COUNTER Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]
- Committees
- Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 15, 2025
Bottom line
This bill significantly broadens and extends the legal framework for the DoD and Coast Guard to detect, track, and neutralize hostile drones, enhancing national security measures against evolving aerial threats.
What it actually does
The "COUNTER Act" amends section 130i of title 10, United States Code, to expand and clarify the Department of Defense's (DoD) and Coast Guard's authority to counter unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) threats, both domestically and internationally. It mandates the delegation of counter-UAS authority within the DoD, explicitly includes remote identification as a mitigation tool, allows for support to other federal agencies, and significantly extends the sunset date for these authorities. The bill also exempts certain information related to counter-UAS operations from public disclosure and broadens the definition of locations where these authorities can be exercised.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue the bill is crucial for national security, providing necessary tools to combat the growing threat of drones to military installations, critical infrastructure, and public safety. They emphasize the need for clear legal authority and flexibility for defense agencies to protect assets from incursions, especially given the rapid advancements in UAS technology and potential for malicious use. The bipartisan support underscores the perceived urgency and importance of these measures.
Opponents contend
Critics might raise concerns about the expansion of military authority within the United States, particularly the broad definition of "covered locations" which could lead to mission creep. They may also object to the exemption of information from public disclosure, arguing it could reduce transparency and accountability, making it harder for the public and oversight bodies to scrutinize the use of these powerful technologies and ensure civil liberties are protected.
The bill is concise, making it accessible for a quick read, but its implications for legal authority and national security warrant careful consideration beyond a superficial review.
Section 2(1)(C), amending 10 U.S.C. 130i(a)
Delegation of Counter-UAS Authority within DoD
This provision mandates that the Secretary of Defense delegate the authority to take actions against unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to the commander of a unified combatant command, the Secretary concerned (e.g., Secretary of the Army), or such other appropriate official of the Department of Defense. This aims to streamline the decision-making process for responding to UAS threats by empowering operational commanders.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that delegating this authority is essential for rapid response to evolving threats, allowing commanders on the ground to act decisively without needing direct Secretarial approval for every incident. This enhances operational efficiency and security.
Critics contend
Some might argue that broad delegation could lead to less centralized oversight, potentially increasing the risk of misapplication of force or unintended consequences, especially in sensitive areas.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the need for rapid operational response in dynamic threat environments with the desire for centralized control and accountability in the use of force.
Section 2(2), amending 10 U.S.C. 130i(b)(1)(B)
Explicit Inclusion of Remote Identification in Counter-UAS Mitigation
This amendment clarifies that the authority to mitigate UAS threats includes using "remote identification broadcast or other means." This explicitly allows for the use of technologies that identify drones remotely as part of threat mitigation strategies, providing a non-kinetic tool for threat assessment.
Section 2(3)(C), inserting new 10 U.S.C. 130i(e)(4)(C)
DoD/Coast Guard Support for Other Federal Agency Counter-UAS Efforts
This provision allows the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard to use their counter-UAS authority to support other federal agencies that also possess authority to mitigate UAS threats. This enables enhanced inter-agency cooperation and resource sharing in addressing drone incursions across various federal jurisdictions.
Section 2(5), inserting new 10 U.S.C. 130i(g)
Non-Disclosure of Counter-UAS Technology and Procedures
This provision exempts information pertaining to the technology, procedures, and protocols used to carry out counter-UAS operations under this section from disclosure. This includes exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3)) and any State or local public disclosure laws, aiming to protect sensitive operational details.
Section 2(8)(A)(ii), amending 10 U.S.C. 130i(k)(1)
Extension of Counter-UAS Authority Sunset Date
This provision extends the sunset date for the counter-UAS authority from December 31, 2026, to December 31, 2030. This allows the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard to continue exercising these critical operations for an additional four years without requiring immediate reauthorization.
Section 2(7), inserting new 10 U.S.C. 130i(i)
Exemption of Overseas Counter-UAS Activities from Certain Criminal Laws
This provision clarifies that specific criminal statutes (including sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of title 18, and section 46502 of title 49) do not apply to DoD or Coast Guard activities related to mitigating UAS threats conducted *outside the United States*. This ensures these agencies can operate without legal ambiguity when countering drones abroad.
Section 2(9)(D)(iii), adding new clauses (x) through (xiii) to 10 U.S.C. 130i(l)(4)
Broadening Protected Locations for Counter-UAS Operations
This provision significantly expands the definition of "covered location" where counter-UAS authority can be exercised. New categories include: DoD buildings and property not open to the public; areas where assistance is provided for incidents involving WMD or high-yield explosives; activities listed in 10 U.S.C. 2692(b); and emergency response limited to a specified timeframe and location. This increases the types of locations where counter-UAS authority can be employed.
This provision explicitly states that sections 32 (destruction of aircraft), 1030 (computer fraud and abuse), and 1367 (destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities) and chapters 119 (wire and electronic communications interception and interception of oral communications) and 206 (aircraft piracy) of title 18, and section 46502 (aircraft piracy) of title 49, do not apply to DoD or Coast Guard activities related to mitigating UAS threats conducted outside the United States.
Section 2(7), inserting new 10 U.S.C. 130i(i)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to reference specific code sections rather than re-stating their content. It is not intended to be evasive, but rather to be precise within the existing legal framework, requiring legal expertise to fully unpack.
Case for: Proponents argue this is essential for operational clarity and legal protection for military and Coast Guard personnel operating in complex international environments, where domestic U.S. criminal laws should not impede necessary defensive actions against drone threats. It provides a clear legal basis for their actions.
Case against: Critics might argue that such broad exemptions from criminal statutes, even when limited to overseas operations, could reduce accountability for actions taken by U.S. forces, potentially leading to unintended consequences or a perception of impunity for certain actions.
Estimated impact: This provision has a significant impact on the legal framework governing overseas counter-UAS operations, clarifying the scope of permissible actions for military and Coast Guard personnel and reducing their legal exposure under specific U.S. criminal laws.