What changed between these versions
A complete substitute amendment, v2 fundamentally restructures the Uyghur Policy Act. It updates the bill's year, revises findings, and consolidates several operative sections. Key changes include the removal of specific funding for public diplomacy, adjustments to reporting requirements, and a shift from mandatory to discretionary language for certain State Department actions, while strengthening the mandate for UN advocacy.
Overview
Extensive changes are present throughout the bill, indicating a comprehensive rewrite rather than incremental adjustments. · v2 represents a fundamental restructuring and rephrasing of the original bill, consolidating some provisions, removing others, and updating timelines and specific examples, while maintaining the core policy intent.
The most significant change is that v2 is a complete substitute, replacing the entire text of v1 with a new version, including an updated short title to 'Uyghur Policy Act of 2026'. This restructuring involves revising the findings section with new details and consolidating several operative sections. Notably, specific funding for public diplomacy was removed, and reporting requirements were adjusted. While the core intent to support Uyghur human rights and address PRC repression remains, the mechanisms and specific directives have been significantly altered, with some actions shifting from mandatory to discretionary for the Secretary of State, though UN advocacy became mandatory.
Major additions
v2 adds a new finding specifically noting that in February 2025, Thai authorities refouled 40 detained Uyghurs to Xinjiang, ignoring warnings from the United States Government and Congress. This highlights a specific, recent event of concern regarding Uyghur repatriation.
This addition provides a concrete example of international actions detrimental to Uyghurs, strengthening the factual basis for the bill's concerns and potentially influencing future diplomatic efforts regarding refoulement.
v2 adds a new finding stating that thousands more Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups continue to be coerced to participate in state-led forced labor transfer programs. This expands on the previous finding about detention centers.
This addition emphasizes the ongoing issue of forced labor beyond the detention centers, broadening the scope of human rights abuses explicitly recognized by Congress and reinforcing the need for related policy responses.
v2 adds a new finding detailing that on March 12, 2026, China's National People's Congress adopted the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which mandates Mandarin instruction for minority children beginning in preschool and subjects all ethnic affairs to party authority, systematically eroding linguistic and cultural identity.
This addition introduces a specific legislative action by the PRC that directly impacts the cultural and linguistic identity of Uyghurs, providing a new, concrete example of the repression the bill aims to address.
v2 adds two specific individuals, Illham Tohti and Rahile Dawut, to the list of prisoners whose unconditional release the Government of the PRC should immediately grant. Illham Tohti is a Uyghur economics professor detained in 2014 and sentenced to life for 'separatism,' and Rahile Dawut is a professor researching Uyghur folklore, detained in 2017 and sentenced to life for 'splittism' and 'endangering State security.'
This addition expands the specific advocacy for individual prisoners, increasing the visibility and focus on more high-profile cases of repression against Uyghur intellectuals and advocates.
v2 adds a provision ensuring that efforts are made to assign at least one Uyghur-speaking member of the Foreign Service to a United States diplomatic or consular post in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Turkiye.
This addition expands the geographic focus of diplomatic staffing to include Central Asian countries and Turkiye, recognizing the significant Uyghur diaspora in these regions and the importance of engagement beyond China.
Deletions
v1 included a dedicated section titled 'Funding for Human Rights Advocates to Conduct Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World on the Uyghur Situation,' which allocated $250,000 for each of fiscal years 2025, 2026, and 2027 to support human rights advocates working on behalf of Uyghurs.
The deletion of this section removes a specific, dedicated funding stream for public diplomacy efforts related to Uyghur human rights, potentially impacting the financial resources available for such initiatives. While general support for advocates remains, the direct financial allocation is gone.
v1 contained a standalone section titled 'Access to Detention Facilities and Prisons and the Release of Prisoners,' which mandated the Secretary of State to develop a strategy for cooperating with partners to pressure the PRC to close detention facilities, allow unhindered access, and protect human rights.
The deletion of this standalone section removes a dedicated, detailed mandate for a specific strategy on detention facilities. While the core objective of pressuring the PRC on detention facilities is integrated into Section 4(a)(7) of v2, its prominence as a distinct, detailed strategy is diminished.
v1 included a directive for the Secretary of State to support independent media, including Radio Free Asia, which conducts reporting and investigative journalism focused on the XUAR, to ensure the reporting of future PRC human rights abuses.
The deletion of this specific directive removes explicit congressional support for independent media, particularly Radio Free Asia, in reporting on XUAR human rights abuses. While general support for human rights advocacy may continue, this specific mandate is no longer present.
v1 mandated that the Secretary of State ensure the Department of State has adequate resources, staff, and administrative support to carry out the provisions of Section 4.
The deletion of this provision removes a direct mandate for the Department of State to ensure adequate resources for its Uyghur-related coordination efforts. This could potentially reduce the explicit pressure on the Department to allocate specific resources for these activities.
Modifications
This change reflects the later legislative reporting date of the bill, aligning its official designation with the year of its expected enactment or significant action.
Before
The short title of the Act was 'Uyghur Policy Act of 2025'.
After
The short title of the Act is 'Uyghur Policy Act of 2026'.
The revised findings provide an updated and slightly refocused factual basis for the bill, incorporating more recent events and terminology, which could influence the framing of policy responses. The removal of specific findings on Han Chinese migration might subtly shift the emphasis of the bill's foundational arguments.
Before
The findings included 18 paragraphs detailing PRC repression, human rights violations, and international responses, including specific mentions of Han Chinese migration, discrimination, and the term 'political reeducation' centers.
After
The findings section was revised, consolidating some points, removing others (e.g., specific mentions of Han Chinese migration and discrimination in hiring/healthcare), and updating terminology to 'vocational education and training centers'. It also added new specific events and legislative actions by the PRC.
The reordering and rephrasing clarify the priorities of Congress. The generalization of entities for XUAR access might broaden the scope of potential visitors but removes specific mentions of the press and a key UN office. The updated list of commended countries reflects current diplomatic recognition.
Before
The Sense of Congress included 7 paragraphs, with specific ordering and content, such as urging the PRC to open XUAR to visits by 'members of the press' and 'Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights', and commending Turkey, Albania, and Germany for providing shelter.
After
The Sense of Congress was reordered and updated. It now urges the PRC to open XUAR to visits by 'international organizations' and 'academic and research institutions focused on internationally recognized human rights'. The list of commended countries was updated to include Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Turkiye, removing Albania.
This change provides the Secretary of State with greater flexibility in implementing these policies, potentially reducing the stringency of congressional mandates. The less specific geographic scope for travel and the shift from 'leading coordination' to 'advocating' for prisoner release could alter the intensity of US engagement.
Before
The Secretary of State 'shall' carry out 12 specific directives, including maintaining close contact with Uyghur leaders, seeking regular travel to XUAR and specific diaspora locations, leading coordination for prisoner release, and utilizing Strategic Dialogue with the OIC.
After
The Secretary of State 'should, as appropriate' carry out 9 directives. This includes maintaining close contact with Uyghur leaders by visiting diaspora communities around the world (less specific than v1), advocating for prisoner release (instead of leading coordination), and engaging with counterparts in Europe, Central Asia, and OIC member states (consolidating previous points).
This modification establishes an earlier initial reporting deadline and a fixed duration for subsequent annual reports, providing a clearer timeline for congressional oversight of the Secretary of State's coordination efforts.
Before
v1 required an annual report, including a classified annex, describing actions taken to address transnational repression and recommendations for further measures.
After
v2 requires a report not later than 180 days after enactment, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, with a classified annex, covering actions taken, actions to prevent transnational repression, and recommendations.
This change provides the Secretary of State with more discretion regarding language training and FSO assignments. While reducing the stringent requirement for China posts, it broadens the strategic placement of Uyghur-speaking FSOs to key diaspora regions, potentially enhancing engagement with Uyghur communities outside China.
Before
The Secretary of State 'shall take such steps as may be necessary to ensure' Uyghur language training is available and that at least one Uyghur-speaking FSO is assigned to 'each' United States diplomatic or consular post in China.
After
The Secretary of State 'may take such steps as may be necessary to ensure' Uyghur language training is available and that at least one Uyghur-speaking FSO is assigned to 'one' United States diplomatic or consular post in China and 'one' in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Turkiye.
This modification reduces the frequency and duration of reporting requirements for the Foreign Service Institute regarding Uyghur language training and staffing, potentially lessening the administrative burden.
Before
v1 required a report on language training implementation no later than 1 year after enactment, and annually thereafter for the following 2 years.
After
v2 requires a report on language training implementation no later than 1 year after enactment, with no explicit requirement for subsequent annual reports.
This change strengthens the US commitment to advocating for Uyghur human rights at the UN by making the directive mandatory and expanding its reach across all multilateral missions. However, the removal of the 'working group' option slightly narrows the flexibility in the type of UN mechanism to support.
Before
The President 'should direct' the US Permanent Representative to the UN to use US influence to oppose efforts preventing consideration of human rights violations or participation of advocates, and to support the appointment of a special rapporteur 'or working group' for the XUAR.
After
The President 'shall direct' the US Permanent Representative to the UN to use US influence at 'every United States multilateral mission' to oppose efforts preventing consideration of human rights violations or participation of advocates, and to support the creation 'or appointment' of a special rapporteur for the XUAR (removing 'working group').
Scope
Complete substitute — Changes are scattered throughout the bill, affecting the short title, findings, sense of Congress, specific directives to the Secretary of State, reporting requirements, language training provisions, and UN advocacy mandates. — While the overarching policy direction to support Uyghur human rights and address PRC repression remains consistent, v2 introduces meaningful refinements in the mechanisms, specificity of directives, and allocation of resources, representing a restructuring of the approach rather than a fundamental shift in policy direction. — As a complete substitute, v2 entirely replaces v1, meaning all provisions interact within the new framework. Specific changes, such as terminology updates (e.g., 'political reeducation' to 'vocational education and training' centers) and the consolidation of policy objectives, affect how various parts of the bill are interpreted and implemented.
Impact analysis
Uyghur human rights advocates seeking funding for public diplomacy
Loss of specific financial support.
v2 removes the specific allocation of $250,000 for each of fiscal years 2025, 2026, and 2027 that was dedicated to supporting human rights advocates for public diplomacy in the Islamic world.
Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) interested in Uyghur language training and assignments
Procedural change, with increased discretion for the State Department and a shift in geographic focus for assignments.
The availability of Uyghur language training shifted from a mandatory 'shall ensure' to a discretionary 'may take steps'. The assignment requirement for Uyghur-speaking FSOs in China changed from 'each' post to 'one' post, but was expanded to include a post in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Turkiye.
International organizations and media seeking access to the XUAR
Procedural change in explicit mention, with a slight generalization of eligible visiting entities.
v1 explicitly listed 'members of the press' and the 'Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights' for unmanipulated visits to the XUAR. v2 generalizes this to 'international organizations' and 'academic and research institutions focused on internationally recognized human rights'.
Individuals detained by the PRC for their ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities (e.g., Ekpar Asat, Dr. Gulshan Abbas)
Increased specific advocacy for their release.
v2 adds two more specific individuals, Illham Tohti and Rahile Dawut, to the list of prisoners whose unconditional release the Government of the PRC should immediately grant.
US Department of State officials responsible for Uyghur policy coordination
Increased discretion and potentially reduced specific programmatic mandates.
Many directives for the Secretary of State in Section 4(a) shifted from mandatory ('shall') to discretionary ('should, as appropriate'). The specific mandate to ensure adequate resources (v1 Section 4(b)) was removed.
US Permanent Representative to the United Nations and multilateral missions
Stronger mandate for US action at the UN, with a slight narrowing of the type of UN mechanism to support.
The directive for the President to instruct the US Permanent Representative to the UN shifted from discretionary ('should direct') to mandatory ('shall direct'). The scope of this directive was expanded to 'every United States multilateral mission'. However, the option to support a 'working group' for the XUAR was removed, narrowing the focus to a 'special rapporteur'.