-risk individual" on the internet if the individual has made a written request not to disclose it. Upon receiving such a request, the entity must remove the information within 72 hours and ensure it's not made available on their websites. It also prohibits transferring this information, with exceptions for news, voluntary publication by the individual, or transfers at the individual's request.
Section 2(e)
Private Right of Action for At-Risk Individuals
This provision grants "at-risk individuals" whose "covered information" is made public due to a violation of this section the ability to bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction, seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. This means they can sue to stop the disclosure or to have a court declare that a violation has occurred.
Defines "covered information" broadly to include home addresses, phone numbers, personal emails, financial details, vehicle identifiers, children's identification, school/daycare information, employment routes, and precise geolocation data. However, it explicitly excludes information required to be filed with the Federal Election Commission or other Federal/State laws for qualifying as a candidate for Member of Congress.
Section 2(a)(5)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to define terms upfront, but the exclusions are significant for understanding the limits of the bill's protections.
Case for: Supporters argue the exclusions are necessary to maintain transparency in campaign finance and candidate qualifications, ensuring that information vital for public accountability remains accessible.
Case against: Critics might argue that even information related to candidacy could be weaponized for doxing, and that the exclusions create a potential vulnerability for candidates, especially those who are also at-risk individuals.
Estimated impact: Narrows the scope of protected information, ensuring certain public records related to elections remain accessible, potentially impacting the privacy of candidates.
Defines "data broker" as a commercial entity collecting/assembling personal information of non-customers to sell or profit from third-party access. It then lists eight specific exclusions, including entities engaged in news-gathering, 411 services, internal data use, health/safety alerts, consumer reporting agencies (under FCRA), financial institutions (under GLBA), covered entities (under HIPAA privacy regulations), and incidental collection/sale related to these activities.
Section 2(a)(6)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to define terms and their scope, but the exclusions are critical for understanding who is targeted by the data broker prohibition.
Case for: Proponents argue these exclusions are vital to avoid unintended consequences, ensuring that legitimate activities like journalism, financial services, healthcare, and directory assistance are not inadvertently stifled by the broad prohibition on data brokers.
Case against: Critics might argue that some of these exclusions could create loopholes, allowing entities that function similarly to data brokers to continue trading sensitive information under the guise of an exempted activity, thereby undermining the bill's intent.
Estimated impact: Significantly shapes the applicability of the data broker prohibition, exempting a wide range of entities and activities from strict regulation under this section.
The bill defines "at-risk individual" specifically for Members of Congress, their families, and staff. However, the data broker prohibition in Section 2(d)(1)(A) applies to the "covered information" of a "covered person," which is defined as "an individual that is located in the United States" or "a United States person." This means the data broker prohibition is much broader than the protections for at-risk individuals in other sections.
Section 2(a)(2) and 2(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)
Why it matters:This is a deliberate legislative choice to apply a broader protection against data brokers, but its specific wording requires close attention.
Case for: Proponents argue that the threat of doxing and privacy invasion from data brokers is not unique to public officials and that all Americans deserve protection from the commercial trade of their sensitive personal information. This broadens the impact of the bill significantly.
Case against: Critics might argue that this expansion goes beyond the stated purpose of protecting Members of Congress and their families, creating a sweeping federal privacy regulation for all U.S. persons under the guise of a bill focused on political violence, potentially leading to unforeseen economic impacts.
Estimated impact: Extends the data broker prohibition to cover the sensitive personal information of virtually every individual in the United States, not just the "at-risk individuals" specified elsewhere in the bill.