Advancing GETs Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Sen. Welch, Peter [D-VT]
- Committees
- Energy and Natural Resources Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 15, 2026
Bottom line
The Advancing GETs Act aims to accelerate the deployment of grid-enhancing technologies through financial incentives, increased transparency on grid congestion, and technical support, with a focus on improving grid efficiency and reliability.
What it actually does
This bill directs the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to establish a shared savings incentive program for grid-enhancing technologies (GETs), returning a portion of realized savings to developers. It also mandates annual congestion reporting by transmission operators to FERC and requires the Department of Energy (DOE) to create an application guide and provide technical assistance for GET implementation. The goal is to modernize the electric grid, improve efficiency, and reduce congestion costs.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the bill will unlock significant efficiencies in the nation's electric grid, reducing congestion costs, enhancing reliability, and facilitating the integration of renewable energy sources without the need for extensive new transmission line construction. They contend that incentivizing GETs will lead to a more resilient and cost-effective power system for consumers.
Opponents contend
Critics may express concerns that the shared savings incentive could lead to increased electricity rates for consumers if the 'savings' are not accurately measured or if the incentive structure is too generous. Some might also argue that the new reporting requirements for transmission operators could impose undue administrative burdens, potentially without yielding proportional benefits.
The bill is concise and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a short timeframe.
Section 3
Establishment of Shared Savings Incentive for Grid-Enhancing Technologies
This section mandates that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) establish a rule within 18 months to create a shared savings incentive. This incentive will return a portion of the cost savings achieved by investing in grid-enhancing technologies (GETs) to the entity that paid for their installation (the developer). The percentage of savings returned must be between 10 and 25 percent, applied consistently, and recovered over a three-year period. Eligibility requires that expected savings be at least four times the investment cost, and the incentive does not apply to GETs already installed.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this incentive is crucial for overcoming financial barriers to adopting innovative GETs, which can significantly improve grid efficiency, reduce congestion, and enhance reliability. They contend it will spur investment in modernizing infrastructure, ultimately benefiting consumers through a more robust and cost-effective power supply.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that such an incentive could lead to higher electricity rates if the 'savings' are difficult to accurately measure or if the incentive percentage is set too high, potentially creating a windfall for developers at consumer expense. Concerns could also be raised about the potential for gaming the system or for the incentive to distort market signals.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the need to incentivize new, beneficial technologies with the imperative to protect electricity consumers from undue cost burdens. It requires FERC to navigate the tension between fostering innovation and ensuring ratepayer fairness, particularly in defining 'savings' and 'consumer protections'.
Section 4
Annual Congestion Reporting and Public Map
This section requires all operators of transmission facilities or technologies to submit annual reports to FERC detailing the costs associated with congestion management and identifying relevant constraints. These reports must specify the cause and limiting elements for constraints costing over $500,000 and identify constraints addressed by future upgrades. FERC is directed to establish a universal metric and protocol for this reporting. Jointly, FERC and the Secretary of Energy must use this data to create and annually update a publicly available map of congestion management costs in the transmission system.
Section 5
Grid-Enhancing Technology Application Guide and Technical Assistance
This section directs the Secretary of Energy to establish an application guide for utilities and developers seeking to implement grid-enhancing technologies (GETs) within 18 months of enactment. This guide must be reviewed and updated annually. Furthermore, the Secretary is required to provide technical assistance upon request to utilities and developers using the guide, including establishing a clearinghouse of previously completed GET projects. This clearinghouse will serve as a resource for identifying issues and solutions related to specific GET applications. The section authorizes specific appropriations for these activities.
The shared savings incentive for grid-enhancing technologies (GETs) will only apply if the expected savings attributable to the investment over a three-year period are at least four times the cost of the investment, as determined by FERC.
Section 3(e)(1)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for defining specific eligibility thresholds and safeguards within a broader program. It ensures that the incentive is only applied to projects with a high return on investment.
Case for: Supporters argue that this '4x savings' rule is a vital consumer protection, ensuring that only highly cost-effective GET investments receive the incentive. It prevents speculative or marginally beneficial projects from being subsidized, thereby safeguarding ratepayers from undue costs.
Case against: Critics might contend that such a stringent threshold could inadvertently exclude innovative GETs that offer significant long-term benefits but may not meet the 4x savings target within a three-year window. This could stifle certain types of beneficial grid modernization.
Estimated impact: This provision will significantly influence which GET projects are deemed eligible for the shared savings incentive, effectively shaping the market for these technologies by prioritizing those with rapid and substantial returns.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 'shall determine appropriate consumer protections' for the shared savings incentive established under the bill.
Section 3(e)(3)
Why it matters:This approach delegates significant authority to FERC, allowing the expert agency to design the specific regulatory mechanisms for consumer protection. This is common practice when legislative text sets a policy goal but leaves the technical details to regulators.
Case for: Proponents argue that this delegation provides FERC with the necessary flexibility to develop robust and adaptable consumer protections that can evolve with market conditions and technological advancements, ensuring safeguards are effective in practice.
Case against: Critics might argue that the lack of specific legislative guidance on consumer protections leaves too much discretion to FERC, potentially resulting in weaker safeguards than intended by Congress. This could leave consumers vulnerable if FERC's interpretation is not sufficiently stringent.
Estimated impact: The effectiveness of consumer protection within the shared savings incentive program will depend almost entirely on FERC's subsequent rulemaking. This provision is a critical determinant of the program's ultimate impact on ratepayers.
Not earlier than 7 years and not later than 10 years after the shared savings incentive is established, FERC shall evaluate its necessity and efficacy, and determine whether to maintain, revise, or suspend it, specifically considering its alignment with FERC Order No. 1920.
Section 3(f)
Why it matters:It is common legislative practice to include review or sunset clauses for new programs or incentives, especially those involving financial mechanisms, to ensure they remain effective and relevant over time. This provides an opportunity for course correction.
Case for: Proponents argue that this evaluation mechanism ensures accountability and adaptability, allowing the incentive to be adjusted or discontinued if it is not achieving its intended goals or if grid policy evolves. Considering Order No. 1920 ensures integration with broader transmission planning efforts.
Case against: Critics might argue that the potential for suspension or revision after 7-10 years creates uncertainty for long-term investment planning by GET developers, potentially discouraging some projects that require longer payback periods or stable policy environments.
Estimated impact: This provision introduces a critical review point for the entire shared savings incentive program, determining its long-term viability and effectiveness. It ensures that the program is not a permanent fixture if it proves inefficient or unnecessary.