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4 versions
TransformativeWhat changed in ENGROSSED AMENDMENT HOUSEcompared with ENGROSSED IN SENATE (Nov 20, 2025)
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A complete substitute amendment. v4 entirely replaces the original bill, which focused on establishing a program to identify American-Jewish servicemembers buried under incorrect markers overseas, with a new bill addressing foreign intelligence surveillance accountability and prohibiting central bank digital currencies. v4 is effectively a different bill from v3.

S. 1318·119th Congress·Introduced Apr 7, 2025

Fallen Servicemembers Religious Heritage Restoration Act

Passed SenateArmed Forces and National SecurityOmnibus
View bill text
Sponsor
Sen. Moran, Jerry [R-KS]
Committees
Veterans' Affairs Committee (primary)
Last action
Jun 5, 2026

Bottom line

This bill combines a reauthorization and reform of FISA Section 702 with a broad prohibition on the Federal Reserve's involvement in central bank digital currencies, reflecting concerns over surveillance and financial privacy.

What it actually does

This bill, as amended by the House, significantly alters the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) by imposing new oversight, criminal penalties, and restrictions on querying U.S. person data, while also extending key FISA authorities. Concurrently, it broadly prohibits the Federal Reserve from developing, testing, or issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) directly or indirectly to individuals, and restricts its use in monetary policy, with an exception for open, permissionless, and private digital dollar-denominated currencies.

Proponents argue

Supporters argue that the FISA reforms are crucial for protecting civil liberties and privacy by adding layers of review and criminal penalties for misuse, thereby restoring public trust in intelligence operations. Furthermore, proponents contend that the CBDC prohibitions safeguard financial freedom from potential government surveillance and control, preventing the creation of a 'surveillance state' currency.

Opponents contend

Critics might argue that the FISA reforms could unduly hamper intelligence operations critical for national security, potentially creating a chilling effect on analysts. Opponents of the CBDC prohibition may contend that a blanket ban stifles innovation, could put the U.S. at a disadvantage in the global financial landscape, and limits the Federal Reserve's ability to adapt to evolving payment technologies.

The bill is moderately short but contains highly technical legal amendments and policy changes across two distinct areas, requiring careful reading to grasp its full implications.

Title I, Sec. 101

Monthly Civil Liberties Review of FBI Queries

prominently featuredmoderately complex

This section amends FISA Section 702(f)(3) to require the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to provide monthly written statements regarding each United States person query to the Civil Liberties Protection Officer (CLPO) within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The CLPO is then mandated to review these queries for compliance with established standards and refer any potential violations or abuses of civil liberties and privacy to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IGIC) for investigation.

GroupImpactMechanismScale
GroupU.S. personsImpactIncreased oversight of queries of their data, enhancing privacy protections.MechanismScale
GroupFBI personnelImpactNew monthly reporting requirements and increased scrutiny of querying practices.MechanismScale
GroupCivil Liberties Protection Officer (CLPO) and Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IGIC)ImpactExpanded duties and responsibilities for oversight and investigation.MechanismScale

Supporters argue

Proponents argue that this provision enhances oversight and protects civil liberties by adding an independent, regular review layer to prevent abuses of U.S. person data collected under FISA Section 702, thereby restoring public trust.

Critics contend

Opponents might argue that these additional bureaucratic hurdles could slow down critical intelligence investigations, potentially hindering national security efforts by diverting resources and time from urgent threats.

Tradeoffs

Balancing national security intelligence gathering with civil liberties protection and privacy through enhanced oversight.

Title I, Sec. 102

New Criminal Penalties for FISA Query Violations

prominently featuredstraightforward

This section amends FISA Section 709 to establish new criminal penalties for specific actions related to intelligence queries. It makes it a crime, punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment, a fine, or both, for an FBI employee or officer to knowingly and willfully violate querying procedures adopted under Section 702(f)(1)(A) relating to United States person queries, or to knowingly and willfully falsify or materially misrepresent compliance with such procedures.

Title I, Sec. 103

Prohibition on Intentional Targeting of U.S. Persons

prominently featuredmoderately complex

This section adds a new subsection (o) to FISA Section 702, explicitly prohibiting any officer or employee of the United States Government from intentionally targeting a United States person for an acquisition under Section 702. It clarifies that any targeting of U.S. persons must instead follow the stricter requirements for specific orders or warrants issued under other titles of FISA or pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Title I, Sec. 104

Congressional Access to FISA Courts

prominently featuredstraightforward

This section directs the Attorney General, within 60 days of the Act's enactment, to revoke any existing procedures issued on or before December 31, 2025, concerning Member access to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR). New procedures must then be issued that comply with section 5(d) of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, ensuring access for Members of Congress and their staff to any proceedings of these courts.

Title I, Sec. 105

Attorney Approval for FBI U.S. Person Queries

mentioned in summarystraightforward

This section amends FISA Section 702(f)(3)(A)(i) by removing the phrase 'supervisor (or employee of equivalent or greater rank) or'. This change eliminates the option for a supervisor to approve United States person queries, thereby making attorney approval mandatory for all such queries conducted by the FBI.

Title I, Sec. 106

GAO Audit of FISA Section 702 Targeting

prominently featuredstraightforward

This section mandates the Comptroller General of the United States (Government Accountability Office or GAO) to conduct an audit of the targeting procedures, including the technical mechanisms, implementation, and operations, used by the Federal Government for acquisitions under FISA Section 702. Within one year of enactment, the Comptroller General must submit a report to relevant congressional committees detailing the audit's results, specifically analyzing whether the targeting procedures effectively limit targeting to non-United States persons located outside of the United States.

Title I, Sec. 107

Extension of FISA Section 702 Authorities

prominently featuredstraightforward

This section extends the sunset date for Title VII of FISA, which includes the controversial Section 702 authority, from its current expiration of April 30, 2026, to April 30, 2029. The amendments made by this section take effect on the earlier of the date of the Act's enactment or April 29, 2026, ensuring a seamless continuation of these authorities.

Title II, Sec. 202

Direct CBDC Prohibition and Retail Banking Restrictions

prominently featuredstraightforward

This section amends Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act to explicitly prohibit Federal Reserve banks from three key activities: offering financial products or services directly to an individual, maintaining an account on behalf of an individual, or directly issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) or any digital asset that is substantially similar under any other name or label. This effectively prevents the Federal Reserve from engaging in retail banking activities or issuing a direct digital dollar.

Title II, Sec. 203

Indirect CBDC Prohibition

prominently featuredstraightforward

This section further amends Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act to prohibit Federal Reserve banks from offering a central bank digital currency (CBDC), or any digital asset that is substantially similar, indirectly to an individual through a financial institution or other intermediary. This provision aims to close any potential loopholes that might allow the Fed to introduce a CBDC via commercial banks or other financial entities.

Title II, Sec. 204

Broad Prohibition on CBDC Development and Monetary Policy Use

prominently featuredmoderately complex

This section broadly prohibits the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee from testing, studying, developing, creating, implementing, or using a central bank digital currency (CBDC) or any substantially similar digital asset for monetary policy. It defines CBDC as digital money denominated in the national unit of account, a direct liability of the Federal Reserve System, and widely available to the general public. Crucially, it includes an exception for any dollar-denominated currency that is open, permissionless, private, and fully preserves the privacy protections of United States coins and physical currency.

Title II, Sec. 205

Congressional Authority over CBDC Issuance

prominently featuredstraightforward

This section states a Sense of Congress that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System currently does not have the authority to issue a central bank digital currency (CBDC), or any digital asset that is substantially similar, and will not have such authority unless Congress explicitly grants it under its Article I Section 8 powers. This is a non-binding statement asserting congressional prerogative.

FOUND

This clause provides an exception to the broad CBDC prohibition, stating that the prohibitions do not apply to 'any dollar-denominated currency that is open, permissionless, and private, and fully preserves the privacy protections of United States coins and physical currency.'

Section 204(C)

Why it matters:This is likely a deliberate attempt to allow for certain types of private digital currency innovation while still preventing a government-controlled CBDC. It represents a nuanced distinction that requires careful reading and understanding of digital asset characteristics.

Case for: Proponents argue this exception is crucial for fostering private sector innovation in digital currencies that uphold American values of privacy and open access, distinguishing it from a government-controlled CBDC while still allowing for technological advancement.

Case against: Critics might argue that the terms 'open, permissionless, and private' are open to interpretation and could create regulatory uncertainty or allow for the development of digital assets that still pose risks to financial stability or illicit finance, despite the intent.

Estimated impact: Potentially significant, as it defines the scope of future digital dollar innovation that is permissible, guiding private sector development and potentially influencing the competitiveness of the U.S. in the global digital asset landscape.

About this analysis. AI-Generated from the official bill text and available committee reports. Gaps in available data are noted explicitly. Verify important details with the official Congress.gov record.

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