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S. 1566·119th Congress·Introduced May 1, 2025

Preventing Power Outages Act

IntroducedEnergySubstantive
View bill text
Sponsor
Sen. Peters, Gary C. [D-MI]
Committees
Energy and Natural Resources Committee (primary)
Last action
May 1, 2025

Bottom line

The bill extends a key grid resilience program and directs funding towards areas with historically worse power reliability, while also clarifying application requirements.

What it actually does

This bill extends a federal program designed to prevent power outages and enhance electric grid resilience by five years, from 2027 through 2031. It modifies the program's criteria for grant eligibility and prioritization, specifically by requiring the inclusion of all outages longer than five minutes, including those on 'Major Event Days,' in reliability calculations (SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI). It also mandates that entities with historically lower reliability scores receive additional consideration for grants and prohibits conditioning grant applications on addressing multiple types of grid hardening activities.

Proponents argue

Supporters argue that extending this program is crucial for modernizing the nation's aging electric grid, reducing the frequency and duration of power outages, and enhancing resilience against extreme weather and cyber threats. They contend that prioritizing grants for areas with lower reliability will direct resources to where they are most needed, ensuring equitable improvements across the grid. Furthermore, clarifying grant application rules will streamline the process and prevent unnecessary burdens on applicants.

Opponents contend

Critics might argue that while grid resilience is important, extending the program without a comprehensive re-evaluation of its effectiveness or alternative funding mechanisms could lead to inefficient spending. Some might also contend that mandating additional weight for lower reliability scores could inadvertently reward past underperformance rather than incentivizing proactive measures. Concerns could also be raised about the potential for federal overreach into local utility management decisions through specific grant conditions.

The bill is short and clearly written, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its provisions within a reasonable timeframe.

Section 2(1), amending 42 U.S.C. 18711(a)

Revised Definition of Electric Grid Reliability Indices

mentioned in summarymoderately complex

This provision redefines how electric grid reliability is measured for the purposes of this program. It specifies that the Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI), System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), and System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) must include all power outages lasting longer than five minutes, even those occurring on 'Major Event Days.' Historically, Major Event Days (like severe storms) were often excluded from these calculations, which could make reliability statistics appear better than the everyday experience.

GroupImpactMechanismScale
GroupElectric utilities and grid operatorsImpactIncreased accountability and potentially altered reportingMechanismMandates a more comprehensive calculation of reliability indices for grant consideration.ScaleNational
GroupCommunities experiencing frequent or long outagesImpactMore accurate representation of their grid's performanceMechanismIncluding all outages in metrics will better reflect actual service reliability.ScaleLocal to regional

Supporters argue

Supporters argue that this change provides a more accurate and transparent picture of grid reliability, ensuring that federal funding is allocated based on a true assessment of performance, including during significant events. This prevents utilities from masking underlying vulnerabilities by excluding major outage events from their reported statistics.

Critics contend

Some utilities or critics might argue that including Major Event Days in standard reliability metrics could unfairly penalize utilities for events largely outside their control, such as extreme weather. They might contend that these events require different types of resilience investments and should be evaluated separately to avoid distorting baseline performance metrics.

Tradeoffs

The provision balances the desire for comprehensive reliability data with concerns about attributing blame for events beyond a utility's direct control. It aims for greater transparency but could lead to higher reported outage numbers, potentially affecting public perception and utility ratings.

Section 2(2)(B), (3)(A)(vi), and (3)(B)(ii), amending 42 U.S.C. 18711(c)(4) and (d)(3)(B), (d)(5)

Prioritization of Lower Reliability Grids for Grants

prominently featuredstraightforward

This provision directs the Secretary of Energy, and subsequently States and Indian Tribes distributing funds, to give additional weight or consideration to grant applicants (eligible entities) that have demonstrated lower reliability over the previous five years. Lower reliability is indicated by higher scores on the SAIDI, SAIFI, or CAIDI indices, meaning more frequent or longer outages. This aims to channel federal funds towards areas most in need of grid improvements.

Section 2(4)(B), adding 42 U.S.C. 18711(e)(3)

Clarification on Grant Application Conditions

mentioned in summarystraightforward

This provision clarifies that the Secretary of Energy, States, or Indian Tribes cannot require grant applicants to address more than one type or category of grid hardening activities, technologies, or equipment in their applications. Furthermore, they cannot give preference to applications solely because they propose to address multiple types of activities. This aims to prevent bundling requirements that might disadvantage smaller entities or those with specific, targeted needs.

Section 2(5), amending 42 U.S.C. 18711(j)

Extension of Grid Resilience Program Authorization

prominently featuredstraightforward

This provision extends the authorization for appropriations for the electric grid resilience program by five years. Instead of being authorized for fiscal years 2022 through 2026, funds are now authorized for fiscal years 2027 through 2031, and are to remain available until expended. This ensures the continuation of federal funding for grid modernization and outage prevention efforts.

FOUND

The new definition of CAIDI, SAIDI, and SAIFI explicitly requires that 'all outages greater than 5 minutes, including on Major Event Days' be included in the calculation of these reliability indices.

Section 2(1)(B), amending 42 U.S.C. 18711(a)(1)

Why it matters:While definitions are standard legislative practice, the specific inclusion of 'Major Event Days' (MEDs) is a substantive policy choice that significantly alters how grid reliability is assessed for this program. It might be phrased technically to ensure precise legal interpretation.

Case for: Proponents argue that including MEDs provides a more honest and comprehensive assessment of grid performance, reflecting the actual experience of customers during significant events. This ensures that funding is directed based on a full picture of reliability challenges.

Case against: Some in the utility industry might argue that MEDs represent extraordinary circumstances that are difficult to mitigate entirely and that including them in standard metrics could unfairly skew reliability scores, making it harder for utilities to meet targets or appear reliable.

Estimated impact: This change will likely result in higher reported SAIDI, SAIFI, and CAIDI scores for many utilities, potentially making more entities eligible for or prioritized in the grant program.

FOUND

The bill strikes subparagraph (C) from subsection (e)(2) of the original act. Without the original text of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the specific content of the removed subparagraph (C) is unknown.

Section 2(4)(A), amending 42 U.S.C. 18711(e)(2)

Why it matters:Striking existing text is a common legislative technique. The reason for its removal would depend on the content of the original subparagraph (C), which is not provided in this bill text.

Case for: Without knowing the content of subparagraph (C), a general argument for striking it would be that it was either redundant, outdated, counterproductive to the program's goals, or superseded by other provisions in this or other legislation.

Case against: Conversely, if subparagraph (C) contained an important safeguard, a specific funding directive, or a critical program requirement, its removal could be seen as detrimental. Without the original text, it's impossible to make a specific case against its removal.

Estimated impact: The impact is unknown without the original text of the stricken subparagraph. It could range from negligible to significant depending on what was removed.

About this analysis. AI-Generated from the official bill text and available committee reports. Gaps in available data are noted explicitly. Verify important details with the official Congress.gov record.

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