v2 significantly expands the scope of individuals protected under the bill by adding "designated Senate employees," "designated House employees," and "former Members of Congress" to the definition of "at-risk individual." It also introduces new definitions for these roles and clarifies exceptions for publicly available election-related information and data broker activities. These changes broaden the bill's protective reach and refine its application.
A bill to improve the safety and security of Members of Congress, immediate family members of Members of Congress, and congressional staff.
- Sponsor
- Sen. Klobuchar, Amy [D-MN]
- Committees
- Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Oct 10, 2025
Bottom line
The bill aims to enhance the personal safety and privacy of congressional members and their families by restricting the public disclosure and commercial trade of their sensitive personal information.
What it actually does
This bill establishes protections for sensitive personal information of Members of Congress, their immediate family members, and designated congressional staff. It prohibits government agencies from publicly posting this 'covered information' and mandates its removal upon request. Furthermore, it makes it unlawful for data brokers to knowingly sell or trade this information and for other businesses to publicly post it online after receiving a written request not to disclose.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue this bill is crucial for protecting the safety and security of Members of Congress and their families, who face increasing threats and harassment. By limiting the public availability of sensitive personal data, it reduces the risk of doxing, stalking, and other forms of harm, allowing them to perform their public duties without undue fear for their personal lives.
Opponents contend
Critics might contend that while the intent is valid, such measures could reduce transparency and public accountability for elected officials. They might argue that some information, even if personal, could be relevant to public oversight, and broad protections could inadvertently shield misconduct or make it harder for the public to access information about their representatives.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 1(a)
Defining Protected Individuals and Data
This section precisely defines who is protected by the bill ('at-risk individuals'), including Members of Congress, their immediate family members (spouse, parent, sibling, child, in loco parentis, household members), designated Senate employees, designated House employees, and former Members of Congress. It also specifies what types of personal data ('covered information') are protected, such as home addresses, personal phone numbers, email addresses, social security numbers, bank details, vehicle identifiers, and information about children under 18, including school attendance and routes.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that clear definitions are essential to ensure the protections are applied consistently and effectively to those most vulnerable to threats due to their public service.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against definitional sections, though some might argue the scope of 'at-risk individual' or 'covered information' is too broad or too narrow.
Tradeoffs
Balances the need for clear scope with potential for over- or under-inclusion.
Section 1(b)
Government Agency Data Protection Mandate
This provision allows at-risk individuals (or their agents) to file notice with Government agencies to mark their covered information (and that of their immediate family) as private. Upon such a request, Government agencies are prohibited from publicly posting or displaying this information and must remove it from publicly available content within 72 hours. Exceptions exist for court orders, signed releases, or entities subject to specific financial privacy laws (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) or confidentiality agreements.
Section 1(c)
Centralized Request Mechanism
This section allows at-risk individuals to make privacy requests directly or through a designated agent. Crucially, it authorizes the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper of the Senate (for Senate members/staff) and the Sergeant at Arms and Chief Administrative Officer of the House (for House members/staff) to make these requests on behalf of at-risk individuals. These legislative officers can also provide a consolidated list of protected individuals and their family members to government agencies, data brokers, and other businesses, streamlining the process.
Section 1(d)
Private Sector Data Protection Mandates
This provision makes it unlawful for data brokers to knowingly sell, license, trade, or purchase covered information of an at-risk individual. For other persons, businesses, or associations, it prohibits them from publicly posting or displaying covered information on the internet if a written request not to disclose has been made. Upon receiving such a request, they must remove the information within 72 hours and ensure it is not made available on their websites. They are also generally prohibited from transferring this information. Exceptions include information relevant to news/commentary on public concern, information voluntarily published by the at-risk individual after enactment, or information lawfully received from a Federal Government source.
Section 1(e) and 1(f)
Enforcement and Interpretive Guidelines
Section 1(e) grants at-risk individuals the right to bring an action in court seeking injunctive or declaratory relief if their covered information is made public in violation of the section. Section 1(f) provides rules of construction, clarifying that the bill does not prohibit lawful investigation or reporting by the press on unlawful activity or matters of public concern, impair access to public functions of Members, limit publication with consent, or prohibit information sharing with government entities. It also states that the section should be broadly construed to favor the protection of covered information.
Defines 'data broker' with specific exclusions for various entities like news organizations, financial institutions, and healthcare providers, thereby limiting who is subject to the bill's prohibitions.
Section 1(a)(6)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to precisely define terms and prevent overreach into existing regulatory frameworks or unintended consequences for legitimate businesses.
Case for: Ensures the bill targets entities primarily engaged in selling personal data while avoiding unintended burdens on legitimate businesses with incidental data handling, such as news organizations or financial institutions already subject to other privacy regulations.
Case against: Some might argue that the exclusions are too broad, potentially allowing some entities to continue practices that could compromise at-risk individuals' data under the guise of an exclusion, thus creating loopholes.
Estimated impact: Narrows the scope of the data broker prohibition, affecting a specific segment of the data industry while exempting others.
Exempts news reporting, commentary, voluntarily published information by the at-risk individual, and information lawfully received from federal government sources from the prohibition on public posting and transfer by 'other businesses.'
Section 1(d)(1)(B)(ii) and 1(d)(2)(B)(ii)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to include carve-outs that address constitutional concerns (e.g., First Amendment) and practical realities of information dissemination.
Case for: Essential for protecting freedom of the press and public discourse, ensuring that legitimate reporting on public officials and matters of public concern is not inadvertently criminalized or stifled by privacy protections.
Case against: Some might argue that these exceptions could be exploited to justify the public dissemination of sensitive personal information under a broad interpretation of 'matter of public concern,' potentially undermining the bill's security goals.
Estimated impact: Preserves journalistic freedom and public access to information while still aiming to protect against malicious doxing and harassment.