MAPS Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Peters, Gary C. [D-MI]
- Committees
- Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 19, 2026
Bottom line
This bill aims to enhance U.S. national security and public health by identifying vulnerabilities and increasing transparency in the supply chains of essential medicines, particularly those with foreign dependencies.
What it actually does
The bill mandates the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), in coordination with other agencies, to update and maintain an Essential Medicines List, conduct a comprehensive risk assessment of their supply chains, and establish a system to map these supply chains using data analytics. It also requires the Department of Defense (DoD) to report biannually on drugs purchased from China-sourced materials or manufacturing.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue the bill is crucial for national security and public health, addressing critical vulnerabilities exposed by past supply chain disruptions, especially for essential medicines. It would reduce reliance on foreign adversaries, enhance domestic manufacturing capabilities, and improve the government's ability to respond to future crises.
Opponents contend
Critics might raise concerns about the administrative burden and cost of implementing such extensive mapping and assessment requirements, potential for overreach into private industry data, or the risk of inadvertently disrupting existing supply chains without clear domestic alternatives.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2
Essential Medicines List Maintenance
This section requires the Secretary of HHS, in coordination with other federal agencies and stakeholders, to update and maintain a list of essential medicines. This list, initially based on Executive Order 13944, must include drugs for chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) threats, those at high risk of shortage, those critical for patients with chronic conditions, and those deemed critical for military preparedness by the Secretary of Defense. The list must be updated at least every two years and published.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a regularly updated, comprehensive list of essential medicines is foundational for national preparedness, allowing the government to strategically address vulnerabilities before they lead to critical shortages.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against the concept of an essential medicines list, though concerns might arise regarding the criteria for inclusion or the administrative burden of frequent updates.
Tradeoffs
Balancing the comprehensiveness of the list with the administrative burden of maintaining it, and ensuring criteria are broad enough to cover all critical needs without becoming unwieldy.
Section 3
Comprehensive Supply Chain Risk Assessment
This section requires the Secretary of HHS, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other agencies, to conduct an annual comprehensive risk assessment of the supply chains for all active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and drugs on the Essential Medicines List. The assessment must identify key starting materials, reliance on high-risk foreign suppliers (over 50% production), primary sourcing from foreign establishments, domestic manufacturing capabilities, public health and national security risks (including cybersecurity), and any federal deficiencies in addressing these risks. It also requires a plan to mitigate national security risks, potentially using Defense Production Act authorities. A report must be submitted to Congress annually, with a public version released within a year of enactment.
Section 4
Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Mapping and Data Analytics
This section directs the Secretary of HHS to coordinate efforts, including public-private partnerships, to map and visualize the entire supply chain for drugs on the Essential Medicines List, from key starting materials to finished dosage forms and distribution. It mandates the use of data analytics to identify national security threats within these supply chains. Requirements include describing agency roles, facilitating information exchange (e.g., location and production amounts of registered establishments, regulatory actions like inspections, recalls, and shortage reports), and submitting an annual report to Congress on mapping status, coordination, data gaps, use of predictive modeling, and industry engagement.
Section 5
DoD Reporting on China-Sourced Drugs
This section requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report every 180 days to specific congressional committees. The report must list all drugs purchased by the Department of Defense during the preceding 180-day period that contain key starting materials, excipients, or active pharmaceutical ingredients sourced from the People's Republic of China, or for which the finished drug product was manufactured in the People's Republic of China.
Requires the risk assessment to identify APIs and drugs relying on a 'high-risk foreign supplier or foreign entity of concern' for more than 50% of production, or sourced exclusively/primarily from foreign establishments.
Section 3(b)(2) and (3)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to avoid reprinting lengthy definitions, but it requires external lookup for full comprehension.
Case for: Supporters would argue this ensures consistency with existing federal definitions related to national security risks, streamlining legal interpretation.
Case against: Critics might argue that relying on external definitions can obscure the full implications of the bill for readers who do not have immediate access to the referenced statute.
Estimated impact: This definition significantly narrows or broadens the scope of entities considered 'high-risk,' directly impacting which supply chains are prioritized for assessment and mitigation.
Clarifies that information exchange among federal agencies for purposes of carrying out sections 3 and 4 is not a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1905 (disclosure of confidential information), but also states it doesn't affect the status of such information as trade secret or confidential commercial information for purposes of other statutes (21 U.S.C. 331(j), 5 U.S.C. 552, or 18 U.S.C. 1905).
Section 7(b)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to address potential legal conflicts and provide clarity on information sharing, but its technical nature makes it less prominent.
Case for: Proponents would argue this provision is essential to enable necessary inter-agency information sharing for national security purposes while attempting to protect proprietary business information from broader public disclosure.
Case against: Critics might contend that this provision creates ambiguity regarding the ultimate protection of sensitive commercial data, potentially deterring companies from full cooperation due to fear of inadvertent disclosure or future reinterpretation.
Estimated impact: Crucial for determining the willingness of private industry to share sensitive supply chain data with the government, directly impacting the effectiveness of the mapping and risk assessment efforts.