A substantive refinement of the BOTS Act, v2 narrows the scope of certain prohibitions and requirements to 'online ticket issuers' and significantly alters enforcement provisions. It removes explicit civil penalty authorities and detailed security safeguard mandates, while adding limitations on how Commission guidance can be used in enforcement actions.
MAIN Event Ticketing Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]
- Committees
- Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 2, 2025
Bottom line
The bill strengthens consumer protections in online ticket sales by making it harder for bots to buy tickets and holding ticket issuers more accountable for site security and reporting.
What it actually does
This bill amends the Better Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act of 2016 to explicitly prohibit the use of automated applications to circumvent online ticket purchasing rules. It imposes new requirements on online ticket issuers to establish and maintain security measures, report incidents of circumvention to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and proactively address known security risks. The bill also enhances coordination between the FTC and other law enforcement agencies regarding cyberattacks on ticketing systems.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue the bill enhances the effectiveness of the BOTS Act by closing loopholes, holding online ticket issuers accountable for maintaining robust site security, and improving coordination among law enforcement agencies. This comprehensive approach is intended to protect consumers from predatory bot practices and ensure fairer access to event tickets for genuine fans.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that the new compliance requirements on online ticket issuers could impose significant operational and financial burdens, potentially leading to increased ticket prices or reduced service availability. Concerns could also be raised about the ambiguity of terms like 'reasonable steps' and 'reasonably foreseeable risks,' which might lead to subjective enforcement.
The bill is relatively short and its core provisions are clearly articulated, making it accessible for an informed reader to evaluate within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(a)(1)(C) of the bill, amending 15 U.S.C. 45c(a)(1)
Expanded Prohibition on Using Automated Applications to Circumvent Ticket Purchasing Rules
This provision expands the existing prohibition in the BOTS Act to explicitly ban the use of any automated application, including software, to purchase event tickets from an online ticket issuer's website or service by circumventing their access control systems, security measures, or technological controls designed to enforce purchasing rules.
Supporters argue
Supporters contend this clarifies and strengthens the original intent of the BOTS Act, making it more difficult for malicious actors to exploit ticketing systems and ensuring a more equitable ticket purchasing experience for genuine fans.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against strengthening anti-bot measures, though some might argue about the technical feasibility of enforcement without impacting legitimate users.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the desire for robust anti-bot measures with the technical challenges of distinguishing malicious bot activity from legitimate high-volume user traffic.
Section 2(a)(3) of the bill, inserting new subsection (b)(1) into 15 U.S.C. 45c
Requirement for Online Ticket Issuers to Enforce and Update Site Policies
This mandates that online ticket issuers establish, implement, and maintain access control systems, security measures, or other technological controls to enforce posted event ticket purchasing limits and maintain the integrity of their online purchasing rules. They must also regularly evaluate and adjust these systems in response to technological changes, threats, and business operations.
Section 2(a)(3) of the bill, inserting new subsection (b)(2) into 15 U.S.C. 45c
Mandatory Reporting of Circumvention Incidents and State Coordination
Online ticket issuers are required to report any known incidents of circumvention to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) within 30 days of discovery. The FTC is also mandated to share these reports and consumer complaints with State attorneys general to facilitate coordinated enforcement.
Section 2(a)(3) of the bill, inserting new subsection (b)(3) into 15 U.S.C. 45c
Requirement for Online Ticket Issuers to Address Known Circumvention Risks
This provision requires online ticket issuers to take reasonable steps to improve their access control systems, security measures, and other technological controls to address any known or reasonably foreseeable risks connected to incidents of circumvention.
Section 2(a)(4)(B) of the bill, inserting new subsection (c)(3) into 15 U.S.C. 45c
Clarification on the Legal Authority of FTC Guidance
This provision specifies that any guidance issued by the FTC regarding this Act does not confer rights, bind the Commission or any person, and cannot be the sole basis for an enforcement action unless the practices also violate a specific provision of the Act itself.
Section 2(a)(6) of the bill, inserting new subsection (e) into 15 U.S.C. 45c
Enhanced Law Enforcement Coordination on Cyberattacks
This provision mandates coordination between the FBI, Attorney General, and other relevant state/local law enforcement with the FTC to share information about known cyberattacks on online ticket issuer security measures. It defines 'cyberattack' and allows for exclusion of classified or sensitive information.
Defines 'circumvention' as the act of avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing an access control system, security measure, safeguard, or other technological control or measure described in section 2.
Section 2(b)(4) of the bill, amending Section 3 of the BOTS Act
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to consolidate definitions at the end of an act for clarity and conciseness in the main text.
Case for: Supporters argue a clear and comprehensive definition is essential for consistent enforcement of the anti-bot provisions and for regulated entities to understand precisely what actions are prohibited or what they must protect against.
Case against: Critics might argue that the broadness of 'otherwise impairing' could be subject to wide interpretation, potentially criminalizing actions not directly intended to be malicious or creating ambiguity for legitimate technical activities.
Estimated impact: This definition clarifies the scope of prohibited activities for bot operators and the duties of ticket issuers, impacting all parties involved in online ticket sales.
Defines 'online ticket issuer' as a ticket issuer that owns or operates an Internet website or online service that, in the regular course of trade or business of the issuer, facilitates or executes the sale of event tickets to the general public.
Section 2(b)(5) of the bill, amending Section 3 of the BOTS Act
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to consolidate definitions, ensuring that the scope of regulated entities is clearly defined without cluttering the main text of the bill.
Case for: Supporters argue this definition clearly delineates which entities are subject to the new requirements, ensuring that the bill targets primary ticket sellers and major platforms that directly engage with the general public.
Case against: Some might argue the definition could be too narrow, potentially excluding certain secondary market platforms or other entities that facilitate ticket sales but might not be considered 'issuers' in the primary sense, potentially creating loopholes for some actors in the ticketing ecosystem.
Estimated impact: This definition determines the scope of entities subject to the new regulatory burdens, reporting requirements, and enforcement actions, significantly shaping the bill's practical reach.