Traveler Privacy Protection Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Sen. Merkley, Jeff [D-OR]
- Committees
- Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 8, 2025
Bottom line
The bill aims to enhance passenger privacy by severely limiting the TSA's ability to use facial recognition technology in airports, requiring explicit consent for its use, and mandating data minimization.
What it actually does
This bill significantly restricts the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) use of facial recognition technology in airports. It prohibits the collection, storage, or processing of biometric information from passengers through facial recognition, except under specific conditions. For Trusted Traveler Programs, it mandates an opt-out option, while for general passengers, it requires an opt-in mechanism with affirmative express consent, ensuring alternative identification methods are always available without discrimination. The bill also imposes strict data minimization rules, requires the disposal of previously collected data, and prohibits passive surveillance.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill is essential for protecting the privacy and civil liberties of travelers from pervasive government surveillance. They contend that biometric data is highly sensitive and its collection and storage by government agencies without explicit, informed consent poses significant risks of misuse, data breaches, and potential discrimination. Ensuring passengers have a clear choice to opt-out or opt-in upholds fundamental rights while still allowing for security measures.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that restricting facial recognition technology could undermine airport security and operational efficiency. They may contend that facial recognition offers a faster, more accurate method of identity verification, which can reduce wait times and enhance the ability to identify potential threats. Mandating opt-in or opt-out processes could complicate security procedures, increase administrative burdens on the TSA, and potentially lead to longer lines and a less streamlined travel experience.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions and implications within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(a), new 49 U.S.C. 44901(m)(2)(A)
General Prohibition on Biometric Data Collection
This provision establishes a broad prohibition against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) capturing, collecting, storing, or otherwise processing biometric information from passengers using facial recognition technology. This means that, by default, TSA cannot use facial recognition for general passenger screening, setting a high bar for its permissible use.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this general prohibition is crucial for safeguarding individual privacy and preventing potential government overreach in surveillance. It ensures that biometric data, which is highly personal, is not collected without explicit justification and consent.
Critics contend
Critics may contend that a blanket prohibition hinders the TSA's ability to leverage advanced technology for efficient and effective security screening, potentially leading to slower processes and reduced security capabilities.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the desire for enhanced passenger privacy against potential gains in security efficiency and speed that facial recognition technology might offer.
Section 2(a), new 49 U.S.C. 44901(m)(2)(C)
Opt-Out for Trusted Traveler Programs
For passengers enrolled in Trusted Traveler Programs (like Global Entry or PreCheck), the TSA may use facial recognition for identity verification at screening locations, but only if passengers are given clear notice and an explicit option to opt-out. Those who opt-out must receive identity verification using an approved identification document without biometric collection and must not be subjected to discriminatory treatment or less favorable screening conditions.
Section 2(a), new 49 U.S.C. 44901(m)(2)(D)
Opt-In for General Passengers
For passengers not enrolled in Trusted Traveler Programs, the TSA must perform identity verification using an approved identification document without collecting any biometric information. However, the TSA may use facial recognition if the passenger explicitly opts-in, providing 'affirmative express consent' prior to each use. Similar to the opt-out provision, those who do not opt-in must not face discriminatory treatment or less favorable screening.
Section 2(a), new 49 U.S.C. 44901(m)(3)
Data Minimization Requirements
This provision mandates strict data minimization practices for any biometric information collected. The TSA may only capture facial images directly relevant and necessary for identity verification. It prohibits sharing biometric information outside the Administration (with exceptions) and limits storage duration: 1:1 matching data only as long as necessary for verification, and 1:N identification data for no longer than 24 hours after scheduled flight departure. Images cannot be compared against anything other than the provided photo ID, except for Trusted Traveler Programs.
Section 2(a), new 49 U.S.C. 44901(m)(6)
Prohibition on Passive Surveillance
This provision explicitly prohibits the Administrator from using facial recognition technology or facial matching software to track or identify passengers outside of the screening location. It also forbids profiling, targeting, or discriminating against passengers for exercising their Constitutional rights, or enabling systemic, indiscriminate, or wide-scale monitoring, surveillance, or tracking.
Defines 'affirmative express consent' as an affirmative act by a passenger that clearly communicates authorization, is in response to a specific notice, and is not merely acceptance of general terms of service or entering a security checkpoint/line.
Section 2(a), new 49 U.S.C. 44901(m)(1)(E)
Why it matters:While definitions are standard legislative practice, the specificity of 'affirmative express consent' is vital to the bill's intent and could be overlooked, potentially leading to less stringent interpretations if not carefully noted.
Case for: Supporters argue this precise definition prevents TSA from claiming implied consent through actions like simply entering a security line, ensuring that consent is truly voluntary and informed, thereby strengthening privacy protections.
Case against: Some critics might argue that such a strict definition of consent could create operational hurdles, making it more difficult for TSA to implement facial recognition efficiently, even with passenger willingness.
Estimated impact: This definition directly impacts how TSA must implement its opt-in/opt-out systems, requiring clear, active choices from passengers rather than passive acceptance.
Requires the Administrator to dispose of any biometric information, including images and videos, collected or stored by the Administration prior to the date of enactment that would violate the new subsection, within 90 days of enactment.
Section 2(a), new 49 U.S.C. 44901(m)(5)
Why it matters:This is a critical retroactive cleanup measure, ensuring that past practices align with new privacy standards. Its placement is standard for such directives but its significance could be underestimated.
Case for: Proponents argue this is essential to prevent the grandfathering of potentially unlawfully or unconsented-to collected data, ensuring a clean slate and full compliance with the bill's privacy principles from day one.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against the disposal of data that would violate new privacy standards, as it aligns with good data governance practices.
Estimated impact: This provision mandates the deletion of an unknown quantity of previously collected biometric data, ensuring that historical data does not circumvent the new privacy protections.
Amends existing sections of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and title 49, United States Code, by inserting 'subject to the restrictions of section 44901(n) of title 49, United States Code,' after references to 'technologies' or 'biometrics'. (Note: The bill text incorrectly refers to 44901(n) instead of the newly added 44901(m).)
Section 2(b) and 2(c)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative drafting to ensure consistency across the U.S. Code. However, the incorrect subsection reference (n instead of m) is a drafting error that could cause confusion if not corrected.
Case for: Proponents argue these amendments are essential to ensure that the new privacy limitations on facial recognition apply comprehensively to all relevant existing authorities of the TSA, preventing loopholes.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against such technical conforming amendments, though the drafting error would need to be corrected.
Estimated impact: These amendments ensure the new privacy restrictions apply broadly across TSA's existing mandates related to technology and biometrics, reinforcing the bill's overall intent.