A substantive modification. v3 updates the short title from "Secure Space Act of 2025" to "Secure Space Act of 2026" and, more significantly, refines the criteria for prohibited entities in Section 2(b)(1) to specifically reference the FCC's "Covered List" rather than a general description of providing covered communications equipment or service. Additionally, v3 introduces a new subsection, Section 2(c), authorizing the FCC to report on supply chain security risks.
Secure Space Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. Fischer, Deb [R-NE]
- Committees
- Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 24, 2026
Bottom line
This bill tightens national security restrictions on the U.S. satellite communications sector by barring entities identified as national security threats, or their affiliates, from holding or controlling satellite system licenses or earth station authorizations.
What it actually does
This bill amends the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 to prohibit the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from granting licenses or market access for geostationary (GEO) or nongeostationary (NGSO) orbit satellite systems, or earth station authorizations, if the applicant is an entity identified on the FCC's 'Covered List' (of national security threats) or an affiliate of such an entity. It also grants the FCC discretionary authority to assess supply chain security risks from equipment manufactured by Covered List entities.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue this bill is crucial for safeguarding U.S. national security and critical infrastructure by preventing hostile foreign entities from gaining access to or control over vital space-based communication networks and ground infrastructure. They emphasize the growing reliance on satellite systems for both civilian and military applications, making it imperative to secure the supply chain and operational control from known threats.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that such broad prohibitions could stifle innovation, limit competition in the satellite industry, and potentially lead to retaliatory measures from other nations. They might also raise concerns about the definition of 'affiliate' being too broad, potentially impacting legitimate businesses with minor foreign ownership or investment, or that the existing 'Covered List' process is sufficient without additional blanket prohibitions.
The bill is concise and its core intent is clear, making it accessible for a quick review by interested parties.
Section 2(a)(1)
Redesignation of Existing Sections
This provision renumbers sections 10 and 11 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 to sections 11 and 12, respectively. This is a technical amendment to make space for the new section 10 being added by this bill.
Supporters argue
Proponents would argue this is a necessary technical adjustment to integrate the new prohibitions seamlessly into existing law, ensuring clarity and avoiding conflicts in statutory numbering.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against purely technical, non-substantive renumbering provisions.
Tradeoffs
None, purely technical.
Section 10(a) (as added by Section 2(a)(2))
Definitions for Satellite and Earth Station Terms
This section defines key terms used in the new prohibition, including 'affiliate' (an entity with 10% or more ownership/control), 'blanket-licensed earth station' (licensed with a satellite system), 'gateway station' (earth station supporting routing/switching, not originating/terminating traffic), and 'individually licensed earth station' (other earth stations or gateway stations). These definitions clarify the scope of entities and infrastructure covered by the prohibition.
Section 10(b) (as added by Section 2(a)(2))
Prohibition on Grant of Certain Satellite Licenses, United States Market Access, or Earth Station Authorizations
This is the core operative provision. It prohibits the FCC from granting a license for a geostationary (GEO) or nongeostationary (NGSO) orbit satellite system, or market access for such systems, or authorization for individually licensed or blanket-licensed earth stations, if the applicant is an entity on the FCC's 'Covered List' (of national security threats) or an affiliate of such an entity.
Section 10(c) (as added by Section 2(a)(2))
Further Consideration for Secured Networks (Supply Chain Risk Assessment)
This provision grants the FCC the discretion to issue a report assessing supply chain security risks associated with any licensee or entity that uses communications equipment designed, developed, manufactured, or assembled by an entity on the 'Covered List.' This applies even if the licensee itself is not on the Covered List, allowing for a broader review of equipment origins.
Section 2(b)
Applicability
This section specifies that the new prohibitions and provisions added by this Act will apply to any license, petition, or authorization granted by the FCC on or after the date the Act is enacted into law. This clarifies that the law is not retroactive for existing licenses.
Section 2(c)
Rulemaking Requirement
This provision mandates that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must issue rules to implement the new Section 10 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 within one year of the Act's enactment date. This ensures the FCC develops the necessary regulatory framework to put the statutory prohibitions into practice.
Defines 'own' for the purpose of determining an 'affiliate' as having, possessing, or otherwise controlling an equity interest of not less than 10 percent.
Section 10(a)(1)(B)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to define terms precisely in a dedicated section. However, the specific threshold has significant policy implications.
Case for: Supporters argue that a 10% threshold is a reasonable and practical standard to identify potential influence or control, even if not outright majority ownership, by entities deemed national security risks. It aims to prevent indirect circumvention of the main prohibition.
Case against: Critics might argue that a 10% threshold is too low and could ensnare legitimate minority investments or passive holdings, creating an overly broad net that discourages foreign capital in the U.S. space sector without a clear national security justification for every instance.
Estimated impact: Could significantly impact investment structures and corporate governance for any entity seeking satellite or earth station licenses if they have foreign investors from countries associated with Covered List entities.
States that the Commission may issue a report assessing supply chain security risks associated with equipment from Covered List entities, even if the licensee itself is not on the list.
Section 10(c)(1)
Why it matters:Often used to grant agencies flexibility without imposing a strict mandate. Could be seen as a compromise to gain broader support.
Case for: Proponents argue that granting the FCC discretion allows the agency to prioritize resources and focus on the most critical supply chain risks as they emerge, rather than being burdened by a mandatory reporting requirement that might not always be necessary.
Case against: Critics might argue that making this reporting discretionary weakens the bill's overall supply chain security posture, as the FCC might choose not to act on potential risks, leaving a significant vulnerability unaddressed. They might prefer a 'shall' mandate.
Estimated impact: The actual impact is uncertain, ranging from significant (if the FCC actively uses this authority) to negligible (if it does not).