A complete substitute amendment, v2 significantly restructures the bill. It introduces a new Sense of Congress prioritizing onshoring critical mineral processing, tightens the definition of "allied foreign country," and removes specific language regarding preferential financing for private-sector investment. Additionally, v2 expands congressional notification requirements to include a detailed report and elevates the Secretary of State's role from collaboration to requiring concurrence for key actions.
Finding ORE Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE]
- Committees
- Foreign Relations Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jun 18, 2025
Bottom line
The Finding ORE Act establishes a framework for international scientific cooperation in critical mineral mapping, with a focus on U.S. supply chain security and promoting U.S./allied private sector involvement in global mineral development.
What it actually does
This bill authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), to enter into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with foreign countries to cooperate on mapping critical minerals and rare earth elements. It aims to secure international supply chains, facilitate private-sector investment, and ensure data protection, while also stating a Sense of Congress to prioritize onshoring critical mineral processing.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue this bill is crucial for strengthening U.S. national security and economic competitiveness by reducing reliance on adversarial nations for critical minerals. They contend it will diversify supply chains, foster private sector investment, and leverage U.S. scientific expertise to identify and develop vital resources globally, ultimately supporting domestic manufacturing and technological advancement.
Opponents contend
Opponents might raise concerns that the bill's provisions, such as offering U.S. or allied companies the 'right of first refusal' for mineral development, could be perceived as economic coercion or infringe on the sovereignty of partner nations, potentially complicating diplomatic relations. Some may also argue that the bill does not go far enough to mandate or incentivize domestic mining and processing, instead focusing on foreign exploration.
The bill is relatively concise and clearly structured, allowing an informed reader to grasp its core provisions and implications within a short timeframe.
Section 1
Short Title
This section establishes the official short title of the bill as the 'Finding Opportunities for Resource Exploration Act' or the 'Finding ORE Act.' This is the common name by which the legislation would be known and referenced.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a clear and descriptive short title helps in public discourse and legislative tracking, making the bill's purpose more accessible.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against the naming of a bill, as it is a standard legislative practice.
Tradeoffs
None apparent for this provision.
Section 2
Sense of Congress on Onshoring Critical Mineral Processing
This section declares that it is the sense of Congress that the United States should prioritize, to the greatest extent practicable, the onshoring of critical mineral processing. This is a non-binding statement reflecting congressional intent and policy preference.
Section 3
Definitions of Key Terms
This section defines several key terms used throughout the Act, including 'allied foreign country,' 'critical mineral,' 'institution of higher education,' 'partner foreign country,' 'rare earth element,' and 'Secretary.' Notably, the definition of 'allied foreign country' is expanded to include NATO members and major non-NATO allies.
Section 4(a)-(c)
Authority for Memoranda of Understanding and Cooperative Activities
This provision authorizes the Secretary of the Interior (through USGS) to enter into MOUs with partner foreign countries for scientific and technical cooperation in mapping critical minerals and rare earth elements. The objectives include increasing supply chain security, assisting partner countries, ensuring U.S./allied companies get 'right of first refusal' for further development, facilitating private investment, and protecting mapping data. Cooperative activities cover data acquisition, resource assessment, training, and education.
Section 4(d)-(f)
Congressional Notification, State Department Concurrence, and Private Sector Consultation
This section mandates that the Secretary of the Interior notify and report to Congress 30 days before entering an MOU, detailing partners, scope, activities, costs, and funding. It also requires the *concurrence* of the Secretary of State for selecting partners, negotiating, and implementing MOUs, and for carrying out the congressional reporting. Furthermore, the Secretary of the Interior must consult with relevant private sector actors.
Section 5
Savings Clause for USGS Director Authorities
This section clarifies that nothing in the Act impedes or alters any existing authority of the Director of the United States Geological Survey (USGS) as provided by specific sections of U.S. Code (43 U.S.C. 31(a) and 31(b)). This ensures that the new authorities granted by this Act do not inadvertently diminish or supersede the USGS Director's established powers.
The bill mandates that in negotiating MOUs, the Secretary shall seek to ensure that private companies headquartered in the United States or an allied foreign country are offered the 'right of first refusal' in the further development of critical minerals and rare earth elements in the partner foreign country.
Section 4(b)(2)
Why it matters:This is a standard way to structure negotiating objectives within authorizing legislation. It's not necessarily evasive, but its full implications depend on how it's applied in practice.
Case for: Proponents argue this clause is essential for securing U.S. and allied access to critical minerals, providing a tangible benefit to companies that support U.S. supply chain resilience and fostering economic opportunities for American businesses.
Case against: Critics might contend that demanding a 'right of first refusal' could be perceived as an infringement on the economic sovereignty of partner countries, potentially leading to diplomatic friction or making MOUs harder to negotiate. It could also disadvantage local companies in partner countries.
Estimated impact: Potentially significant economic impact for U.S. and allied mining/development companies, granting them preferential access to newly mapped mineral deposits.
The definition of 'allied foreign country' was changed from the original bill. It now means 'a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or a country that has been designated as a major non-NATO ally under section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321k)'. The original text defined it as 'a country with which the United States has entered into a mutual defense treaty or other mutual defense agreement.'
Section 3(1)
Why it matters:Changes in definitions are common during the legislative process to refine scope. It's a technical adjustment with broad policy consequences.
Case for: Proponents would argue this expanded definition broadens the pool of trusted partners for critical mineral development and data protection, aligning with existing U.S. foreign policy designations and strengthening alliances beyond just formal defense treaties.
Case against: No direct case against the expansion itself, but some might argue that a broader definition could dilute the focus on the most strategically critical allies or introduce more complexity in data sharing and security protocols.
Estimated impact: Expands the number of countries whose companies would benefit from the 'right of first refusal' and whose data would be protected under the MOUs, potentially increasing the reach and impact of the bill's objectives.
The original bill aimed to facilitate private-sector investment 'including by leveraging preferential financing from entities such as the United States International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the United States that prioritizes projects committed to processing minerals in the United States or an allied foreign country.' The amended bill removes this specific language, simply stating 'facilitating private-sector investment in the exploration and development of critical minerals and rare earth elements.'
Original Section 3(b)(3) vs. Amended Section 4(b)(3)
Why it matters:Such changes often occur during committee markups to broaden applicability, reduce specific mandates, or address concerns about trade implications or the scope of federal financing. It's a substantive policy shift.
Case for: The removal might be argued as making the bill more flexible, allowing for a wider range of private sector investments without being tied to specific financing mechanisms or processing locations. It could also address concerns about potential trade disputes or the feasibility of mandating processing locations.
Case against: Critics might argue that removing this language weakens the bill's commitment to onshoring or friendshoring the *processing* of critical minerals, which is a key vulnerability in the supply chain. It could be seen as a missed opportunity to use U.S. financial tools to directly incentivize domestic or allied processing capacity.
Estimated impact: Reduces the explicit federal financial leverage to incentivize critical mineral processing in the U.S. or allied countries, potentially shifting the focus more towards raw material extraction and less on the full supply chain.