One Agency Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Lee, Mike [R-UT]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 13, 2025
Bottom line
The bill consolidates all federal antitrust enforcement under the Department of Justice, fundamentally restructuring the government's approach to competition policy.
What it actually does
This bill transfers all antitrust enforcement functions, including ongoing investigations, personnel, assets, and funding, from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to the Department of Justice (DOJ). It eliminates the FTC's authority to initiate new antitrust actions and makes extensive technical amendments to federal law to reflect the DOJ as the sole federal antitrust enforcer.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the current dual enforcement system between the FTC and DOJ leads to wasted taxpayer resources, hampers enforcement efforts through overlapping jurisdiction, and creates uncertainty for businesses. Consolidating these functions into a single agency, the DOJ, will streamline enforcement, improve efficiency, and provide clearer guidance for the market.
Opponents contend
Opponents contend that eliminating the FTC's antitrust role would reduce overall federal enforcement capacity, remove a valuable administrative enforcement tool, and diminish the benefits of having two distinct agencies with different perspectives and approaches to competition issues. They argue that the FTC's unique expertise and focus on 'unfair methods of competition' would be lost.
The bill is relatively concise, and its core purpose is clearly articulated, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its implications within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2
Congressional Findings on Antitrust Enforcement
This section outlines Congress's findings, stating that the current overlapping antitrust enforcement jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission has wasted taxpayer resources, hampered enforcement, and caused uncertainty. It concludes that primary federal responsibility for antitrust enforcement should be given to a single entity, with the Department of Justice being best suited for this role.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue these findings accurately reflect the inefficiencies and confusion inherent in the current dual enforcement system, providing a strong rationale for consolidation.
Critics contend
Opponents might dispute the extent of 'wasted taxpayer resources' or argue that the perceived uncertainty is outweighed by the benefits of having two distinct enforcement bodies.
Tradeoffs
The bill navigates the tension between achieving administrative efficiency through consolidation and potentially losing the benefits of diverse enforcement perspectives and tools offered by a dual agency approach.
Section 4
Transfer of FTC Antitrust Enforcement Functions to DOJ
This is the core operative provision, mandating the transfer of all FTC antitrust actions, employees, assets, and funding to the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division. The Attorney General is tasked with implementing this transfer within a transition period of up to 1 year and 180 days, with a possible 180-day extension. During this period, the FTC is prohibited from initiating new antitrust investigations or actions without the Attorney General's approval.
Section 4(a)(4)
Continuation and Management of Existing Antitrust Actions and Consent Decrees
This section details how ongoing FTC antitrust investigations, studies, litigations, and other proceedings will be handled. All such matters are transferred to the Department of Justice, with the Attorney General determining their continuation. The FTC may, with DOJ consent, deputize former antitrust employees to continue these actions. After the transition period, the Attorney General gains sole authority over all consent decrees previously entered into by the FTC concerning antitrust or unfair methods of competition.
Section 4(a)(5)
DOJ Authority for Investigative Studies and Reports
The bill grants the Attorney General the authority to require businesses (persons, partnerships, and corporations) engaged in or affecting commerce to file annual or special reports and answer specific questions. This information must pertain solely to competition or antitrust laws and can be made public by the Attorney General, with strict protections for privileged or confidential trade secrets, which can only be shared with law enforcement agencies.
Section 5
Redirection of Agency Consultations and Premerger Filings; FTC Restrictions
This section transfers any federal agency requirement to consult with or seek concurrence from the FTC on antitrust matters to the Department of Justice or the Attorney General. Similarly, all premerger notification filings previously submitted to the FTC will now be submitted to the Attorney General. Crucially, the FTC is explicitly prohibited from opening new investigations or enforcement actions related to antitrust laws or unfair methods of competition, except for continuing existing matters with DOJ approval.
Section 6
Comprehensive Technical and Conforming Amendments to Federal Law
This extensive section makes numerous technical and conforming amendments across various federal statutes, including the Clayton Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, Webb-Pomerene Act, and others. These changes systematically remove all references to the Federal Trade Commission's antitrust authority and transfer relevant powers and responsibilities to the Attorney General or the Department of Justice. Notably, it amends Section 5 of the FTC Act to remove 'unfair methods of competition' from the FTC's purview and repeals several FTC investigative powers related to competition.
This provision amends Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act by striking 'methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair' and repeals paragraph (3) of Section 5(a). This effectively removes the FTC's authority to police 'unfair methods of competition' as a distinct category of prohibited acts, leaving only 'unfair or deceptive acts or practices' under its purview.
Section 6(d)(1)(A)(i) and (ii), amending 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) and (3)
Why it matters:While standard legislative practice for implementing comprehensive statutory changes, the effect of these amendments is to substantially narrow the FTC's mission beyond merely transferring antitrust functions, which could be seen as a deliberate and consequential redefinition of its powers.
Case for: Proponents would argue this clarifies the FTC's role, ensuring it focuses solely on consumer protection and avoids any residual overlap or ambiguity with the DOJ's consolidated antitrust authority.
Case against: Opponents would argue that 'unfair methods of competition' was a crucial tool for the FTC to address anti-competitive practices that might not meet the strict legal definitions of Sherman or Clayton Act violations, potentially leaving a regulatory gap in federal oversight of competition.
Estimated impact: Significantly alters the scope of the FTC's remaining regulatory authority, potentially narrowing the range of anti-competitive behaviors that can be challenged by any federal agency, particularly those that are novel or do not fit neatly into traditional antitrust categories.
This provision grants the Attorney General the power to require 'persons, partnerships, and corporations' to file annual or special reports and answer specific questions about their organization, business conduct, practices, management, and relations to other entities, specifically pertaining to competition or antitrust laws.
Section 4(a)(5)(A)
Why it matters:This is a direct transfer of a power previously held by the FTC (under FTC Act Section 6(b)), but its placement within the transfer section might obscure its significance as a new, broad information-gathering tool for the DOJ, an agency primarily focused on litigation.
Case for: Proponents argue this is essential for the DOJ to conduct market studies and gather intelligence necessary for effective antitrust enforcement, replicating a vital function previously performed by the FTC to understand market dynamics.
Case against: Critics might express concerns about the potential for increased regulatory burden on businesses, the scope of information that could be demanded, and whether the DOJ is adequately structured and staffed to handle such extensive data collection and analysis, which was historically a civil agency function with a dedicated Bureau of Economics.
Estimated impact: Creates a new, broad information-gathering power for the Department of Justice, potentially increasing reporting requirements for businesses and enhancing DOJ's ability to conduct market-wide investigations and studies.